Iran's military doctrine is based on principles of asymmetric warfare and is supported by the strategic depth provided by its extensive and mountainous territory. Its approach seeks to avoid direct confrontation with its adversaries, opting for deterrent strategies that allow it to stay below the threshold of war. Likewise, its traditional defensive doctrine seems to be evolving towards a more offensive posture. Aware of its conventional military weaknesses, it has prioritized the development of ballistic missiles and drones. Furthermore, it seeks regional hegemony relying on its extensive network of proxies.
Iran: Challenges and strategies
Iran has endured years of international sanctions and mistrust from its neighbors. The Islamic Republic, as happens with China or Russia, has become a revisionist regime dissatisfied in its case with the status quo existing in the Persian Gulf since the end of the Cold War (Gil, 2023, p. 302). Iran's strategic priorities have been focused on consolidating the regime that emerged after the fall of the monarchy of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in 1979, and it aspires to “be the regional leader interacting in specific scenarios” (Echeverría, 2020, pp. 925- 926). Iran's main objective is to ensure that the Islamic Republic does not disappear and to spread its model of Islamic revolution. As Zamir points out, regional ambitions were very present in the revolutionary vision of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and “implicit in the idea that the revolution has to be exported.” In this sense, Zamir relies on the work of Nader Uskowi, Temperature rising. Iran's Revolutionary Guards and Wars in the Middle East, in which its author describes a meeting called by Khomeini in a Paris suburb in 1978, during which he stated that “the revolution is not about Iran; it is about the entire region” (Zamir, 2022, p. 5).
As detailed in The Military Balance, Iran appears as a prominent regional power, with a military doctrine that combines the defense of its territory with the possession of the largest short- and medium-range ballistic missile arsenal in the region. Likewise, it has focused on the development of an asymmetric defense aimed at confronting and deterring a possible attack by its main adversaries, the United States (USA) and Israel. To achieve this last goal, use a variety of allies and proxies. In addition, the war in Ukraine has caused the country to become a weapons supplier to Russia, especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and direct attack munitions. The inventory of UAVs is very important and it has also developed ground attack cruise missiles. However, the rest of its Armed Forces have mostly obsolete material, despite having a relatively developed national arms industry capable of producing a significant number and variety of armed UAVs, as well as intelligence, surveillance and recognition (2023, p. 324). Indeed, the notable development of UAVs and missiles is a direct consequence of the shortcomings of its conventional forces. These forces have suffered years of international sanctions that have considerably restricted access to foreign technologies and weapons (Gil, 2023, p. 307). Just look at the outdated inventory of aircraft or tanks. According to The Military Balance, in 2023 Iran has a total of 1513 cars: 480 T-72S, 150 M60A1, 75 T-62, 100 Chieftain MK3/MK5, 540 T-54-T-55/Type-59/Saifir-74 and 168 M47 / M48 (2023, p. 324).
Given this situation, it is understandable that it has opted for its nuclear program and the development of missiles and UAVs. Although in the beginning the latter were Chinese-made, currently, Iran produces a growing number of drones of its own design, although they also copy American models, most of which were shot down in Iraq, such as the ScanEagle, MQ-1 Predator or RQ-170 (Gil, 2023, p. 310). According to a declassified document from the US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (hereinafter AWG), titled Iran Quick Reference Guide, its drone program is one of the most developed in the region and began in 1986 with the development of the model Possible. These systems provide a significant advantage in asymmetric warfare and can be produced in large quantities economically. Among the most advanced models, the shahed-129, capable of carrying up to eight air-to-ground missiles and with an action radius of 200 km. Iran has used UAVs in various areas, such as Iraq, Syria, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden and Afghanistan. They also operate in Yemen, northern Israel and Israeli territorial waters. Hizbullah is likely to monitor UAVs operating in Lebanon and Israel “to maintain a lower Iranian presence.” Additionally, they have been used to harass the US Navy. Iran has provided less advanced technology of these systems not only Hezbollah, but also Hamas and Yemen's Houthi rebels (AWG, 2017, pp. 60-61).
According to a declassified 2010 US Department of Defense document addressing Iranian military power, Iran's strategy to ensure the survival of its regime is based on deterrence. For years, Tehran has proclaimed the existence of an “Army of twenty million men” and has defended a doctrine of asymmetric warfare. Likewise, it has been expanding its support networks with diplomacy, economic influence, soft power and sponsorship of terrorist and paramilitary groups. The aforementioned document also highlights that an important part of this deterrence strategy involves the Iranian nuclear program and its willingness to “keep open the possibility of developing nuclear weapons.” In addition, The Islamic Republic uses the Quds Force to clandestinely exercise its military, political and economic power abroad. Tehran provides weapons and training to Hizbullah in Lebanon and to Palestinian groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In addition, it provides support to Shiite militias in Iraq[1].
Uskowi maintains that Iran has been a country at war for years: in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and through covert operations in Afghanistan. This author identifies four fronts of action. In the West, the proxies Iranians maintain a land corridor connecting Iran, through Iraq, with Syria, Lebanon and Israel's northern front in the Golan Heights. On the southern front, the Houthis operate on the borders of Saudi Arabia and have the ability to interfere with trade through the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Furthermore, on the Eastern Front, Iran has been involved for more than four decades in operations in Afghanistan (Uskowi, 2019, p. 1). As detailed in a report by Institute for the Study of War, Iran and its allies have been able to take advantage of the current conflict between Israel and Hamas to exert control over a key sea route. Since December 9, the Houthis have attacked commercial ships transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait with drones and missiles almost daily. The Houthi military spokesman stated that these attacks are part of their “continuing campaign against all commercial maritime traffic bound for Israel,” and has promised that the attacks will persist. According to US officials, the IRGC is directly involved in the “planning” of these attacks, which are disrupting traffic across the Red Sea (2023, p. 3).
Iranian aspirations to achieve regional hegemony experienced a notable increase after the Arab Spring. Iran expanded its targets, including Saudi Arabia, and this expansion was made possible by Iran and Hizbullah's support for the Houthis. Similarly, elements of the Taliban were supported in western Afghanistan, a region in which they have important economic interests. At the same time, economic, political and military aid was offered to its allies in Iraq and Syria against the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The relevance of all this is that it allowed Iran to test tactics and technologies in “a combat environment in which its forces sometimes operated against American actions and partners.” That is why the aforementioned AWG document warned that regional operations through proxy, the proliferation of ballistic missiles, in addition to cyber activities, raised the threat level from Iran and “have threatened to change regional dynamics in ways that are incompatible with US interests.” Furthermore, it is highlighted that Tehran has developed a structure that “it believes will deter potential adversaries and establish the foundations of its regional dominance” (AWG, 2017, pp. 1-2).
The aforementioned ballistic missile program has its roots in the war against Iraq, during which Saddam Hussein's regime deployed these missiles against Iran's strategic targets, evidencing the vulnerability of its defenses. Since then, Iran's strategic missile forces have become one of the key elements of its deterrent strategy. Currently, Iran has the largest missile arsenal in the region, which is under continuous development and improvement. These missiles have the capacity to reach Israel and other Gulf countries. However, doubts remain about the accuracy of many of them, suggesting that they could be used against critical infrastructure and cities.[2]. However, cruise missiles appear to be increasingly closing this gap and could further increase their deterrence capabilities (Mclnnis, 2017, p. 19). The Iranian inventory, under the control of the IRGC Aerospace Force, is equipped with conventional warheads. There is a possibility that in the future they could be modified to carry chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear loads. On the other hand, a certain number of systems and technology have been provided to its proxies in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen (AWG, 2017, pp. 53-54). In addition, there is a program developed by the IRGC for the manufacture of advanced space launch vehicles (SLVs), which has allowed it to launch its third satellite during 2023. However, this fact has raised fears that this program functions as a cover for the development of long-range ballistic missile technology “while nominally adhering to its self-imposed 2000 km limit”[3]. The proliferation of short and medium range ballistic missiles is due to the absence of a modern air force, such as Israel, the US or Saudi Arabia. Iran's most accurate systems are those with short range, such as the SRBM Fateh-110, while those with greater scope, such as MRBM Shahab 3, are less precise. Although at the moment it lacks intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, the possibility that in the future Tehran will embark on developing them “to have a strategic response against the United States” is not ruled out. (Defense Intelligence Agency -DIA-, 2019, pp. 30-31).
The Iranian security paradigm is articulated around three aspects: the projection of its military power, the conduct of war far from its borders when necessary, and the deterrence of its enemies. The memory of the numerous casualties in its war against Iraq between 1980-1988 continues to be very present in the collective imagination. Hence, a considerable part of its security approach involves the possibility of transferring a possible armed conflict to the territory of its adversary and establishing “a security cordon” around its own borders (Zamir, 2022, p. 6). Iran's main enemies are Israel and the US, and to deal with the threat that both represent it has opted for asymmetric deterrence. According to Arasli, Iran has adopted asymmetric warfare strategies as a “universal panacea” to defend itself against its adversaries. It is a system that is not officially defined, unless it is known, and amalgamates elements of conventional warfare with operations through special units, insurgent tactics and terrorist practices.[4].
Israel and the US represent a significant threat to the Ayatollahs' regime, just as it is to the State of Israel due to their geographical proximity. Given its military inferiority, particularly vis-à-vis a rival like the United States, Iran has devised a series of asymmetric strategies with a marked deterrent nature to avoid eventual military action by Israel or the United States. However, before delving into These strategies, it is pertinent to address, even briefly, the concept of deterrence, a term linked to defense and susceptible to generating confusion. For some analysts, such as Waltz (1981) or Snyder (1971), deterrence and defense are different approaches, while others, such as Gray (1982) or Lodal (1980), maintain that both expressions “overlap” (Buzan, 1991, p. 188). Javier Jordán explains the concept clearly by stating that it is “a process that consists of influencing an actor through a threat, tacit or explicit, so that he does not carry out a certain action.” This process can be carried out before a conflict breaks out with the aim of avoiding it, but also once it has started to limit its intensity and scope.[5]. As Posen points out, deterrence doctrines may also seek to punish the aggressor, “to increase his costs without reference to their own” (Posen, 1984, p. 4).
According to Buzan, the problem associated with the definition of deterrence is easier to address if it is approached through the distinction between the military strategy of “retaliation and denial.” Retaliation is based on punishing the adversary “in response to an attack.” Its primary purpose is to impose “a reciprocal cost.” This type of deterrence is usual in the context of nuclear deterrence. As for denial, it essentially involves “blocking an attack by physically opposing the forces carrying it out.” Buzan illustrates this example with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which deployed a large number of forces in Europe with the objective of delaying or stopping an eventual conventional attack by the Soviet Union (Buzan, 1991, pp. . 187-188). As Jordán points out, both approaches complement each other, since one country can deter another from aggression through the threat of a forceful defense of its territory and with retaliation against the economic objectives of the aggressor.[6].
Undoubtedly, military superiority is not synonymous with deterrence. In the case of Iran, this is far from being comparable with that of Israel, and much less with respect to the United States. This military inferiority perceived by Iran pushes it to develop deterrent strategies. Now, with the means it has, would it be able to develop an effective deterrent? To some extent, this was evidenced by the MILLENIUM CHALLENGE 2002 exercise, organized by the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in the summer of 2002, representing one of the most expensive and ambitious military exercises in US history. This simulated a conflict between the American Armed Forces (blue team) and those of a country in the Persian Gulf (red team), which could be compared to Iran. The red side was placed under the command of retired Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper of the Marine Corps. Congress mandated this exercise with the goal of “exploring critical operational-level warfare challenges facing the U.S. Armed Forces after 2010.” Conceived by the Pentagon as a demonstration of “cutting-edge technologies,” the exercise sought to provide commanders with “commanding knowledge of the battlefield to carry out rapid decisive operations.”[7].
Within the framework of the simulation, the blue team issued an eight-point ultimatum in which the eighth requested the surrender of the red side. However, Van Riper was aware that the Government of his “country” would not accept it, so he decided to anticipate and strike first as soon as an aircraft carrier battle group from the blue side entered the Gulf. Once they were within range of him, the insightful Van Riper ordered the launch of a barrage of missiles from land launchers, commercial ships, and low-flying aircraft to reduce his radar signature. Simultaneously, swarms of speedboats loaded with explosives carried out suicide attacks. The radar system Aegis It quickly became overwhelmed, resulting in the sinking of 19 Blue Side ships, including an aircraft carrier, several cruisers, and five amphibious assault ships. According to Van Riper, “it was all over in five, maybe ten minutes.”[8].
The failed exercise in question provided insight into the combat strategies of the two naval forces operating in Iran: the naval branch of the Artish (IRIN) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN)[9]. The IRIN employs a much more conventional doctrine, while it is primarily the IRGCN that employs asymmetric doctrines to guarantee Iran's security in the Gulf. Both navies have sufficient capacity to influence the strategic Strait of Hormuz, a vital point for the flow of resources and international trade (Office of Naval Intelligence -ONI-, 2017, p. 5; Guerrero, 2021, p. 3) . The IRGCN strategy is configured as “an extension of Iran's defense strategy, which seeks deterrence in the face of a maritime attack, rapid escalation if deterrence fails, and waging a protracted war if necessary.” It should be noted that Iran has the geographical advantage of the shallow waters of the Gulf and the narrow waters of the Strait of Hormuz. This geographical configuration gives the IRGCN commanders the perception of being in a position to deal a severe blow to their enemies through the use of small mobile platforms (ONI, 2017, p. 21; Guerrero, 2021, p. 5).
This strategy had its origins during the war against Iraq, when swarms of boats manned by members of the IRGC carried out attacks against oil tankers from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, then allies of Iraq. In this context, on April 14, 1988, the American frigate FFG 58 USS Samuel Roberts was hit by a mine, provoking a forceful response from the US through the so-called operation Praying Mantis. This operation cost Iran the loss of a frigate, damage to another, and the sinking of a missile patrol boat (Pérez Triana, 2011, pp. 90-91; Guerrero, 2021, p. 6). By virtue of this experience, Iran, in clear military inferiority compared to the United States, has adopted the deterrence strategy as a premise, “projecting an image of military force.” Added to this aspect are the economic consequences derived from an eventual closure of the Strait of Hormuz (ONI, 2017, p. 22; Guerrero, 2021, p. 6).
Mclnnis points out that Iran focuses its deterrence strategy on responding to possible attacks with forceful retaliatory actions. Logically, the aim is to discourage starting a conflict or promote its rapid de-escalation. This doctrine is commonly known as Threat in Response to Threat. Within this category, the most significant threat comes from the IRGC Quds Force and its proxies, the so-called Axis of Resistance, with the capacity to carry out terrorist actions and asymmetric warfare. Within this deterrent approach are also ballistic missiles and the notable development of cybersecurity. According to this author, this has similarities with the US doctrine of flexible response operations (Mclnnis, 2017a, p. 19). The term Axis of Resistance is used by Iran to refer to its partners, proxies and allies, such as the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, Hizbullah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. Mostly made up of Shiite actors, although there are also Sunni ones, such as Hamas. This axis stands as a key element to expand Iran's influence and achieve strategic depth (DIA, 2019, p. 15). These four main proxies of Iran make up what has been known as “the four cities strategy”, with which Tehran seeks to consolidate its influence on its path towards regional hegemony. Except Syria, the rest are non-state actors and there are also groups proxies among the Shiite militias of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bahrain and Nigeria. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad would add 18 men; Hizbullah 000; the Houthis would number 50 and the Syrian militias 000. In addition, we must add the 100 members of the Popular Mobilization Force; 000 from the Fatemiyoun Brigade and 12 from the Zainaboyoun Brigade. In total, 000 militiamen and paramilitaries controlled or closely linked to the Quds Force (Zamir, 122, pp. 000-20).
Military doctrine
Just as the US has a system of strategic development and doctrine formation that is reflected in the National Security Strategy, Iran develops its strategy and doctrine from a document established by the supreme leader known as the “20-Year Vision.” ”. From this document, five-year development plans are created that not only guide the country's economic policy, but also provide guidelines for security requirements and areas of defense investment. To carry out this process, the supreme leader and his advisors receive information and advice from the General Staff and other people responsible for the regime's foreign and defense policy (McLnnis, 2017a, p. 4).
Within the Iranian doctrinal framework, Disvallar distinguishes two phases and a third in development even today. The first, called Effective DeterrenceIt was developed between 2003-2010 and was based on the size of the country, which provided sufficient strategic depth to wear down the enemy, which would imply the deterrence of an eventual invasion. The Mosaic doctrine was part of it and will be explained later. In turn, access/area denial capabilities were incorporated A2 / AD. However, it is a doctrine that was only valid to face an invasion like the one suffered by Iraq. The second phase of Iranian military doctrine was formulated between 2011 and 2014 in response to the threat posed by Israel, ISIS and the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The defensive nature was still present, but emphasis was placed on the network of proxies and in the extensive arsenal of ballistic missiles as a means of deterrence. As for the third phase, not yet completed, it is based on the premise that “the limited second strike doctrine” will not be able to deter the aggression of an alliance formed by the US, Israel and the GCC, so further expansion of the battle zone is required. A doctrine of “massive retaliation” would then be chosen.[10].
In short, Iran has undergone a transformation towards an “advanced defense” doctrine motivated by its limitations in conventional warfare. The aim is to achieve an “interplay between conventional deterrence and plausible deniability.” The lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan were decisive in demonstrating the potential represented by their proxies, unmanned aerial vehicles and missile force. This doctrine is based on “capitalizing on the weaknesses of its rivals by employing cost-effective solutions to protect Iran from enemy attacks.” In essence, it represents an insightful interplay of doctrines “both offensive and defensive while building on the concept of conventional deterrence” (Ahmed, 2020, pp. 4-5).
Arasli highlights that the development of the Iranian asymmetric doctrine experienced a notable boost in the first half of 2003, in the context of the operation Iraqi Freedom. In this scenario, its military inferiority to the United States in a conventional conflict was evident to the Iranian regime, so every effort was made to develop “effective deterrence by all means.” It is a doctrine that the regime's strategists understand as a way to “deter, deny, mitigate or annul the use of overwhelming military force,” such as that of the United States, but that can also be extrapolated to Israel, with a much more modern army than the Iranian one[11]. The principles and parameters of this doctrine were the following, according to Arasli, and could be divided between those used in times of peace and those used in times of war. Regarding the former, the aim is to deter a military attack by using all available means (hard y soft power and deception). The high preparation of its Armed Forces and the development of an indigenous and self-sufficient defense industry were also emphasized. In the context of war, first of all, the decentralization of military force is advocated “to mitigate air power, firepower, intelligence capabilities, battlefield information dominance, and spectrum control.” enemy's electromagnetic The incorporation of unconventional tactics, such as terrorism, is considered a very important element. Innovation and the element of surprise are also promoted, in addition to concentrating the main effort on the enemy's weak points (center of gravity). In addition, the use of allied forces and proxy, as well as political, information and psychological warfare strategies in conjunction with the military effort. Finally, the importance of the human factor is highlighted, especially with regard to religious fervor and the disposition towards “the effort for martyrdom.”[12].
This last aspect, related to the practice of martyrdom, was identified by Arasli as the distinctive element that differentiates the Iranian approach from the rest of “similar doctrinal and conceptual visions.” The philosophy of martyrdom and suffering is strongly rooted in Shiite eschatology and was strengthened after the Islamic revolution of 1979 through a series of “radical and extreme” interpretations of Islam. These interpretations were evident in the war against Iraq, where authentic “human waves” were pushed through the Iraqi minefields. However, these practices were put aside once the conflict ended and it was not until 2004 that a review of these experiences related to martyrdom was carried out. In this process, new elements inspired by the Iraqi and Palestinian insurgency, as well as Al-Qaeda suicide attacks, were added. In turn, there was a public campaign to recruit volunteers for these suicidal practices destined to serve in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and in the force Basij. According to official statistics, before March 21, 2006, the date of the Iranian New Year, 53 volunteers, both domestic and foreign, had applied. Surprising as it may seem, this practice of martyrdom is seen by Iranian leaders as an “absolute weapon” capable of deterring or defeating a possible attack by the US or Israel. Iran is the only country in the world that officially has suicide units, thus making this practice “a crucial force multiplier against any aggressor in any future conflict with Iran.”[13]. How effective this practice can be is a challenge, especially considering the limited effectiveness of Japanese kamikaze attacks during World War II. However, it would also be a serious mistake to underestimate the possible damage caused by thousands of volunteers willing to sacrifice. This strategy may have taken a backseat as a result of Iran's continued development and improvement of drones, in search of more advanced and efficient tactics.
Another peculiarity of the Iranian defense system is that it is based on a hybrid system that bears similarities to past structures, such as the case of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, which had the Army and the Republican Guard. Similarly, in a historical context, Nazi Germany with the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS[14]. Thus, the Armed Forces are divided into two branches. On the one hand, the regular forces or Artish and, on the other, the IRGC. The first is focused on defense against external threats, while the IRGC is tasked with defending both external and internal threats, in collaboration with the Artish (DIA, 2019, p. 10). As he Artish like the IRGC have their origins in the 1979 revolution, and currently, the latter plays a fundamental role in the Iranian regime, holding significant political, military and economic power. It is responsible for the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the alleged development of nuclear weapons (Ottolenghi, 2011, p. III). According to data provided by The Military Balance By 2023, Iran's total active force consists of 610 men, distributed as follows: 000 in the Army, 350 in the IRGC, 000 in the Navy, 190 in the Air Force, and 000 in Air Defense. Additionally, it is estimated that there are between 18 and 000 members of the gendarmerie and paramilitary forces. Likewise, there are nearly 37 reservists and approximately 000 armed men of the paramilitary militia can be counted on. Basij (2023, pp. 324-328).
The Shah had left a modern and highly trained army, but the new leaders doubted his loyalty, which led to a purge in the Armed Forces, especially affecting an officer corps that had received training abroad (Ahmad, 2020, p. 3). The historic rivalries between the IRGC and Artesh are a thing of the past. Both forces are firmly controlled and indoctrinated by the regime's clerics, since the Iranian Constitution, in its article 144, establishes the "Islamization" of the military.[15]. In the previously mentioned declassified AWG document, the need for Western analysts to avoid underestimating the importance of the Islamic revolution in Iranian military doctrine is rightly highlighted. This importance is enshrined in the 1979 Constitution itself (with amendments until 1989), since officers are not only selected based on their tactical attitudes, but also on their religious “credentials” (AWG, 2017, p. 14). In its preamble, in the section titled “An Ideological Army,” it is stated that “in the training and equipping of the country's defense forces, due attention must be paid to faith and ideology as the criteria.” basic”[16]. The hostile environment in which the country finds itself has forced it to develop an asymmetric warfare doctrine focused on “exploiting enemy weaknesses” and establishing credible deterrence, despite the significant limitations of its military apparatus. To achieve this purpose, Iran makes use of its considerable missile force, its naval capabilities, the Quds Force, as well as groups proxy and the practice of terrorism (AWG, 2017, p. 14).
It is relevant to highlight the importance that Iran attributes to psychological warfare, showing its military capabilities through various means, such as publications, the Internet and official statements. Arasli highlights that this approach seeks to achieve specific political and propaganda goals. On the one hand, an explicit challenge towards the West, which sometimes translates into selective attacks (Gil, 2023). On the other hand, the recurring practice of misinformation about its true military capabilities, with the aim of confusing its enemies. Likewise, the deterrence strategy previously addressed in this work. Finally, it is worth highlighting the regular manifestation of its military power, directed both at the Iranian people and at the entire Muslim world.[17].
According to Mclnnis, Iranian military doctrine is based on military lessons learned, especially after the war against Iraq. Its objective is to find pragmatic solutions to the continuous security challenges it faces “within the framework of the ideological and strategic concepts of the State.” Ideology is an important component in the IRGC, especially in the Quds Force. The IRGC has an approach towards guerrilla warfare and terrorism through groups proxy, as well as towards strategies such as the mosaic doctrine. Over time, Iranian doctrine has gained complexity, often through trial and error, incorporating foreign teachings in many of its aspects, mainly from the United States. Something similar happens with foreign technology, for which there are few restrictions. . In short, it follows the “tradition of the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasty of sanctioning the adoption and subsequent Iranianization of anything effective in war” (Mclnnis, 2017b, p.3). To a large extent, this doctrine appears to be limited to “defense, deterrence and asymmetric warfare.” However, Mclnnis acknowledges that the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles in Syria appears to indicate Iran's growing involvement in conventional offensive operations (Mclnnis, 2017b, p. 3). In any case, Iran's offensive doctrine basically seeks to export the Islamic revolution and increase influence outside its borders, as has been repeated previously. At the same time, these measures allow the creation and maintenance of a significant number of proxies that can be used for deterrence. But when it comes to classic offensive doctrine, it still has a long way to go. However, it is true that the IRGC has increasingly integrated conventional capabilities into its unconventional campaigns carried out in Syria and Iraq (Mclnnis, 2017a, p. 2).
Hybrid warfare
The AWG document breaks down the Iranian doctrine into several points: hybrid warfare, mosaic defense doctrine, naval, air and cyber doctrine. Regarding hybrid warfare, it is highlighted that asymmetric warfare practiced by Iran “is a comprehensive strategy designed to overcome Iran's inability to match the power of the US through tactics that exploit alleged Western vulnerabilities.” The term hybrid war is used to describe the tools used by Tehran in developing this strategy. Likewise, the document reflects how the Iranian doctrine is, in general, defensive, based on area and access denial. A2 / AD. Conventional land warfare would constitute the core of this defensive doctrine, “but it takes a backseat to the increasingly aggressive and forward-looking posture that seeks to create a layered deterrence by maintaining friendly states and groups proxy”. Due to its military inferiority compared to its regional enemies, Iran has allocated significant resources to its missile systems and the development of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Likewise, it is noted that Iran has analyzed US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, concluding that it is capable of responding to the overwhelming superiority of the US and its aversion to casualties through the use of drones and swarms of boats (AWG, 2017 , pp. 15-16).
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