At the end of January 2024, the Harpia publishing house had the excellent idea of publishing “Operation Eldorado Canyon. “The 1986 US Bombing Raid on Libya.” As its title indicates, this issue describes in great detail the previous events that culminated in the US bombing of Muammar Gaddafi's Libya in 1986, the different stages of planning and preparation that led to its possible realization and, of course, the execution of the operation.
For those who do not know it, -and it is a very important fact- its author, the Major Jim Rotramel (equivalent to commander of the Spanish Air and Space Army), now retired, is a former Combat Systems Officer ('Weapon System Officer' or WSO) of the F-111D and F Aadvark ('Aardvark' in Afrikaans) of the USAF. The naturalness and everyday nature with which the different weapon systems (and not only) are described and evaluated, as well as advantages, disadvantages and the operational decisions that led to using one or the other, exude an expert familiarity and knowledge of them that is difficult to understand. find another way. Apart from the pilots and WSO who carried it out, there are probably few people better than Rotramel to talk about the topic at hand.
The work «Operation Eldorado Canyon. The 1986 US Bombing Raid on Libya» It is divided into ten chapters and an annex, although its subdivision is not of much relevance. The first chapter addresses the issue of the escalation of tensions between the US administrations of Jimmy Carter until 1981 first and that of Ronald Reagan later, and Gaddafi's Libya. This escalation included the financing of international terrorism by the latter and the defense of freedom of navigation ('Freedom of Nagivation') in the Mediterranean with the former's aircraft carrier groups in what was known as 'The Line of Death'. ('Line of Death'), a Libyan claim without legal basis on the Gulf of Sidra as its own sea.
The second chapter develops the escalation that would lead to different actions that served to improve the planning processes and actions on the ground of the USAF. This section describes the events that led to the perfection of these operations with the more than disappointing experience of the USS Independence (CV-62) and the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in Lebanon in 1983 that led to the downing of several aircraft during the operation and the capture of a pair of American pilots by Syrian authorities. Also carried out as part of this learning were the 'Attain Document' operations in January and April 1986 and the 'Prairie Fire' operation in March 1986, which culminated in the damage and/or sinking of 2 Libyan corvettes and 2 patrol ships, as well as as a first contact with the Libyan forces both on land - anti-aircraft defenses - and at sea and especially in the air.
Not only the financing and training of international terrorism by Muammar Gaddafi, but the continuous harassment of US military and diplomatic personnel abroad - carrying out attacks against them - caused the tension between both countries to grow to such an extent. a point that ended up leading to a strategic punitive action that managed to paralyze Libyan activities against the West. This operation was named El Dorado Canyon. The study of this evolution is of special relevance these days, as it perfectly documents how the achievement of small actions in the known as 'Gray Zone' accumulated over time They can trigger forceful responses by certain actors to end the escalation. This is one of them.
The majority of the book, that said, focuses on the performance performed by F-111Fs refueled primarily by KC-10A and KC-135A and supported by USAF EF-111As based at RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom. The author dedicates up to five chapters to dissecting the day-to-day operation. As well as another for planning and preparation, and a sixth for his return. The complexity of the operation was colossal, especially because neither France nor Spain agreed to overfly their territory during it, which forced the transit time to double, creating truly complex in-flight resupply schemes. Both for the going and for the return. All this was aggravated by the tactical radio silence in which practically the entire mission was carried out to maintain strategic surprise and the limitations of the inertial navigation systems technology of the time, which were many.
From a technical point of view, the book will not leave anyone indifferent, as it develops both the technical specificities of the different weapons, personnel and organizational systems and the different aircraft used and also how the lessons learned from other previous experiences helped improve processes within the USAF at the level of responsibilities, selection of objectives, clarity in the message, and being able to better concatenate ends, means and ways.
As an example, the limitations for recording attacks with the AVTR (Airbourne Video Tape Recorder) system are perfectly explained; or the discussions around the different ammunition to use. Since the decision not to use the most modern GBU-24/B Paveway III bombs (2000 pounds), a system that had just been declared operational the same month as the operation, but with a limited number of LLLGB kits (Low-Level Laser-Guided Bombs, or Low Altitude Laser Guidance Bombs) and with a clear lack of experience of the pilots with them (and evaluation tests) were not used. Or why the GBU-12 Paweway II (500 pounds) - the one recommended by the planning team for being more precise, but with less destructive capacity - was also discarded, since greater 'apparent' destruction was sought in the images to subsequently disseminate that would convey greater media and political impact. Ending up using munitions that were known to be 'inferior' - the GBU-10E/B Paveway II (2000 pounds) and Mk 82/BSU-49 (500 pounds) - but for which they were fully trained and with an acceptable evaluation history. .
Although the book only reflects in great detail the F-111F part of the operation, a chapter, the eighth, is also included, which describes the attacks carried out by the A-6E (Intruder) TRAM (equipped with Target Recognition and Attack Multi-sensors) of the US Navy aboard the USS Coral Sea (CV-43) and USS America (CV-66), as well as the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) support that the mission received from the A-7E Corsair II and F/A-18A Hornet (armed with HARMs) of the US Navy and the US Marine Corps, and countless support aircraft for both electronic warfare (such as the EA-6B Prowler) and early warning from both the aircraft carrier group and nearby bases in the Mediterranean.
Although this part is generally forgotten in history books because it does not arouse the same interest as the rest, the ninth chapter focuses on the return of the F-111F and their home bases in the United Kingdom. It is certainly the most human chapter of all and includes the different 'incidents' that occurred during the return. For example, two KC-10A from the first wave that had to land at NAS Sigonella or ELTON 43, an F-111F from the third air formation that had to make an emergency landing at the Rota Naval Air Base (NS Broken).
One of the undoubtedly most interesting parts of the volume is the reconstruction with satellite photos full of indications of the attack trajectories of the different aircraft - in addition to the support vehicles during them as well as their simultaneous attacks against the Libyan anti-aircraft defenses -, the planned location and final impact of the attacks, divided and detailed by type of ammunition, sensors and methods used, with Battlefield Damage Assessment and an analysis of the results a posteriori thanks to the meager results of the missions of the SR-71A after different attempts. Due to the clouds, up to three attempts were needed. The videos of BBC journalists ended up being used to complement the unsuccessful reconnaissance flights.
Of special interest are the evaluation from the Soviet point of view, based on a report written by the later Air General of the Soviet Air Force, Aleksandr Koldunov, on it and the performance of the Libyan anti-aircraft defenses of Soviet origin. Also the book's author's appreciation of the losses in the Libyan IADS, and the lessons learned from the last chapter, which are all included in this work.
The author also provides a vision, undoubtedly key, to understand the problems that occur during this type of operations. For example, the problems caused by following the procedures of different entities to the letter, but when put together, they interfere with each other and end up causing a severe failure in the planning process. In this case, the rigid authorization procedures for access to satellite images of the targets to be attacked caused a serious lack of intelligence support in the early phases of the planning process that could have been disastrous, since authorization was denied to the pilots who had to plan attacks on said satellite images for weeks, hindering the operation.
The book is a story not only from the perspective of planning and technical operational, which are excellent, but also human with multiple perspectives from each aircraft -pilots and WSO- both prior to the operation and during it. Furthermore, he is full of well-rehearsed anecdotes to understand the human dimension of these operations, as well as how geographically and politically distant and at the same time so close that the chains of command can be in such operations with a marked strategic nature. An example of this is the handwritten notes in the margin of the plan that the pilots received once it was reviewed by Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, conveying the president's key ideas to the planning team.
In addition to all this, the book explains with crystal clarity the complexities of the time when planning an operation of such magnitude with two services such as the USAF and the US Navy, which also included the deployment of the two aircraft carriers, the USS Coral Sea (CV-43) and the USS America (CV-66), and a wide range of other assets that were not yet available on board them, such as the Grumman A-6 Intruder for SEAD and ECM against the Libyan IADS, but which were essential for the success of the mission. Not only the general coordination of the two services, but the distribution of objectives, deployments, the different supports around the mission - such as SAR missions -, mutual coverage, coordination times, the distribution of intelligence on the operation, etc.
In relation to the above, it is also very interesting that this unusual bicephaly also allows a comparative analysis between the part of the operation carried out by the USAF and that of the US Navy, to end up concluding that the lack of greater SEAD support for the USAF during the mission - which was intended to benefit from surprise - ended up harming it, with the consequent downing of one of its devices, and which worked (thanks to said support) very effectively for the US Navy.
In addition to this, there are also certainly impressive parts of the book such as the impressive display and take-off of the 'Elephant Walk' ('herd of elephants') which must have constituted the majestic spectacle of 24 tanker planes taking off at once from Lakenheath. A coordinated operation from up to 6 different airports in radio silence, and that in total would involve 24 attack F-111F and 4 EF-111F support, as well as three dozen KC-10A, KC-135A, KC tanker aircraft -135E, and KC-135Q.
Needless to say, the book presents a magnificent and very complete order of battle of both the USAF and US Navy strike groups, and the corresponding unit emblems.
In short, if someone wants to know how combined operations of strategic impact are carried out - or were carried out in 1986 - from the political level to the (above all) tactical and operational level, passing through their technical details, this is undoubtedly a job that will not interest them. will leave you indifferent.
For more details: https://harpia-publishing.com/hapbook/389
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