In March 2015, the tanks of the Houthi coup plotters and the Yemeni army loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh managed to reach the last large city controlled by the government of Abd Rabbu Mansur al-Hadi. At that moment the Saudis, seeing their man fall, decided to intervene definitively to support the latter, initiating a series of operations that cannot be understood without considering the maritime scenario, surely the most unknown dimension of this bloody conflict.
In 1990 Yemen was unified from South Yemen and North Yemen, creating that same year the “Yemen Navy and Coastal Defense” (QBWS), from the remains of the previous states. Particularly noteworthy is the important heritage of South Yemen, a country that had granted the Soviet Union a base on the island of Socotra and which, in return, received material and advice from Moscow.
Already in 1990, the QBWS had a fleet focused on coastal defense and equipped with ships of Soviet and Chinese origin of the Osa, Tarantul and Huangfeng classes (the latter being mere Chinese copies of the Osa class), as well as a good number of patrol boats armed with rapid-fire cannons and unguided rockets and a flotilla of supply ships of Soviet-Polish design of the Polnocny class, important to be able to move troops to the different island territories such as Socotra or Hanish, strategic due to their position at the entrance of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, respectively, one of the busiest shipping routes in the world and crucial for the transport of crude oil.
However, since the unification of the country and especially since the civil war of 1994, the importance of the QBWS had been secondary, hence little attention was paid to it in the following decades, which led to obsolescence and giving up. goes down to the main surface ships. Patrol boats and minesweepers were then used as the main means of combat, in the case of the Australian P-1022. However, it should be said that in 1995 two Rubezh coastal defense systems were acquired, to which up to 65 P-15M Termit anti-ship missiles must be added.
Those purchases could well have been the result of tensions between the newborn unified state of Yemen and Eritrea, since at that time there was a bitter territorial dispute over the Zaqar-Hanis archipelago between both countries, and in particular over the island of Greater Hanish. The fact is that the island began to be exploited by a German tourist company under the protection of several hundred soldiers deployed in Sana'a, a situation in which the Eritrean government demanded the immediate withdrawal of said troops to return to the status quo ante, everything this under the threat of a month-long ultimatum that would expire on December 11, 1995.
Faced with Sana'a's refusal, the Eritrean army organized a quick amphibious raid that reportedly included airborne elements. The Eritreans barely had traditional fishing boats and a ferry but even with this meager force they were able to reach Hanish Mayor and disembark without any problem, after which they overwhelmed the defenders. The fact that the Yemeni navy had not been able to even send a single of its surface ships, which could undoubtedly have eliminated the entire enemy fleet, is worth taking into account. In any case, after this debacle, the QBWS continued to play an increasingly anecdotal role. However, although it is not entirely clear, it is believed that before 2015 Yemen's dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh had purchased Iranian Noor-type missiles, an indigenous version of the Chinese C-802, although it is also possible that Tehran supplied them. to the Houthis from the beginning of the direct conflict with Saudi Arabia and its acolytes, given their interest in keeping the conflict entrenched. In any case, they would become an important vector in future stages.
Finally, it is also worth noting that Yemen, despite its extreme poverty, has managed to have some of its own manufacturing capacity that has allowed it to have homemade explosives, artillery, drones and even armored cars like the Jalal 3, widely used during the war. civil, to which must be added a certain transfer of knowledge by Iran, aimed at reinforcing the Houthi war effort, all of which would have its importance, as we will see.
Naval resources
When the Arab military intervention in Yemen took place, the area was not free of other military forces, since on the other side of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is Djibouti, where Japan, France, Italy, the United States and China have military bases. . Furthermore, somewhat further south, in Somalia, since 2008 Operation Atalanta had been carried out, led by the European Union within the framework of the European Union Naval Force (EU-NAVFOR), which involved the permanent deployment in the area of at least one a pair of warships, normally a frigate or corvette, along with maritime patrol aircraft.
For its part, China had carried out an evacuation operation of its civilian population reminiscent of the one carried out in Libya, in which some 600 Chinese citizens were concentrated in the port of Aden, where a pair of Type 054A frigates took them out of the country. Türkiye also sent a frigate for a similar operation. The navies of India and Pakistan were also present in the area. The first in anti-piracy and evacuation missions and the second in the Hodeida port area.
Finally, the ubiquitous U.S. The Navy had a varied flotilla that included a pair of amphibious assault ships, a supply ship and a destroyer as escort, while from the Camp Lemonnier base in Djibouti, they maintained several drones in charge of carrying out attack and surveillance operations against the branch of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
A separate case is that of Saudi Arabia and its allies. Starting with the intervention in March 2015, the Saudis forged an important coalition in which the greatest effort was made on land, despite which, the United Arab Emirates sent Baynuna class corvettes with a displacement of 900 tons, missile patrol boats domestically built Ghannatha-class corvettes and Murray Jibs-class corvettes. The latter are boats manufactured by Lürssen and, despite the fact that they barely displace 600 tons, they have a heliport, a 76 mm Oto Melara cannon in the bow, a 30 mm CIWS Goalkeeper located in the center of the ship looking aft, as well as Crotale anti-aircraft and Exocet anti-ship missiles.
Egypt temporarily provided a pair of Ezzat and Ramadan class missile boats respectively, the Oliver Hazard Perry class Alexandria frigate and the Jianghu II class Al-Nasser, the latter with a twin 100mm mount.
For its part, Saudi Arabia - the main interested party in the operation - had three Riyad class frigates, based on the French Lafayette class, with a displacement of 3.000 tons as the main naval vectors, to which we must add four Medina class frigates of 2.000 Tn, four Badr class corvettes of 1.000 Tn, nine Sadiq class patrol boats of about 500 Tn and several Sundown class minesweepers (which would have their role, as we will see), adding in total more than 20 ships suitable for carrying out operations.
The Saudis had a good number of French Dauphin multipurpose helicopters on board. Furthermore, as the war progressed and the situation with Iran worsened, Riyad did not hesitate to draw on its checkbook to significantly improve its capabilities. For example, as of 2017 they confirmed the acquisition of several P-8A Poseidons, essential for naval air operations and to control the Exclusive Economic Zone of Yemen. Likewise, they are in the process of acquiring several dozen German patrol boats and have formalized the purchase of five Avante 2200 corvettes from Navantia.
Despite the size of the naval deployment, the level of coordination between the Arab navies remains unclear, because although at the political level there was a concurrent will to act on Yemen, there is hardly any information about what happened at other levels and we do not know the restrictions that each state imposed on the use of the means provided.
Regarding regional military cooperation, the most important institution was the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), established in 1984 within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council. This institution maintains a permanent army of close to 10.000 soldiers and its headquarters are located in the gigantic King Khalid base. The divergent interests of PSF members make this force difficult to employ, although it already played an important role in sustaining the Bahrain regime after the Arab Spring, and is also one of the few examples of regional military cooperation.
Furthermore, at the end of March 2015, the leaders of the Arab League agreed to form the Joint Arab Military Force in the wake of the Yemen conflict, although it does not seem that this force is destined to act in the Gulf country, but in any case it indicates highlights the little regional cooperation in defense matters, and that apart from a few military exercises, there is not much experience in joint efforts of several navies, which has undoubtedly been detrimental to their ability to carry out naval operations during the conflict. .
Regarding the bases from which they operate, the Saudi Arabian navy has its main naval base in Jedah, in the Red Sea, about 700 km from the Yemeni coastal waters, while the Emirati navy has it in Abu Dhabi, about 2.000 km. However, the latter have sought to improve their position in the area by building at least three bases, one in Somaliland, another in Perim and another in Socotra, the latter has also been joined by Riyad, although more have arrived. later than UAE in this race. North of the Yemen border, in Jizan province, Saudi Arabia also maintains the large King Khalid land and air base, from which the air force and presumably in the future, Saudi P-8As can operate in support of Its navy, for its part, the UAE has Spanish CN-235MPA maritime patrol aircraft and Canadian Dash 8, which could be deployed in Socotra or in some of the Saudi bases.
The geographical environment
Although it has always been an inland country, some areas of Yemen have been oriented towards the sea, since fishing and commercial activity was vital for survival. Already at the beginning of the 1538th century, the Portuguese established some positions in Yemen, taking the city of Aden from the Ottomans in XNUMX, which in turn would later be occupied by the British, attesting to the strategic importance that this country has historically enjoyed.
The coasts are generally quite straight and lack important bays in which to take shelter. Furthermore, the coastal territories are rugged and have complicated orography full of reliefs that favor illicit activities. Much of this Yemeni coast is uninhabited with the exception of the westernmost area of the country where most of the main ports are located.
The coastline totals about 1.900 km, which without representing a significant figure - Spain has 4.960 km - does represent a notable challenge, especially if we take into account the large number of island and archipelagic territories in the Yemeni Red Sea. Towards the south and in the middle of the Indian Ocean, the island of Socotra stands out, a territory protected by the UN due to its natural riches and which is very well located as it is the key to the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa. On the Red Sea coast the main ports are: As-Salif, Mokha (Moca) and Hodeida. Towards the south near the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb is the country's largest port, Aden, and a few kilometers to the east is Abidjan. From there, always heading east, there is little population and the ports are separated by great distances, however it is worth mentioning those of Balhaf, Mukalla, Sayhut, Nishtun and Gaydah. In addition to these, there are also several terminals dedicated to hydrocarbons and that have good port facilities, such as Ash Shihir, controlled by Canadian companies or Ras Isa, in the hands of a state company.
Most of the ports mentioned above are relatively small, so their traffic is dedicated to fishing activities and cabotage navigation used by smugglers and local traders, some of whom are not Yemenis, but Omanis, although above Everything belongs to their tribes, committees, AQAP and Daesh, who have the last word on the small port cities and fishing villages of the east.
At the level of submarine warfare, the Red Sea presents limited opportunities, since the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal make movements outside that theater of operations difficult. The Red Sea itself is relatively narrow and only in its most central areas are there depths below one kilometer. However, it also has its advantages for ASW warfare. Firstly, high temperatures, often exceeding 30ºC, work in favor of submarines by producing conditions in the water that negatively affect the propagation of waves. sound. Secondly, the noise produced by the large number of civilian vessels passing through the area helps the submarines go unnoticed. Finally, the seabed, given its complexity, is ideal for a submarine to go unnoticed.
Perhaps the Gulf of Aden presents better conditions for the use of submarines, both because of its much greater depths and because of the saline transfer of hot underwater water from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. It is a seasonal phenomenon, which increases between May and October, and decreases until it stops between July and August. The salinity in these areas reaches 40%, with all the effects that this high level of salinity has on the bathymetry. Already in the middle of the Second World War, the Italians deployed eight submersibles that achieved some success attacking Allied shipping in support of the Axis forces in North Africa and giving meaning again to the Arabic meaning of Bab el-Mandeb: “Gate of the tears".
The climate is arid, with little rainfall and temperatures that usually range between 25 and 35 degrees, however the monsoon affects the area between June and September, and storms and cyclones also occur in November, when the Indian Ocean leaves to be relatively calm.
The monsoon winds are from the west-southwest in the Gulf of Aden and from the northwest in the southern part of the Red Sea, however when this season passes the winds from the Gulf of Aden come from the northeast.
Around 5% of the world's crude oil passes through Bab el-Mandeb, with dozens of transport ships and especially oil tankers heading to the terminals of the oil pipelines that face the Red Sea, and that come from Saudi Arabia, Sudan or Egypt. In fact, during the Yom-Kippur War the Egyptian navy temporarily blocked navigation in said strait, although not for long, since the U.S. Navy sent a naval force to break said blockade. The alternative route requires a detour around Africa through the Cape of Good Hope, which means several more days of crossing, with the costs that this entails.
In general, we are facing a scenario of reduced seas that forces us to operate on internal lines, and all of this crowned by a strait, relevant, although not vital, for international commercial traffic, but for regional traffic, which is why it has had its role in the Yemeni conflict.
The strategies
The foreign military intervention in Yemen has been orchestrated from the beginning by Riyadh, who has set the main political objectives, which could be summarized as first isolating, and then eliminating Iranian or anti-Saudi influence throughout the territory that comprises Yemen.
Based on the political guidelines, a strategy has been designed that in the maritime aspect is related to the economic blockade and support for land operations. The economic blockade is related to the naval blockade, which is added to the land and air blockades, while support for land operations is combined with positive control of Yemen's waters.
Now, it is important to make it clear that technically, rather than a naval blockade, in reality we would be facing a large campaign of naval patrol and interception, since the access of civilian ships to Yemen has not been systematically prevented, although it is true that has partially suffocated.
Through the economic blockade, the aim is to reduce the morale of the population and the combatants of the enemy side, force them to divert resources from the front to the rear, cause internal disaffection and reduce vital supplies of war material to reduce combat capacity. Houthi.
Naturally, the maritime blockade is a fundamental pillar of the economic blockade, however it must be accepted that an absolute blockade has not been carried out, since in that case the internal situation of a country like Yemen would be so terrible that it would undoubtedly have put the entire International Community against Riyad. Instead, it is a naval blockade that focuses on imports, but does not attack, for example, fishing activity, vital for the survival of the local population.
Although it may seem that Western NGOs, or respect for Human Rights, are not elements that have managed to negatively affect the Saudis and their allies, the truth is that little by little we are seeing how some defense material markets in Europe are have closed due to violations of International Law alleged by several countries, although it is true that for now this is an element of tertiary importance.
Closely related to the naval blockade is obtaining control over the seas, something important that has made it possible to influence combat on land through the supply of war material, naval fire operations and the execution of amphibious operations.
The presence of Emirati and Saudi bases in Socotra at first was probably a way to streamline and improve operations in the Gulf of Aden and Yemen. Subsequently, as the degree of involvement in Yemen increased and bases were established in areas of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, they have become tools to increase regional influence.
Although Saudi Arabia is the main interested party in the Yemen conflict, no one is unaware of its ability to convene, by managing to assemble an Arab coalition that at least gave an image of unity in the first moments of the intervention, although it is true that When it comes down to it, only a handful of countries have contributed in a notable way.
In Arab politics, the UAE and Saudi Arabia itself have long been faithful allies, and the Iranian situation, relations with Qatar and Turkey, the outcome of the Syrian war, or the Arab Spring in Bahrain are undoubtedly events that have favored a much more active regional foreign policy on the part of Abu Dhabi.
Politically and strategically, the UAE has committed to taking charge of the southern front, which starts from Aden and the Indian Ocean, while Saudi Arabia has been responsible for guarding its border and carrying out limited ground attack operations. However, these kinds of spheres of influence are not immovable, especially since Saudi Arabia is the regional power and Yemen is still much closer to its territory.
Another always important actor is the United States, for whom Yemeni waters are important for its regional and naval policy. Regarding the first, the containment of Iranian influence in the region stands out, especially after the paths followed by the Syrian war. In terms of naval strategy and policy, freedom of navigation is a fundamental principle of International Maritime Law historically advocated by the United States, and this right has at times been threatened by Houthi practices of discriminatory attacks against commercial vessels.
The security of maritime traffic is probably an objective shared by practically the entire International Community, and although apparently Tehran could be interested in reducing said security, the truth is that even Iran has exported 415.000 barrels a day to Europe, for example. which would not be in their benefit to torpedo the freedom of navigation in the area.
Along with the Houthi threat to maritime traffic, there is a potential threat that the phenomenon of Somali piracy will be imitated in Yemen, and although this has not yet happened, we must remember that most of the Somali arms black market is nourished by shipments of Yemen, so the result of the conflict will have its echoes on the other side of the Gulf of Aden. Even the practice of pirate activities by groups related to Al Qaeda or Daesh is not at all a crazy possibility in a country in which the state did not even have good control of its territorial sea in its best times.
It must be remembered that the emergence of piracy forces shipowners to spend large sums of money on improving the security of their ships, and insurance policies also increase, so ultimately the entire economy suffers, as does It occurs with any other type of attack that poses a threat to lives, ships or goods. All of this creates a chain effect that costs a lot of money.
In the Iranian case, their actions against Saudi Arabia and its allies through their proxies are part of the regional strategy that they have been implementing for decades and which is aimed at increasing their regional influence and breaking the country's isolation. Regarding the naval dimension of the Yemen conflict, for Iran the most important thing is to be able to circumvent the Saudi blockade and deliver weapons, particularly technologically advanced ones, such as anti-ship missiles, MRBMs, MANPADs or anti-tank missiles. .
The Houthis, for their part, together with former members of the regime and tribes opposed to Hadi, are trying to win the civil war, although given their situation of international isolation, achieving a stalemate that generates a minimum strategic deterrence would be an achievement equivalent to that of Hezbollah against to Israel in 2006.
To achieve strategic deterrence, the Houthis act on three fronts: on the one hand, the land battlefield, on the other, attacks using surface-to-surface missiles against the Saudi rear, and finally, asymmetric naval warfare. Within the latter there are two tools: the attack against maritime traffic, and the attack against warships, in the latter case both tactical objectives are sought, for example avoiding a landing, and strategic objectives, such as maintaining the Saudi navy. away from the coast to avoid a nearby blockade.
Finally, we have the very weakened Yemeni state. On paper, the internationally recognized government is that of Hadi, although it is worth considering whether the majority of the state apparatus has remained in Houthi hands. In any case, Hadi's government, with the remains of the QBWS, supports the Saudis in the naval blockade. by using patrol boats and minesweepers, and at the same time trying to maintain sovereignty over the island territories with relative success. It should be added that it is estimated that Salé and the Houthis controlled 68% of the Yemeni army in June 2015, which would obviously also affect the QBWS.
The absolute dependence on Saudi Arabia and its allies, the state of the QBWS and its transport fleet, the operational costs of actively participating in the naval blockade, the lack of naval infantry, as well as a logistical apparatus mean that in the background Yemen is unable to exercise sovereignty over the most remote territories of the continent, having de facto lost all influence over the Socotra archipelago, including Socotra, Abd al-Kuri, and the uninhabited islands of Samhá and Darsá, which may become nests of piracy and smuggling.
Let us consider that already in 2011, Somali piracy used Socotra as a supply base to increase the radius of action of its attacks and that, where there is no state, pirates, terrorists and other actors take advantage of the circumstances to their advantage.
The naval blockade
The naval blockade on Yemen aims to prevent the arrival of any type of reinforcement (economic, material or technical) to the Houthis. Unfortunately, in the precarious situation in which the country finds itself, it has dramatic humanitarian consequences. In Yemen, hundreds of people die every day due to food shortages, particularly in inland areas where there is hardly any agriculture, fishing is not possible and not everyone owns livestock. The supply of treated water for human consumption has also been reduced due to various factors, giving rise to outbreaks of dysentery and a cholera epidemic, which is especially difficult to combat due to the lack of medicines. The province of Hodeida has been the most affected by this disease, with more than 150.000 cases. On the other hand, Yemen is one of the few countries in the Arabian Peninsula with little oil, a product on which they depend and which has seen its price double while the average income has collapsed. The Red Cross was even forced to purchase 750.000 liters of fuel in order to maintain the supply of potable water in the cities of Hodeida and Taiz throughout December 2017.
As much as it may seem to us, direct attacks on the economy and the civilian population are means of waging war, no matter how cruel they may seem, and there is no doubt that they produce significant wear and tear on the Houthi forces. In fact, if they have not been able to implement a strategy based on the massive use of rockets, it has probably been because the blockade prevented them from receiving the necessary number of these - or key components for their manufacture.
However, the blockade is very imperfect and is exercised from a distance. Given the availability of artillery, battle tanks and other heavy weapons stationed in the main Yemeni ports, as well as the presence of naval mines and anti-ship missiles, it is understandable that it has not been possible for the coalition to obtain absolute control of the coastline. When attempts have been made to seek a blockade close to the ports, notable casualties have been suffered in a short time. Only as the forces of the UAE and its allies have advanced along the western coast of Yemen have they managed to threaten the most important ports, as in the case of Mokha and Hodeida, although at the cost of fierce fighting, due to their importance for the Houthis.
The blockade, imperfect as we said, has not managed to completely cut off the arrival of refreshment material. The Iranians either organize operations through their secret service, or they hire local smugglers to do the work for them, mounted on their small dhows, a type of traditional boat used in half of Asia and of which there are thousands in Yemen. Dhows sail very close to the coast, and go unnoticed by other ships, so in order to be boarded it is necessary to get closer than is prudent to areas where surface ships would run aground or be exposed to artillery, missiles and other Houthi weapons, hence the difficulty of cutting off arms trafficking. The boarding pieces of the Saudi-led coalition ships also do not have a relevant role, since the traffickers are usually well equipped with weapons. For example, in September 2018 the North American destroyer Jason Dunham intercepted more than a thousand AK47 assault rifles on a simple skiff, while on other occasions larger ships have been captured with Toophan, Delavieh, Tosan anti-tank missiles, thousands of AKMs. , machine guns and RPG-7... At least, the blockade does practically eliminate the arrival of heavy material, which is no small thing.
The fact that after three years of war the Houthis still have the means to fight indicates that the naval blockade has not been effective, since it is obvious that the weapons have been entering by sea. Going one step further and approaching the coast, thus limiting fishing activity, which is the perfect disguise for smugglers, would mean leaving ships and crews exposed to coastal artillery, anti-tank weapons and traffickers who are perfectly armed, which is also not true. seems to be within Arab intentions. A compromise solution has therefore been reached.
Arab operations
The Riyadh-led coalition's intervention began with a naval fire support operation by the Saudi Navy. Between March and July 2015, Hadi's last major bridgehead in Yemen was in the city of Aden, where Saleh and the Houthis had concentrated their weakened forces after several offensives. In Aden, the South Yemen Secessionist Committees had been formed, joined by other factions and some units of the regular army, and despite this the advance of the insurgents had not been able to be stopped. In fact, the Saudis had waited until the last moment for Hadi's troops to contain the enemy on their own. Since this did not happen, the Houthis instead reached several very important port terminals in Aden. From this critical moment, the 100 and 76 mm Giat and Oto Melara cannons began to shell the Houthis, who saw several of their attacks stopped by the precise fire of naval artillery that possibly fired tensely, something for which the Compact Mark 2 cannon with 23 kg HE projectiles of the Riyad class frigates is especially well positioned. As soon as the battle of Aden was over, and the international airport could be secured, an air and naval bridge began to reinforce Hadi's forces and begin a ground counteroffensive. This naval bridge was essential since the central areas of Yemen are dominated by AQAP, Daesh and the tribes. Road infrastructure is minimal if not non-existent, which means that the best way to supply the pro-Hadi has been by sea and, in this sense, logistics ships and the merchant navy have been fundamental to sustaining the entire strategy. of the coalition in Yemen. Thus, thanks to the port of Aden, the
Emirati armored battalion, several thousand Sudanese mechanized troops, South American mercenaries and thousands of tons of weapons and ammunition vital to supporting Hadi, not only in order to fight against the Houthis, but against his own internal enemies in southern Yemen.
Since then there have been several naval operations. At the end of 2015, the island of Hanish Mayor and others in the same archipelago were still in the hands of the pro-Salé, with Hanish Mayor being protected by a garrison of at least 200 soldiers. Hanish had been vacated by the Eritreans in 1998 after an international arbitration that ruled in favor of Yemen, after which a permanent garrison was installed on the island. Halfway between Eritrea and Yemen, according to Riyad, it was used as a logistics center to hide weapons that were later going to be sent to the continent. For all these reasons, at the beginning of December 2015, the Riyad class frigates with the help of the Saudi air force fighter-bombers began a series of attack operations that lasted approximately a couple of weeks and that destroyed most of military posts. This softening was necessary as there were some fortified points on the island, including trenches dug along the beaches and observation posts high up on the elevations. The defenders had reserves of material, including heavy machine guns, RPG-7 grenade launchers and perhaps some BTR-60 armor, but their main means were the ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns, and 20 mm D-152 guns, both types of weapons placed in positions hardened by circular rock walls, which looked towards the coast. The amphibious assault was carried out by a combination of Yemeni troops from the Secessionist Committees, Saudi marines and infantry and for this purpose speedboats were used that carried a platoon each and were escorted by Panther and Cougar helicopters, the latter armed with a cannon. 621 mm Giat M20 lateral side, and all this accompanied by constant naval support fire from the Compact Mark 2 cannons. To maintain the operation, at least one Boraida class logistics ship, belonging to the Saudi navy and with capacity for two helicopters. We do not know much about other forms of landing that could have been carried out, nor about the means available to the Yemenis, although it seems that the ground deployment was done by helicopters and foot infantry supported by the occasional Toyota gunship. As far as we know, the garrison did not put up much resistance, probably due to its isolation and the demoralization caused by the intermittent bombardment of recent weeks. Despite having opposed it, a well-trained force capable of moving in time to the landing points could have put the enemy infantry in serious trouble by taking advantage of the fortifications and heavy weapons available, since the fast boats used to disembark barely had a machine gun for self-protection.
Fighting in Midi
Between the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, pro-Hadi with Saudi support launched several attacks in northwest Yemen, along the Saudi coast and border, against the docks adjacent to the town of Midi. In February, the Saudi marines intervened directly, probably carrying out a combined raid with a ground assault that also received air support, as images were spread on the internet showing aviation bomb craters in several buildings next to the coast.
The Saudi marine brigade has between 3.000 and 4.500 men who are grouped into a regiment with four battalions, equipped with between 200 and 440 BMR-600 versions 3560.50, P and/or M1. This vehicle from the Enasa firm, now extinct, is nicknamed “al-khinzir” (the pig) by the Saudis and is omnipresent in their marine infantry. Between 60 and 300 were manufactured under license by the Riyadh industry, while 140 were purchased from Spain in the 80s. The 1st Royal Marine Brigade participated in the 1991 Gulf War as part of Task Group Tariq, which was kept in reserve. It is a unit with a higher availability than other forces.
The Saudi Navy for its part provides the landing craft and perhaps coordinates tactical air support with the air force, but it is not clear to us whether JTAC has been integrated to allow close air support operations. The bulk of the naval infantry rides in BMR-600P vehicles improved by having air conditioning and Battle Management Systems, as well as an M2 Browning heavy machine gun. To reinforce the marine infantry battalions, there are anti-tank units that use jeeps with M-40A1 105 mm recoilless cannons. Thanks to these weapons, not only are anti-tank capabilities available, but they are also used to provide fire support. against protected targets.
In the middle of February, during the fighting around Midi, a motorized section of BMR-600P was surprised by the Houthis, who looted and destroyed several vehicles, but not before recording their victory. Since then the front has remained relatively calm, and the Saudi marines have remained inactive, although they represent the most appropriate force to intervene on the Yemeni coast.
The role of the United Arab Emirates
On paper, the UAE also has its own marine battalion, which is equipped with Ukrainian BTR-3 armored vehicles, a modification of the BTR-80 that has received certain improvements such as the Buran-N1 turret, equipped with a 30 mm cannon and capable of carrying CC missiles. However, for now Abu Dhabi has reserved this unit and in its place has deployed an armored battalion equipped with Leclerc and VCI BMP-3 tanks.
On May 13, 2018, UAE forces carried out an amphibious assault against the small port of Al-Fazah, which at the time was only a few kilometers from the front line where the pro-Hadi were launching their own offensive. The amphibious operation was coded as Red Arrow, and sought to capture Al-Fazah and an important enemy command center. The operation was a success when the enemy command center was destroyed, a number of Houthi troops were eliminated, and the town was secured. It is possible that the raid against Al-Fazah was preceded and succeeded by similar amphibious raids against other coastal towns in the area.
During the summer of 2018, amphibious landing or simulated landing operations were carried out before beginning the ground assault against the vital port city of Hodeida, but regardless of the number of enemy troops that could be distracted, the truth is that the battle It became entrenched, suggesting that amphibious operations were insufficient.
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