The Ukrainian War III: From the reconquest of Kherson to stagnation

«The Ukrainian War III: From the reconquest of Kherson to stagnation» It is the third book dedicated to the Ukrainian War by Armies. Coordinated by Beatriz Cózar Murillo and Christian D. Villanueva López, it aims to clarify some of the key moments of a conflict that seems long. Following the line of the two previous volumes, it combines rigor and depth with an effort to adapt the content to audiences outside the military world.

Almost two years have passed since Russia invaded Ukraine. The frustrated attempt to decapitate the Ukrainian government has led to a war that still seems far from being resolved. In this third book, a critical period is covered, without which it is impossible to understand the current situation. A period of time that goes from the Ukrainian reconquest of Kherson to the subsequent changes in Russian strategy. A before and after that has allowed Russia to take the war to a new phase of stagnation while the costs for Ukraine's allies increase. Also bring back the pulse of a Russian Army that has suffered enormous casualties, but that has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt.

In addition to analyzing their behavior, this work also deals with various aspects, such as war in the cyber, maritime or cognitive domain, as well as the fundamental role that an organization like Wagner Group has had in several of its phases. Finally, as it could not be otherwise, an important space is dedicated to the role and evolution of unmanned aerial systems, key elements whose multiplication helps to explain to a large extent the future of this war.

Index of «The Ukrainian War III: from the reconquest of Kherson to stagnation»

• List of acronyms

• Foreword, by Francisco J. Dacoba Cerviño, general director of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies

• Chapter 1. The bear in the maze. Preliminary lessons from Russian military performance in Ukraine, by Guillem Colom Piella.

• Chapter 2. The Jersón campaign. From the Russian invasion to the Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2022, by Gonzalo M. Vallejo Quevedo.

• Chapter 3. Mobilization and adaptation. The arrival of surovikin and the new Russian strategy in Ukraine, by Christian D. Villanueva López.

• Chapter 4. The use of drones in the Ukrainian war, by Juan Luis Chulilla Cano, Jesús Román García and Christian D. Villanueva López.

• Chapter 5. The Ukrainian war in its naval aspect, by Augusto Conte de los Ríos.

• Chapter 6. The cyberwar that was not. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine seen from the cyber domain, by Josué Expósito Guisado.

• Chapter 7. Strategic communication in the Ukrainian war, by Clara Rodríguez Chirino and Paula Redondo Álvarez-Palencia.

• Chapter 8. The Wagner group. An unclassifiable phenomenon, by Francisco J. Matías Bueno

• Final considerations, by Beatriz Cózar Murillo and Christian D. Villanueva López

• Bibliography

• About the authors