On Wednesday, November 11, 2020, a document was published on the official website of the Russian Government, pending presidential ratification, of utmost importance for Russian foreign strategy. The text included a proposal for an agreement intended for the government of Sudan that, if materialized, would culminate in the opening of a permanent Russian naval base in the Red Sea. It is therefore necessary to analyze the context in which the news occurred, the possible motivations of the Kremlin and the foreseeable consequences of this movement.
The published document is an essential first step, which still has many steps left before it becomes a reality. Firstly, within the Russian Federation itself, it must have the approval of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin - something that is taken for granted. Subsequently, in Sudan, it needs the support of the transitional government currently in power, which is not so certain given the complex internal situation of the African country.
The agreement with Sudan would allow the Eurasian giant to have “a logistical support center” where repairs would be carried out (without specifying their complexity), Russian Navy ships could be resupplied and which could also serve to the rest of the crews during their deployments in the Indian Ocean. The agreement would have a duration initial period of 25 years, in addition to a renewal clause for periods of 10 years.
According to Coordinates that appear in the draft 30 pages, the base would be located north of the city of Port Sudan, somewhat away from the merchandise port. The facilities could house a maximum of 300 military and civilian personnel, four ships and, most importantly, these would include those powered by nuclear energy. This means that both class nuclear cruisers could stop there Kirov such as submarines, including strategic ones.
The proposed size for this one is striking. It is true that 300 troops may not seem like many, but it is also worth remembering that before its remodeling, the Tartús naval base barely had any. 50 effective between sailors and technicians.
Another important point of the agreement has to do with the use of this base as a point of arrival for supplies to reinforce Russian activities in Africa. Thus, Russia will be able to transport through the ports and airports of Sudan, “weapons, ammunition, and equipment” necessary for its operation, but not only. Taking into account that from Sudan Russia distributes weapons and mercenaries to Libya and the Central African Republic, this point may be important.
This agreement, of great importance and significance, would be framed within what some call the new Scramble for Africa, in which different powers try to increase their presence on the continent. This especially affects emerging and revisionist powers such as Turkey or China, but also others that seek to boldly improve their international status, such as Russia, and that want to recover part of the lost weight. In the case of the latter, it could be said that it has arrived late in the race despite its previous establishment in Africa (in Soviet times), but using a peculiar asymmetric and low-cost strategy, it is managing to significantly increase its influence on the continent. black.
This is partly the importance of the document that we learned about on the 11th. If until now Russia has used bases, for example in Libya, but always trying to maintain plausible deniability and has based its strategy on offering services to local leaders to consolidate its power, this is different. Instead of investing very little money to operate through third parties (proxies) or sending PMCs like Wagner to support the current leader on his throne, obtaining extraordinary returns, in this case the change in strategy is notable. .
Military bases, no matter how you look at them, cannot be considered an asymmetric element, but precisely something that is only at the disposal of the most important powers, since they represent a charge for the public coffers of great importance. In fact, in the United States itself, the country that has by far the most bases abroad, there have been quite a few debates around this issue. Indeed, there are many voices that maintain that the benefits of having bases abroad are less than the large costs associated with them and that it would be more appropriate to invest in projection means to use them at great distances if necessary, than not to spend money each year in sustaining vulnerable sites.
Russia and the Horn of Africa
During the Cold War, the USSR was a key actor in the Horn of Africa, where it established relations with different countries, although following a poorly cohesive strategy. In the area there were bases in Dahlak, Aden and Socotra, at a time when the Red Army moved freely through the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, Somalia and Djibouti were two states with which it established important relations, until the Ogaden War (1977-1978), when these ties were broken by supporting its rival, Ethiopia. The end of the USSR also coincides more or less temporarily with the loss of influence in two other allied states, South Yemen and Ethiopia, with the VMF withdrawing from the Indian Ocean except in a very specific and almost anecdotal manner until a few years ago.
After the Russian withdrawal and the significant loss of influence in the area, we have to wait until the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000) to once again see an active role for the Kremlin in the region. Russia intervened in this conflict indirectly, using both mercenaries and, in specific cases, personnel from its own armed forces to build a capable air force, something that was key in the war.
However, that presence was just a mirage and Russia was not in the political, economic, or military conditions to sustain a permanent presence of importance. However, the situation in the Horn of Africa changed since September 2008, when the Russian Federation began to take part along with the rest of the nations in international missions in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden. And although Russia does not act as a member of these missions, It does coordinate its efforts with the rest of the ships stationed there, such as those taking part in the operation Atalanta, or at the time those of Ocean Shield, producing a certain degree of integration.
With everything, we had to wait for the Ukrainian War in 2014, and the establishment of sanctions by the West so that Russia began to increase its presence in Africa without complexes, something possible largely due to the success of its military mission in Syria and after adopting a new intervention model based on support local leaders by offering a full range of services to keep them in power, much like, although on a much smaller scale, as it did with Assad himself in Syria. It has been precisely the image of Russia as a reliable partner that has derived from this conflict and the support provided to Assad that has allowed it to win new friends in Africa, something that it has been able to take advantage of in recent years.
Sudan, a key player in the Russian axis of influence
Returning now to Sudan, the regime that for decades had Lieutenant General Omar al-Bashir as its visible head, deposed in April 2019, has been involved for many years in several armed conflicts (Darfur, for example), in which They have committed numerous war crimes. This has significantly tarnished the country's external image and, as could not be otherwise, it has been subjected to continuous international pressure, which has left Sudan isolated. A favorable context for Russia, which has thus been able to export weapons and increase its influence with ease, in addition to accessing the country's resources, protecting in return the Sudanese regime with its veto power in the United Nations Security Council.
Along with the sale of weapons and the diplomatic shield provided to Sudan, Moscow has deployed other of its tools, already used successfully in Libya or Syria, such as Wagner Group mercenaries with the mission of training and advising Sudanese troops. Additionally, he has also offered services that include counseling against “Color Revolutions,” the information war, and the simple and plain internal repression.
The latter could be perfectly seen during the protests that led to the overthrow of the dictator Bashir. Support for repression, first by Bashir himself, and then by the Military Junta that deposed him, has recently endangered the relationship between Russia and Sudan, since the opposition has come to share power with the military since August 2019. Russia has moved skillfully since then to be able to get closer to Sudanese civil society, which was resentful of the Kremlin's role, and has done so by supporting the opposition-military agreement, thus demonstrating its ability to adapt to the change of scenario.
Regarding the military issue, in recent years Sudan and Russia had formally strengthened the strong ties they already had through a series of agreements. In fact, the draft for an agreement on a possible naval base would have been drafted some time ago and would have been offered to Sudan for the first time in November 2017, during a visit by former president Omar al-Bashir to Moscow.
Subsequently, in 2019, a bilateral agreement in terms of security with a duration of seven years, according to which, there would be “an exchange of opinions and information on military and political issues and issues of strengthening mutual trust and international security, an exchange of experience of peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN, interaction in the search and rescue at sea and the development of relationships in the joint training of troops”. Under it, Russian ships were also allowed access to the sudanese ports. As part of this agreement, Russia has donated a training ship for the Sudanese navy.
In this context, everything indicates that Sudan, despite its limited economic capacity, will continue to be one of the main buyers of Russian weapons on the continent, as they have recently made clear, Russia accepting access to Sudanese raw materials as a form of payment.
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