The Future of the VCR-105 Centauro

The VCR-105 Centauro has been the spearhead of the Spanish Cavalry for the last two decades. A vehicle that was once a cutting-edge vehicle that, however, has become progressively outdated due to insufficient investment, which has made it impossible to implement the necessary improvements. This has led to a situation, as we will see, in which it is necessary to seriously consider whether it is advisable to modernize both the barges and the weapons, implement a new 120mm tower on the 8×8 Dragon chassis or do the same, but choosing a 105mm cannon. We will talk about all this and more in the following lines.

As we know, in 1994, with a view to equipping the FAR Light Cavalry Regiment, a French AMX-10RC 6×6 light tank and an Italian Centauro 8×8 arrived at the Castillejos II Cavalry Brigade, to carry out a comparative study. with the idea of ​​deciding which of them was the most appropriate to cover the existing needs. After completing the test plan, the Italian vehicle was selected, which demonstrated better qualities, especially because it was much more modern and sophisticated.

Consequently, 22 copies were acquired, 2 for the Cavalry Academy and 20 for the Lusitania 8 Regiment, which were delivered starting in 2000. At the same time, another test plan was carried out, the purpose of which was to study the possibility of replacing the AMX-30 EM2 of the light armored units of the Cavalry Brigade, placing special emphasis on its use as an essential element of support for the VEC, which ended with the purchase of another 62 examples.

Finally, we will review what the future of the Centaurs will be, looking at the possible actions that can be taken, regarding their modernization or replacement with another improved vehicle.

After just under 20 years in service, the VRC-105 Centauro has provided excellent services in the Spanish Army, despite the fact that, for political reasons, it was never allowed to be used in operations carried out abroad. In fact, although a small number of vehicles (I seem to remember there were four) were painted white to go on a UN mission, their use was finally prohibited because, upon seeing it, the Minister of Defense at the time stated that “it had a too aggressive appearance.” No comment.

But, before continuing, let's briefly review a little of its history in Spain. To do this, we must go back to the 90s, especially to 1994, the year in which the then Castillejos II Cavalry Brigade received a French AMX-10RC 6×6 light tank and an Italian Centauro 105 8×8, to be subjected to a comparative test plan, which would serve to select the most suitable model for the Light Cavalry Regiment of the FAR (Rapid Action Force) Lusitania No. 8, although it was clear that there was a clear predilection for the Italian vehicle , especially because it was much more modern and sophisticated than the French one. In fact, between both light tanks there was a gap of 13 years (1979 to 1992), which was clearly demonstrated in the different tests. Furthermore, as we will see later, between the first 22 Centaurs acquired in the 1st phase and the 62 used during the 2nd, some differences were found that had to be updated, after the pertinent agreements were made.

First phase test plan of the Centaur

It was divided into 4 sections, dedicated to studying firepower, mobility, organization of the barge and logistics, from which it was concluded that the AMX-10RC was inferior to the Centauro, for different reasons, summarized in:

• Firepower:

  • The AMX-10RC's fire direction was considered obsolete or, at least, very outdated; The low-recoil gun was at the limit of its capabilities and could only use its specially developed ammunition, which was also less powerful than most of those used by NATO; It lacked a stabilization system for shooting in motion, and its night vision set (low light level TV) was ineffective; The vehicle commander did not have a second specific night vision system, nor an independent and stabilized periscope, which the Centauro did integrate; Finally, it presented some pointing problems at high temperatures (very simple elements and without some sensors such as the meteorological one.
  • The Centauro had much more effective elements, although with some limitations. For example, its stabilization only makes it possible to shoot at low speed and on fairly flat terrain, despite which it allows tracking and aiming at the target, which is very positive in a reconnaissance vehicle. The Fire Direction is quite complete and has an independent periscope for the tank commander that also includes a light-intensifying night viewfinder, which complements the shooter's thermal camera (first generation, later replaced in all Spanish vehicles). ), which is also available to the boss. Besides, has hunter killer capability or hunter-killer.

• Mobility:

  • The complex mechanical groups of the AMX-10RC provide modest results on the road and great limitations on soft terrain, reducing the maximum speed to 85 km/h, while its off-road evolutions, especially in bad conditions such as rain, snow, mud , etc., are much less agile than in the case of the Centauro. In any case, the main problem detected in the tests referred to the fact that, to make turns, it uses, as a completely exceptional case, the same system as the armored tracked ones, that is, braking the wheels on the side for which wants to spin; Obviously, this operation causes excessive tire wear, especially when moving on hard terrain, such as roads.
  • In the case of the Centauro, apart from its 8×8 traction, the possible use of tire pressure regulation equipment, or the voluntary turning of the last axle (retrosteer), facilitates its evolution on varied terrain. In addition, its runflat wheels (the AMX-10RC can also mount them) favor movements with serious damage during trips that are not excessively long, but sufficient in most cases. In summary, with the systems used by current wheeled armored vehicles, especially those in the 8×8 configuration, the truth is that their mobility over normal terrain or with medium difficulties is very similar to that offered by tracked vehicles.

• Helmet organization:

  • The design of the AMX-10RC barge, with the power unit in the stern, makes it difficult to feed the ammunition as well as the development of derivative versions that, for their usual configuration, must mount the power unit in the bow, which facilitates the installation of the different elements and systems.
  • The Centauro, by having a drive unit positioned at the front, provides greater protection at the front and, in addition, can be ammunition more easily, using the rear access door. On the other hand, the rear camera can be very useful for carrying out different tasks, in addition to transporting ammunition, which is usual. Thus, it serves as a command post, personnel transport for 4 additional crew members, transport of specific loads or transmission equipment, etc.

• Logistics:

  • From this point of view, the AMX-10RC requires a very high time to carry out the main maintenance tasks and, of course, repairs. Consequently, its service life will be shorter than recommended and it will remain damaged for an excessive amount of time.
  • Regarding the Centaur, We must say that it has a self-diagnosis system, including the electronic elements of the tower, record and type of shots fired, relevant data from the power unit, data transfer to higher logistical levels, etc.
  • Of course, at the time of the tests, an armored family for the Italian Army was already being developed from the Centauro chassis, which was called Freccia or Flecha, currently in full production, which already has a wide range of versions (VTT, tank destroyer with Spike missile launcher, reconnaissance with 60 mm high-speed cannon, 120 mm mortar carrier, 155 mm ATP piece, VDAA with 76 mm automatic cannon, ambulance, etc.).

Second and third phase of the Centauro program

Of the 22 Centaurs initially acquired^[1] The first three copies were received in Spain in October 2000, with just enough time to take part in the parade held in Madrid on Hispanic Heritage Day. A little before those three vehicles arrived in Spain, the Cavalry Brigade received three other examples that, at the request of the Spanish Army, were transferred by the Italian Army to be subjected to a complete test plan, within the second phase of the program. . Its main purpose was to study the possibility of replacing, in the future, the AMX-30 EM2 of the light armored units of the Cavalry Brigade, the Numancia 9 and España 11 Regiments. Consequently, the tests were oriented especially to study the tactical and comparative aspects with the AMX-30 EM2, placing special emphasis on its use as an essential element of support for the VEC.

The results of the tests were highly satisfactory, making it clear that the Centauro is perfectly capable of replacing the AMX-30 EM2, which it equals or surpasses in most aspects.[2]. Only in the tactical mobility section[3] was slightly inferior to that; However, taking into account that will act normally framed with VEC, whose ability to move over varied terrain is much less, we must conclude that its mobility is more than enough to cover the required requirements.

After contracting the acquisition of the Centaurs of the second phase, on July 19, 2004, the first eight vehicles arrived at the Cavalry Brigade.[4], following deliveries until 2006.

We must highlight that, taking into account the report carried out by the commission that tested them in 2000 and the experience of the Lusitania 8 Cavalry Regiment, the vehicles received a series of improvements among which we will highlight, among others, the following: Replacement of the camera first generation thermal, with a more modern and efficient second generation; installation of a second machine gun mount on the roof of the tower, so that both the loader and the tank commander have their own weapon; reinforcement of the rear plate of the barge and development of a towing V, so that a Centauro could be towed with another similar vehicle[5]; external front and rear electric compressed air intakes; etc On the other hand, although the Spanish ET had the intention of mounting reactive shell modules on the bow and sides, the Italian consortium IVECO-FIAT OTO Melara (CIO) advised against it, considering that the excessive weight could damage the front suspension and elements of the direction, the idea was finally discarded.

The third phase only included a total of 4 VCREC recovery vehicles, which were delivered between 2005 and 2010. For obvious reasons, this quantity was totally insufficient.[6] for the two Regiments that were provided with those 62 vehicles; and that, without counting the first 22 copies. Of course, since the last reorganization of the Army which, without a doubt, meant the practical dismantling of the Cavalry Weapon which, for many years, as we will see, was one of the main objectives of a good part of the General Staff and, of course, of the Infantry, it was clear that both the purchase of the VCREC and the VPC were not a priority nor, in fact, did they have the slightest interest.

Let us not forget that the personnel of that Arm, especially those of light units, saw their hegemony within the Army in danger, if it was finally decided to create the Armored Arm, following the example of the main Armies in our environment, even though it was very beneficial. for the effectiveness and good work of the Army as a whole. Of course, the availability of vacancies throughout the national territory, which allow, for example, the command requirements to be met in order to access subsequent promotions, is also a benefit to take into account.[7].

Some clarifications about Cavalry and the Armored Weapon

The issue of the Armored Weapon is quite thorny because it can hurt many sensitivities, both within the Infantry and the Cavalry, since, in the end, it has meant the practical disappearance of the second, which has already lost any capacity inherent to the different Weapons (fighting according to their modalities , sufficient firepower, which allows it to prevail over the enemy in certain situations, carry out various missions according to needs, etc.). In fact, of the classic missions of Cavalry, reconnaissance, security and combat, the entity and capacity of the current units will hardly allow them to carry out any of a certain complexity, especially combat ones. In fact, there is only one Regiment left, the Spain 11 which, I am fully convinced that, in the next reorganization of the Army, will be erased at a stroke, while the rest, belonging to Grupo[8] and lower, also controlled by Infantry units[9], they will have a presence little more than ornament. 

In order not to dwell on this topic excessively, I will mention, just in passing, some data that leads me to think that, for quite some years now, the General Staff, controlled to a large extent by the Infantry and, of course, the components of that Arm , especially those from light units, have redoubled efforts to ensure that the Cavalry loses its influence in the main decisions of the Army, until reaching the current critical situation in which that influence simply tends to zero. Let's look at some examples of certain events that, from my point of view, offer me no doubt that they have been premeditated and thoroughly studied, with the sole purpose of laminating the capacity of the Cavalry, for the benefit of the Infantry, although this fact represents in reality a clear detriment to the effectiveness of the Army.

As an example, I will quote:

• Disappearance of the Lieutenant Generals from the Cavalry, so the Superior Council of the Army does not have any representative of the Army[10]. Therefore, if someone were to ask: Who is currently in charge of defending the interests of the Cavalry? The truth is that I can only think of one credible answer: NO ONE. As for the Brigadier Generals, after the disappearance of the Castillejos, there is no longer any command vacancy for them, that is, another hard blow for the Cavalry. 

• Since the mechanization of the Spanish Army, largely due to the Cavalry itself, which remained tied to the horse for longer than advisable, the truth is that all materials of a certain quality and power, They ended up in the Infantry units, leaving the remaining remains for the Cavalry. In fact, until the reception of the Centauro in the 2000s, the Cavalry did not have any newly built tanks or armored vehicles, with the sole exception of the AAML acquired as a result of the Sahara conflict, and which, in reality, were simple vehicles. light with very poor qualities that, however, played a quite relevant role[11].

• With the purchase of the VCI Pizarro and the Leopardo tanks, a series of templates were designed that included both vehicles in the Cavalry units; However, they were eventually deleted from those templates, especially when the Centaurs tested report came to light in late 2000, which stated that the Centaurs could replace the AMX-30 EM2, without any problem. This statement is simply a half-truth or, rather, a MALICIOUS LIE.[12] Well, curiously, it did not mention that it was referring to the Light Armored Regiments, not mentioning the Armored Regiments in any case. Consequently, it was used as an excuse to remove the Pavia 4 Armored Regiments from the environment, which has now become a mixed Infantry/Cavalry monstrosity, about whose employment and functions I have enormous doubts. As for the Montesa 3 Armored Regiments of Ceuta and Alcántara 10 of Melilla, as they are located in border areas with Morocco, although I am not clear about their organization, the latest news I have about them is that they are “very powerful units” equipped with a section from VCI Pizarro and another from Leopardo 2A4. In short, words are unnecessary.

• The creation of the so-called Multipurpose Organic Brigades, something like girls for everything, was the perfect excuse to destroy the most powerful and versatile Brigade of the Army, the Castillejos II Cavalry Brigade which, with the current name of Aragón, is no longer even the shadow of what it was. The truth is that, personally, he wouldn't know how to define it or explain how it could be used either. By the way, I also believe that at this moment it is commanded by a General with notable experience in mountain units? That is, the most appropriate[13] what occurs to me.

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