Australia's announcement that it will acquire at least 8 nuclear-powered attack submarines has been a notable surprise, especially since it was accompanied by another announcement of even more profound consequences: the formation of AUKUS between the US, the United Kingdom and Australia itself.
It is true that for years in specialized defense circles it had been considered that Australia needed nuclear attack submarines. Already in 2009, the Australian cabinet then in power ruled that the nuclear option was excluded to replace the Collins-class diesel-electric submarines of national design (very problematic and of low operability). In various studies on the future of Australian submarine weapons, like this one from ASPI of 2012 titled “Mind the gap. Getting serious about submarines”, Three options were explored, one of them being to have nuclear-powered submarines of the Virginia type, although there were doubts that even the Americans would be willing to transfer that technology.
According to the Financial Times, it was the Australians who asked the Americans for technology to have nuclear attack submarines. This led to the creation of AUKUS, a military technology sharing partnership (not some kind of new defensive pact). According to the british government statementWith AUKUS, joint capabilities development and technology sharing will be enhanced, ensuring our people remain safe from harm and reinforcing our shared objectives. “AUKUS will foster deeper integration of science, technology, industrial bases and supply chains related to security and defence.”
The desire of the Australian government to have nuclear attack submarines reveals to us the great strategy that Australia has finally adopted to face the Chinese challenge, a great strategy that largely breaks with traditional conceptions about defense, the type of alliances and the structure of strength of the Australian armed forces.
The advantages of nuclear attack submarines
A priori, having large displacement nuclear attack submarines (SSN) is always much better than diesel-electric submarines (SSK), so it might seem that the Australian government simply wants to have the best type of underwater weapon possible. However, the issue has a much higher strategic significance that reveals the type of relations that Australia will have with China and the US.
As seen in the map below, nuclear attack submarines have the advantage of being able to operate for many more days than their conventionally powered counterparts.
Furthermore, nuclear submarines can navigate submerged at much higher speeds than conventional ones (20 knots versus 6,5 knots according to the map legend, although it depends on each nuclear and conventional submarine). Those with conventional propulsion must partially emerge periodically with the snorkel to recharge the batteries with the diesel engines, while the nuclear ones can navigate indefinitely completely submerged. The only limitation is the amount of food on board. In any case, since the space for the nuclear reactor and its fuel is much smaller than that necessary to house the electric generators, diesel engines and batteries of conventional submarines and its displacement is usually significantly greater, with few exceptions, Nuclear submarines have much more space for food.
The issue of space is not trivial. Compared to conventional submarines, nuclear submarines also have a greater capacity when it comes to transporting torpedoes, missiles and also much larger and more capable sensors, including a larger active sonar in their bow, which increases the effective range and sensitivity to returning sounds. Much longer submarines also allow much larger passive sonars to be deployed throughout the ship. Passive sonars are vitally important in modern submarine warfare, especially for detecting and hunting other submarines.
Returning to the armament, the large size of the SSN Virginia Block V allows space for 12 VLS with Tomahawk missiles from the previous blocks, adding the VPM for 28 additional Tomahawk missiles (or a smaller number of ballistic missiles), in addition to space for 65 torpedoes or Harpoon missiles. The large Attack-class conventional submarines that Australia was going to acquire they only had room for 28 torpedoes; The Collins class only deployed 22 torpedoes; The French Scorpene 18 torpedoes.
the submarines hunter killer They are attack submarines designed to be able to passively detect other attack submarines while being capable of moving at speeds as high as 10 knots (the specific speed of each submarine). hunter killer it varies). In general, when a submarine reaches a certain speed in its progress, it reaches a point where the internal noise does not allow its passive sonars to detect other submarines, so it must slow down greatly or stop. This is a tactical servitude regarding a hunter killer, which can advance at 10 knots while being able to detect enemy submarines, being able to maneuver without going “deaf” as would happen to an attack submarine not optimized to hunt other submarines.
Since the last years of the Cold War, submarines have become so silent that detection by passive means has become progressively more difficult, hence a submarine with large active sonars has a great advantage over those that have sonars. with smaller receivers. Besides, the deployment of drones with their own active sonars, offers the tactical advantage of being able to explore the presence of other submarines without the SSN giving itself away.
Having said all the above, and understanding the advantages that having nuclear submarines will bring to the country, the fact that Australia requested help to build nuclear submarines that can operate for many days in distant areas of operations, indicates Australia's intention to abandon a strategic posture focused on defending the country from direct military aggression. This military posture, sometimes referred to in Australian circles as “continentalist”, does not require large nuclear attack submarines, but rather smaller conventional submarines are sufficient to defend Australian coasts. The debate over Australian submarines, therefore, signals a radical shift in Australia's strategic and military posture, not simply the acquisition of a superior weapon (nuclear submarines) over an inferior one (diesel-electric).
The submarine debate in Australia's grand strategy
For years, the strategic debate in Australia revolved around the sheer magnitude of China's rise (the size of its economy and military), the degree of relative American decline, the threat of the magnitude of China's rise (a benign rise versus an aggressive and threatening China), the type of political relations Australia should subsequently have with China and the US, and, finally, the type of armed forces Australians should deploy.
For example, if the magnitude of the Chinese rise was not enough to eclipse North American power and was a threatening rise for Australia, it would be advisable to maintain close relations with the United States. On the contrary, if China's rise were superlative, out of economic interest and not being able to expect to be defended by the Americans, political relations would have to involve distancing themselves from the Americans. In that case, if China did not represent a serious threat, there would be no need for an armed force dedicated to the defense of the Australian bastion.
The strategic change in Australian defense policy ended in 202.0 with the publication of "2020 Defense Strategic Update" and "2020 Force Structure Plan", which proposed a strategic environment in which China represented a serious threat to Australia. Consequently, the Australian armed forces should move from the traditional continental defensive posture and begin to acquire long-range attack weapons, so that from a deterrence strategy of denial they move to having deterrence capabilities by retaliation.
There are abundant publications exploring these questions, from which I have selected excerpts from the following two to frame this discussion.
In the study of the year 2016 "Australia's Strategic Culture and Asia's Changing Regional Order", the four main currents of opinion that Australian security and defense specialists maintain on the future strategic context and the type of alliances and defense policy that Australia should adopt to face the rise of China are exposed.
The first, an optimistic liberal position, considers that the economic interdependence of the region, and in particular relations between China and the United States, will likely continue to provide the foundations for a stable future. The mutual economic interests of China and the United States will ensure that competition between the two regional powers is limited and that Australia does not need to make a significant change in its strategic policy.
The second position, still liberal but more pessimistic in outlook, sees the prospect of China becoming dissatisfied with the prevailing international order as real. Australian strategy should therefore focus on integrating China into the existing US-led order. There are several ways to do this, including through incentives and socialization, as well as restrictions. Australian policy would therefore support the institutional and regulatory means of shaping China's policy preferences and make significant contributions to efforts to increase the costs China would have to pay if it attempted to deviate from the prevailing environment.
The third approach is more realistic in that it considers the prospect of a military dispute between the United States and China plausible, if not probable, and advocates what has come to be known as a hedging strategy. That is, Australia should be in a position to support regional efforts to deter China from destabilizing the status quo by bolstering its own military capabilities while engaging in diplomatic relations with China to offset the harmful consequences of a hedging strategy.
The fourth approach is the most important. pessimistic and would represent a significant change for Australian strategic policy. This view sees China's scale, wealth and ambition as ultimately incompatible with the prevailing regional order. As a consequence, Australia and other countries will need to develop a new way of structuring Asia's strategic framework. The best-known representative of this approach, Hugh White (in his book “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power"), maintains that concert between the powers, in which the large states of the region share power and influence to manage Asia's international relations, would be the optimal path forward and that Australia will need to develop an independent military capacity significantly older to navigate this new world.
However, while this debate has become heated and, at times, surprisingly personal, it has not captured the public imagination and remains the focus of a fairly small group of policy analysts, journalists and academics.
En the studio CSBA 2013 "Gateway to the Pacific. Australian Defense Strategy and the Future of the Australia-US Alliance", a taxonomy of the different Australian strategic positions was proposed with respect to the magnitude of the Chinese rise, the threat that this rise implied, the position of the United States, the capabilities that the Australian military force should have and the type of alliance with the Americans.
Minimize alliances: Alliance minimalists believe Australia is at great risk of being caught in the middle of the increasingly tense rivalry between the United States and China. They also have serious doubts about the United States' ability to preserve its favorable position as a credible long-term security provider in Asia. His vision of the future is underpinned by a firm conviction in the inexorable nature of China's rise and the inescapability of American decline. As a result, they argue, the United States should learn to adapt to Chinese ambitions, and Australia should seek to develop a more autonomous security policy. Hugh White, a leading proponent of this school of thought, has argued that the United States will inevitably be forced to share power with China in Asia and should therefore accept that large swaths of China's maritime environs will eventually fall. under Beijing's sphere of influence. Echoing the injunctions of classic naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett, Hugh White paints a pessimistic vision of Asia's future maritime landscape becoming a "no man's ocean" where no power could truly exercise control of the sea. Australia should therefore focus first and foremost on remaining on the periphery of Sino-US competition, avoiding any engagement that could lead to cheating while implementing a vigorous sea denial strategy. White's declinist perception is shared to some extent by figures such as Peter Leahy, former chief of the Australian army, who has expressed strong reservations about the future of American primacy in the region and has questioned the need to deepen military ties with United States. United for fear of unnecessarily antagonizing China. Several business groups with vested interests in China, particularly in the mining sector, have also shown a strong reluctance to approach the United States.
Maximize alliances: On the opposite side of the spectrum are alliance maximalists, who believe that in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness, strengthening Australian security relies on deepening ties with the United States. By more proactively signaling Australia's strategic solidarity with the United States and taking steps to strengthen its own defense contributions to the US-Australia alliance, Canberra can better encourage the United States to maintain its regional security commitments and improve durability and credibility of the alliance as a deterrent. Alliance maximalists argue that this can only happen if Australia gains the capacity to make significant contributions in the event of a regional crisis or conflict. Ross Babbage of the Kokoda Foundation, for example, has argued that Australia should acquire the military means to "take an arm off any major Asian power seeking to attack Australia", and has raised the need for the Australian Defense Force ( ADF) should not only defend the Australian coasts but also take the fight to the enemy and play an active role alongside US forces in the course of a protracted campaign (see your book "Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030"). Paul Dibb has also argued that Australia should strengthen its relationship with the United States so that it maintains its security commitments in the region to counter China. Alliance maximalists tend to believe, in particular, that the ADF should adopt a policy of "deterrence by punishment", rather than simply a policy of "deterrence by denial", partly as a hedge against uncertainty. As Babbage has written: “the assumption that, in the event of a major security crisis in the Pacific, Australia could count on rapid and tailored military resupply from the United States is almost certainly invalid.”
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