To untie the knot of the Sahel or, at least, try to do so, we must start with the old quarrels, affronts and confrontations between communities and, within them, between elites and lower classes. They come from afar and the actions of governments over time have led to greater benefits for some (farmers, especially) and have been to the detriment of others (especially shepherds). Added to this in the last decade is the jihadist element, which takes advantage of this breeding ground to try to gain resources (power and influence) to, among other objectives, negotiate with the Government and also gain followers.
As if the above were not enough, all of this is punctuated with attacks and murders to "convince" of their "goodness" and that of their religious, anti-colonial, anti-French and anti-system discourse. The appearance of jihadists on the scene implies foreign intervention: France, EU, USA, AU and the G5 Sahel, with an especially bloody and ambiguous role of the local armed forces with some rebel militias. And, to everything, we still have to add one more element: climate change, with what is aggravating, since we are fighting for dwindling resources.
Sahel: A decade of increasing violence
“We must act to organize the return of civilians. My only dream is to return home. I pray that our country regains the peace it once had. The solution is dialogue. We want to return as soon as possible”, is the call of one of the 401.736 internally displaced people from the Malian conflict as of September 2021. Only in the Mopti region, violence between February 2020 and September 2021 has caused forced displacement of more than 100.000 people (a total of 159.027). This testimony collected in an interview in Bamako in October 2020 and the data provided appear in the report recently published by the Danish Institute of International Studies on the conflict in the Sahel and the analysis of which is the subject of this document.
Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people fleeing the escalation of violence in the country since the beginning of the security crisis in 2012 and which is increasingly costing the lives of an increasing number of civilians:
As can be seen in the graph that you can find at the end of the section, as violence increases in the Sahel, it becomes increasingly imperative to know as best as possible who, why they are involved in this upward spiral and how the dynamics develop. that lead to violent clashes. But, also, who suffers from it, of course. Everything to try, as far as possible, to analyze the errors made and be able to stop it.
Franchises of jihadist groups, local militias, criminal gangs, security forces, foreign armies... They are the actors who, with different motives, ideologies and agendas, move on the ground pursuing their own interests. And, to do this, on some occasions they resort to exploiting old, almost ancestral quarrels or injustices and, on other occasions, it is just the opposite, new problems created by new situations or circumstances are exploited.
Pre-existing conflicts that develop at the same time as a until now unstoppable process of climate change. This added factor acts as an accelerant and aggravating factor, but not a trigger. per se. According to the Danish report, the vector that generates conflict is the lack of efficient action and management of natural resources with regard to land and water, especially as they are increasingly stressed by climate change. In this way, food insecurity adds to the previous political and economic problems in the area, triggering the possibility of more confrontations breaking out over access and use of dwindling resources.
A case study: the Mopti region in Mali
What was stated in previous paragraphs is exemplified in the central Malian region of Mopti, the epicenter of violence in the country and where conflict, resource scarcity and climate change interact with each other in a complex way.
The graph we have shared below places the Mopti region on the map, in the center of Mali. While below, jihadist attacks are recorded throughout the region from 1992 to 2022, clearly observing their increase over time in the area where Mopti is located and, beyond, the heart of the Sahel.
In Mopti, specifically, insecurity has led to the abandonment of local and state authorities of their positions and responsibilities. This in turn has led to an increase in the presence and influence of various armed groups in the area that have taken advantage of the disputes between the inhabitants (over control of land and water) and their lack of protection. And even more, the high availability of weapons has intensified violence against civilians and left them more exposed.
Not only jihadists, but also criminal gangs, settling scores between communities and security forces interact in this breeding ground of armed confrontations. To this we must add the international intervention that has established domestic priorities and that, with its support, has led to the brutal return of state armed forces with ambiguous ties with the local self-defense militias and that have aggravated the violence and the climate of impunity. in this punished region.
Actors and vectors of conflict in the Sahel
Accelerated by the fall of Gaddafi, Mali's security crisis erupted in 2012 when a coalition of separatist Tuareg rebels and three jihadist groups (AQIM, MUJAO-Movement for Unification and Jihad in West Africa- and Ansar Dine) take control of the north of the country and declare the independent state of Azawad.
In a short time, the jihadists defeat the Tuaregs and threaten the capital, leading to French military intervention, Operation Serval, in January 2013. Busy with this, the Malian security forces forget about the growing tensions in the center of the country between ethnic Fulani herders and Dogon farmers (problems that in the humid areas also include fishermen). Long-standing disputes over grazing, land and water rights, aggravated by droughts, corruption of officials and marginalization, especially of Fulani herders, whose ancestral way of life is harmed by legal benefits to Dogon farmers.
With this situation, jihadist groups enter the scene in the Mopti region, using these problems to gain a foothold, expand their influence, access resources and recruit members among the locals. Starting in 2014, with French pressure in the north, these groups move south, towards Mopti (as mentioned a few lines above) and the borders with Burkina Faso and Niger. Below is an infographic with the chronology of the formation of the different jihadist groups in the context of the security crisis in Mali:
Thus, starting in 2015 we find a significant increase in insecurity and violence throughout the area with jihadist groups, Malian armed forces, the G5 Sahel regional joint force and an increasing number of local self-defense militias. The latter in an attempt by the communities to protect themselves from the lack of security and the flight from the authorities due to jihadist attacks in this increasingly violent context of groups facing each other and each other.
This, of course, is for those who have not directly joined the ranks of the Al Qaeda and Daesh franchises in the region in search not only of protection but also in an attempt to improve their political situation (gain influence) to achieve economic objectives. For example, in the case of Fulani herders, recovering their grazing rights from Dogon farmers. Others enter for different reasons, such as the improvement of their social situation, if we talk about the lower classes, or nostalgia for other ancient and better times for their respective ethnic groups or towns.
Among the groups mentioned in previous paragraphs, some stand out for their capabilities, such as:
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