Movements around great power competition led by the US and the People's Republic of China will determine the international security architecture for decades to come. Of all the regions in which both contenders stake their leadership, perhaps the most important is the Indo-Pacific. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, if consolidated, could give the US a position of advantage that Beijing intends to avoid at all costs.
Sara Alvarez Quintans
As a strategic partnership initiative, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or simply “the Quad,” was born under the protection of the United States and Japan with the aim of counteracting the growing Chinese influence in the Western Pacific. By building a network of regional alliances, which included India and Australia, the aim was to promote military cooperation between these countries.
However, the initiative suffered numerous ups and downs throughout its short but intense history. Finally, after the withdrawal of Australia and India, it seemed that the future of the Quadrilateral had its days numbered. There was little, if any, talk about this idea.
In recent times, however, China's increasingly frequent actions in the regional context of the Indo-Pacific and the growing instability in the region have caused security perceptions on the part of the former members to be redefined. Now, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue could find a favorable scenario to move forward, unlike what happened in the past.
What is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue?
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is launched as a strategic partnership proposal (strategic partnership), very different from the mechanisms of more traditional alliances. In the strategic partnership, the parties are not strictly allies, but it is assumed that they share a vision on a specific challenge, and to face it they put their own resources at the disposal of the other members of said association.
This is part of the new trends in security and alliances, which some authors call coalitions of the willing. These new formulas, which could be called “informal”, allow considerable flexibility in shaping the association. From choosing in which fields you want to collaborate, to the degrees to which you intend to do so, without ruling out changes in the perceptions and involvement of the parties.
The most obvious advantages that this system offers are speed and usefulness. The marked dynamism of the interactions between the parties involved allows specific groups to be created to deal with specific problems for which a course of action has been previously agreed upon. This process eliminates certain obstacles that could delay, or even reject, the action. It is, therefore, a system based on obtaining results through immediate dynamic interactions.
The second Quadrilateral (Quad II) incorporates the definitional enigma into the nature of the association itself. If at his birth he had already responded to somewhat lax terms, as has been explained, his reappearance does not seem to imply, for the moment, greater concretion to his defining lines. On the contrary, it remains to be seen whether the initiative takes the form of an informal coalition whose main objective would be to fight against Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region, or whether, on the other hand, it remains a highly flexible and adaptive formula. , which would allow it to respond to different objectives. Euan Graham[1], from the Lowy Institute in Australia, argues that the latter is a tactic that allows the weight of the issue to be delegated to Beijing instead of the members of the Quad themselves: depending on the intensity of China's actions, the initiative could function more like a diplomatic instrument of deterrence, as the situation required.
However, this ambiguity can also work against the Quadrilateral. To begin with, the lack of definition can create errors of perception, both for the members of the Quadrilateral themselves and for third parties, whether or not they oppose the initiative. In a scenario of security dilemma, as the current competition with China appears to be, perceptions are the key element. Furthermore, not only Beijing, but other governments and public opinions, both national and regional, could misinterpret (for better or worse) the true nature of the Quad and what it aims to achieve. Concretion, without constraining the dynamism that the strategic association formula allows, seems to be emerging as the best alternative.
Origins and chronology
In order to better understand the reason for the Quadrilateral initiative, it will be necessary to take a brief tour of its history. In this way, the positions of the different countries involved and their interests can be put on stage without falling into simplifications.
It has already been established that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue consists of an informal alliance that responds to the strategic partnership formula. Among other things, this implies that the level of commitment of its members is relatively flexible. To a certain extent, this was one of the characteristics that led to its dismantling.
But, like many other things, it didn't start out that way. Its origins, in its most tentative stage, date back to joint operations in the context of the tsunami that devastated the coasts of the Indian Ocean in December 2004. During the rescue operations, Australia, Japan, India and the United States formed the core group of the coordinated response to this natural disaster. The success of the humanitarian aid operations and the great compatibility that these four countries demonstrated during their development were the basis on which, in 2007, the concept of the first Quadrilateral Security Dialogue would be built.
Indeed, it was three years later when Shinzô Abe, then Japanese Prime Minister, announced the formation of a dialogue mechanism between those same four countries. At the meeting that took place in Manila, Philippines, during the ASEAN Regional Forum, the first informal conversations of the four participants took place. However, India and Australia later denied that these talks had been about security in the region. Here, concern about perceptions on the part of China was noted again.
However, the initiative continued its development. In September of the same year, the well-known Malabar Exercises were held, the second of that season (Malabar 07-02), joint military exercises between the United States and India. However, on that occasion Japan (which had already participated previously), Australia and Singapore were included.[2]. In this way, the five countries carried out a series of military exercises in the Bay of Bengal, which included, among others, personnel exchanges, maritime control drills and transport operations.[3]. Despite the success of the maneuvers, Abe's resignation and the pressure exerted by the Chinese government led, shortly after, to the dismantling of the initiative. Australia's withdrawal in 2008 was the definitive milestone that ended the first life of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
We would have to wait until 2017 to witness the revival of the Quadrilateral. Informally called the “Quadrilateral 2.0” or “Quadrilateral vol. 2”, the initiative has returned to the regional strategic landscape after almost a decade of growing instability and competition between the different powers present in the Indo-Pacific. Although no effort related to the Dialogue was carried out during the years it was inactive, important work was done to strengthen the bilateral ties that had previously been one of its main weaknesses. In this sense, it can be stated that the members of the Quadrilateral are at a point of greater strategic convergence than in the past, which could facilitate better functioning and, perhaps in the long term, the consolidation of the initiative.
In 2017, numerous events took place that paved the way for a new and more dynamic Quadrilateral. Perhaps one of the most relevant was the civil nuclear cooperation agreement between Japan and India in June, which will allow the export of nuclear material and technology for exploitation for non-military purposes.[4]. This was a first step towards the normalization of bilateral relations, since the nuclear capabilities of the Indian government constitute an important factor in its foreign policy.
Without a doubt, 2017 was a key year for the reactivation of the Quadrilateral. In September, the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to India aimed to align Japan's “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy with the Act East Policy India, deepen the bilateral defense relationship and, more generally, develop a stronger bond between both countries[5]. In November, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tarô Kôno (current Minister of Defense) once again focused attention on the Quadrilateral Dialogue during an interview, highlighting the need to revive this initiative[6]. And, reminiscent of 2007, the four involved met again in Manila to discuss issues concerning the security of the region[7]. From this moment on, talks at the ministerial level under the 2+2 formula[8] resumed and continue on a more or less regular basis[9].
Why did it fail in the past?
This is, perhaps, the most relevant question that must be asked to know what can be expected in the future of the Quadrilateral. What was it that caused the initiative to be abandoned? Have the traits and tendencies that caused her to fail been corrected? Will something similar happen again in the coming years?
One of the main points of divergence among the members of the initiative was the perception of the threat that China represented to their interests. The United States was the main interested party in defending its presence in the region, which the Beijing government wanted to reduce at all costs, calling it interventionist. The Nine-Dashed Line in the South Sea and the Pearl Necklace in the Indian Ocean strategies are designed to ensure China's presence beyond its territorial waters, and thus be able to protect its commercial and energy interests in a very wide region. However, the construction of infrastructure (commercial ports, military bases...) associated with these strategies puts at risk free access to the important trade routes that connect the Gulf of Aden with East Asia; at least, from the American perspective.
Japan, for its part, knew how to take advantage of the growing regional insecurity to carve out a role as a promoter of international order based on respect for international regulations and status quo. For decades, the particular situation of its armed forces has meant that its security depends, to a large extent, on both the performance of its allies and the stability of its environment. From the point of view of Japanese national politics, growing uncertainty was the right environment to promote constitutional reform and have its own army. In the international context, he positioned himself in defense of liberal values.
Although Washington and Tokyo were, as already explained, the main supporters of the Quadrilateral initiative, the other two parts of the equation were much less committed to its future.
At the time of the initial talks on the Quadrilateral Dialogue, India had a very different foreign policy position than today. The problematic relationship with Pakistan constituted one of the most eminent issues of foreign policy. On the other hand, the pressing social problems that characterize the country and local contingencies meant that the government's gaze was directed, above all, towards the interior of its borders. It was not until more recently that the doctrine of positive unilateralism began to take hold in Indian strategic thinking. This doctrine refers to the idea that India will not be able to defend its position as an international power without first stabilizing its environment., that is, improve the relationship with its neighbors, which includes (but is not limited to) Pakistan.
However, before India began to effectively implement this change in stance, its approach to the Quad initiative was very tentative. In fact, after the summit that took place in August 2007 within the ASEAN Regional Forum (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), during which parallel talks took place between the United States, India, Japan and Australia, both the Indian and Australian representatives denied that issues related to security and common positions on the matter had been discussed. In this episode, as in other similar ones, the great concern caused by altering China's perceptions about the intentions of a possible military collaboration was expressed.
Finally, the event that most directly led to the dismantling of the initiative was Australia's withdrawal. In 2008, with the arrival of Kevin Rudd to the position of Australian Prime Minister, the country's official withdrawal from all negotiations related to the Quadrilateral was announced. This in turn caused India's subsequent withdrawal, making the initiative virtually null and void. There was strong speculation about alleged Chinese pressure on the new government to withdraw from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, but whether this took place or not, Australia's international credibility was affected. Specifically, the bureaucratic apparatus in New Delhi seems to continue, to this day, to be suspicious of the true level of commitment on the part of Australia[10].
Equating the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to a containment exercise against China would not only be a terminological simplification, but would also misinterpret both the international context and the capabilities of the actors involved. Containment is, quite simply, a non-viable option.[11]. The main reasoning behind this statement is based on the fact that the measures necessary to carry out effective containment are manifestly costly (not to mention the implicit risk they entail) and do not correspond to the initiatives that have been tried to be implemented in the Quadrilateral framework. If this idea were licentiously compared to the Soviet containment carried out by the United States in the context of the Cold War, it could be observed that this parallelism does not correspond to the reality of what is happening today. The international context is not the same as in the era of superpower hegemony.
In fact, the predominance of the military element was one of the reasons that Australia gave to show its suspicion about the nature of the association. Among the critics of the initiative, there are also voices that argue that an exclusively military approach is not the best alternative to face the numerous regional challenges. Even among the defenders of the Quadrilateral there are those who recognize these criticisms and argue in favor of the position that this association should take the form of a forum, in which economic and cultural initiatives predominate, beyond a merely geostrategic and security framework.
Since it was first outlined, the possible construction of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as an international institution has gone through different stages of evolution, each with different levels of commitment. As a whole, the process has been characterized by ups and downs and inconsistencies, marked by the variable involvement of governments that discarded or reintroduced the issue on their agendas depending on whether it benefited their own agenda. This has been, without ruling out others, one of the main impediments to the Quadrilateral being able to really take shape, and perhaps define its objectives more specifically in order to design adequate structures to carry them out.
How it fits in the context of the Indo-Pacific
The strategic concept of the Indo-Pacific is undoubtedly linked to the conception of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. That is why, sometimes, they can become confused[12], although in reality they are ideas of a very diverse nature and well differentiated. Expanding the game board to accommodate new players, such as India, is part of a grand regional architecture strategy.
In this context, the members of the initiative propose a whole series of principles of conduct linked to this new conception of the Indo-Pacific as a reference concept. These principles include freedom of navigation and flight, respect for the international regulatory system and the rule of law, and recourse to the peaceful settlement of disputes. In addition, they highlight certain matters in which the Quadrilateral parties have special interest in cooperating, such as counterterrorism initiatives, the problem of nuclear proliferation, and improving connectivity at the regional level.
As a strategic concept, the Indo-Pacific is an eminently maritime idea. In fact, the term “Indo” refers to the Indian Ocean, and not India, a common misinterpretation. In this way, the Indian and Pacific oceans are united in a single competition board, which enables the emergence of new international actors and dynamics, integrating very different interests. Thus, Japan seeks the support of other regional actors that have sufficient capacity to achieve the proposed objectives, which are embodied in the idea of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”
In this new strategic scenario, India is seen as one of the main actors. The position of this country in the regional panorama and its national interests regarding this issue will be analyzed later and in greater detail. For now, however, it can be said that Narendra Modi's government seeks to promote a whole series of initiatives (related to security, but also beyond this field) aimed at claiming a position of greater relevance for his country in the international context. .
India is emerging as the main power with sufficient maritime capacity to counter Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. China's String of Pearls strategy, which until a few years ago largely did not clash with the objectives of India's limited foreign policy, is increasingly being interpreted from the perspective of strategic competition. For example, the significant investment in infrastructure that China has allocated to the Gwadar port in Pakistan is especially worrying for New Delhi.
One of the most defining characteristics of the Indo-Pacific as a region is its undoubted link to international economic flows. From the Gulf of Aden to Japan, these waters are the passageway for major ocean highways (sea lanes) that move the largest percentage of maritime trade in the world. These great oceanic trade routes constitute a strategic factor of great importance, since they transport, among countless merchandise, tons of hydrocarbons that are distributed throughout Asia. If we take into account that countries such as China, South Korea, Taiwan or Japan are very large importers of energy resources, the relevance of these commercial networks is established. The ability to have free access to these resources is a necessary requirement for the respective national security of the countries in the region.
Southeast Asia is an eminently insular area. The complex geography of this area causes bottlenecks to form[13] natural disasters that make navigation and commercial flows difficult. This has given rise to what has come to be called the “Malacca dilemma.”[14]. A hypothetical blockade of these strategic points by the armed forces of a competing country could put the economy of one of the aforementioned governments in check by playing the card of energy dependence. The straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok are the most traveled, which would mark them as the most likely targets in this imaginary case. The entire area between Darwin (Australia) and Singapore constitutes a major commercial bottleneck in which congestion points proliferate.
Apart from the geostrategic approach, we must also take into account other types of risks that these points present, such as the proliferation of piracy and the presence of transnational criminal organizations that carry out activities such as human trafficking, weapons or narcotics. Any of these acts constitutes a severe threat to the national security and interests of the affected countries. For example, illegal fishing alone constitutes a major risk to an economy like that of Indonesia and other small island states; not to mention its potential link to other types of illicit activities[15]. Cooperation between interested parties to end this type of behavior and guarantee security in these waters beyond large power pacts is not only necessary, but could be articulated as one of the pillars of the construction of institutions at the regional level. . An effort that would interest small and medium-sized players in order to integrate into more ambitious initiatives, but that would take into account their interests and needs.
Analysis of the positions of the different countries
As previously noted, for the initiative to move forward, it is necessary that the perceptions and interests of the members align appropriately. However, the question of the true nature of these interests has not been resolved. It is still imperative to work on this point beyond a simple code of shared values, even though this is the central element of unity in a relatively “early” stage, in which lack of definition does not give rise to more forceful commitments. Taking this into account, it is also necessary to talk about whether these aspirations and interests really coincide or not. In previous pages it has already been discussed that this lack of alignment was one of the errors that led to the dismantling of the Quad in 2008. Therefore, the pertinent question is: what has changed in this regard?
China is the central element of the perceptions of instability among the members of the Quad, but it is also the central element of their different approaches to the issue. Not only Australia, as has already been seen, has difficulties when it comes to combining its relationship with Beijing and its security interests. Japan, without going any further, was involved in a period of rapprochement with the Chinese government after the dismantling of the Quadrilateral Dialogue.[16]. However, this line of action seems to have not been satisfactory for the Japanese government.
It seems that Quadrilateral 2.0 will be motivated by the regional ambitions of India and Japan, which seek to increase their influence while defending the status quo. Australia, for its part, will seek to diversify and deepen its alliances with other powers in the region, beyond China and traditional alliances with the United States, a country that is considered unstable due to the leadership of President Donald Trump.[17].
Japan
To understand the dynamics of the issue, analyzing the individual positions of the countries involved in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is essential.
Japan has always been the main supporter of the Quadrilateral initiative. This is due, in part, to the negative perceptions that the country has about the safety of its environment. Not only China's assertiveness in the regional maritime arena, but also the unpredictability of North Korea as a revisionist actor on the margins of the international community.
For Tokyo, the Quad represents a unique opportunity for many reasons. Firstly, it would be an appropriate tool to establish some competition in the face of the Chinese presence in the South Sea and the rest of the Western Pacific. Of particular concern is the situation regarding the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu in Chinese), which has been disputed for several decades, and the territorial incursions into the waters of the Okinawa prefecture, in the East Sea. The most striking measure taken regarding these “gray zone situations”[18] has been the constitution of a defensive chain of islands, known as the “southwest wall”, in which it is intended to install two defense systems to defend Japanese territory from a possible incursion.
The Self-Defense Forces (FAD), which in some ways replace regular armed forces, have undergone great changes in the last decade. The development of maritime and amphibious capabilities has been one of the defense ministry's top priorities, designed, no doubt, to counter the increasingly frequent “gray zone situations” present in the Japanese security environment.
However, in the broader regional environment, Japan cannot use its own means to counter Beijing, since the country's own constitution renounces war and having its own army. This provision is included in the controversial article 9, the main objective of the revisionist currents in Japan.
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