The Donbas war

The War in Donbas began in 2014. Since then it has witnessed the use of the most modern technologies, such as electronic warfare by Russia or increasingly advanced drones on the Ukrainian side. At the same time, such ancient weapons, the Maxim M1910 machine guns from the First World War, have been seen in operation. It's not a coincidence. In many aspects, especially in recent years, the Ukrainian battlefields have kept interesting parallels with those of the Great War: Trenches, snipers, bunkers, sieges and the massive use of artillery have formed a less modern conflict of what the term “hybrid warfare” suggests.

Tensions between Ukraine and Russia began in 2013, with the danger of greater integration of Ukraine into the EU to the detriment of Russia. It is then that Russia applies sanctions to the Ukrainian confectionery giant Roshen, owned by Poroshenko, an influential businessman and former minister of foreign affairs and trade of Ukraine, as punishment after his visit to Brussels.

Russia wanted to force Ukraine to join the Customs Union, which is still a geoeconomic tool of Russia, as seen in the Roshen sanctions, which Belarus and Kazakhstan joined. Although only momentarily, it achieved its goal of stopping Ukraine's integration into the EU, leading to the Euromaidan protests against Yanukovych's government on November 21, 2013.

The virulence of the protests, as well as government repression, forced Yanokovich to flee on February 22, 2014, with opposition leader Olexander Turchynov being elected interim president. This caused even greater discontent, in this case among the Russian-speaking population, increasing the revolts, something that was taken advantage of by Russian intelligence. These protests, parallel to the seizure of Crimea by Russian troops in March, escalate with the arrival of Russian civilians to join them. Protesters seize regional administrative buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and Odessa, proclaiming themselves mayors and governors. Some of these, as well as a multitude of protesters, were later detained, in an attempt to regain control by the Ukrainian government.

At the beginning of April, tension increases to a new level with the seizure of government buildings, including some belonging to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), also stealing weapons from its facilities. Although the security forces managed to recover and stabilize all the cities except Donetsk and Luhansk, on April 12 the first phase of the war began, with the assault of government buildings by armed men under the command of Igor Girkin, a former GRU (military intelligence) operative. The rebels manage to take over several cities and there is even an armed clash between Girkin's men and members of the Ukrainian SBU.

It is on April 14 when the so-called ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) begins, an operation designed to recover the lost territory in eastern Ukraine, but which starts from a notable disadvantage for the official side, since its barracks were to the west. of the country, in many cases a great distance from the regions in which they had to operate. This represented a significant setback that prevented us from responding effectively to the uprising and subsequent war, due to logistical problems.

The referendum and the subsequent proclamation of independence of the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, on May 22, motivated a new escalation in the ATO, becoming directly directed by the Ministry of Defense to the detriment of the SBU.

The government offensive focused on surrounding the rebel enclaves, isolating both republics from each other, and in turn from Russia, a country from which numerous volunteers and mercenaries came, especially Wagner employees and Russian special forces operatives, as well as equipment military of all kinds. The Kiev government was on the verge of achieving its objectives, despite several setbacks due to the numerous shortcomings of its armed forces and volunteer battalions, when the Russian intervention occurred in August 2014, given the imminent fall of both separatist republics. This occurred, first of all, by sending reconnaissance and sabotage detachments and preparing the battlefield for the second wave, in charge of various BTG (Battalion-level Tactical Groups).

The latter were the key to what would happen next and the main protagonists of the most important battles that occurred during the conflict. Firstly, on the occasion of the battle of Ilovaisk, in that same month of August, in which they took part by surrounding the troops loyal to Kiev, who owned this strategic enclave, which allowed them to cut communications between the Donetsk Republic. and Russia. After surrendering, the kyiv troops were guaranteed a safe corridor for their retreat, surely without the intention of respecting it; During the escape they were massacred, losing numerous material and personnel, including dead, wounded and captured. Even in some footage that we can find on the Internet it is possible to see Russian soldiers with their Ratnik equipment guarding the checkpoints. This defeat, added to the fear of a subsequent Russian invasion, led to the signing of the Minsk I protocol between Kiev and the separatists, a truce that was not respected and which motivated the Second Battle of Donetsk Airport, which began on September 28. of 2014 and which lasted for the following three months.

It is, however, the battle of Debaltsevo that begins the last phase of the conflict. Once again, troops made up of Ukrainian volunteers and uniformed men are surrounded by several Russian and rebel BTGs, until they are worn out and defeated. Once again, a Ukrainian defeat leads to the signing of a new agreement, in this case the Minsk II protocol, which helps cool the armed conflict and turn it into a static trench war. Among the reasons we can cite as the main cause the limits on weapons, with security zones in which the use of artillery with a caliber greater than 100 mm is prohibited. As expected, numerous violations have been committed. All in all, it has served to de-escalate the conflict to acceptable limits.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces before the Donbas war

Although there has been much talk about Russia's way of waging war, the state of its armed forces after the 2008 reforms, etc., all of which has helped in part to understand the conflict, experts have devoted much less attention to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). The war would not be understood without knowing the lamentable state of these prior to the start of the conflict, something that conditioned the entire campaign.

As we will see later, the Donbas War has been eminently urban, which requires troops to have a high level of training, large numbers, and adequate equipment and doctrine, something they lacked at the beginning of 2014. Among other aspects of the urban war with which they could not deal, we can cite the following:

• The fragmentation of combat: In cities, which are divided into numerous compartmentalized spaces, the deployment of formations causes them to fragment into small tactical units, which causes lower commands to take on special relevance. In this sense, the Ukrainian non-commissioned officers and lower-ranking officers lacked this preparation, something that was felt practically from the first stages of the conflict.

• Force volume: Cities, with their hundreds or thousands of buildings, different levels (from the roof of buildings to the underground), alleys, etc., require a greater volume of personnel. Both the rebels and the UAF lacked sufficient numbers to carry out these operations. The Ukrainian government was forced to resort to conscription, something that was alleviated in part thanks to volunteer battalions. In both cases, especially at the beginning of the war, the quality of their components left much to be desired due to poor training and discipline. Furthermore, in the case of regular troops, morale was very low.

• Combined weapons: the combination of different weapons; artillery, armored weapons, infantry, engineers, etc., requires numerous exercises for perfect integration and to be able to take advantage of the capabilities of each one. The UAF hardly carried out military exercises before the war due to lack of funds and these practically never involved units larger than a company.

Curiously, at least on paper the UAF had 125.482 men shortly before the start of the war, according to the then defense minister, Ihor Tenuikh. Of these, on March 11, 2014, it only had about 6.000 prepared for combat of the 41.000 that made up the ground army. They formed what was known as the Immediate Reaction Force.

The state of the material was also deplorable, with 90-95% of it inherited from the Soviet era and completely outdated or suffering from excessive wear, which caused numerous losses of vehicles due to mechanical failures. Of the 800 armored vehicles (tanks, VCIs, APCs, self-propelled artillery, etc.) lost in the first two years of the war, half had been abandoned by their crews due mostly to breakdowns and to a lesser extent to minor damage caused by the enemy. At least, the material, thanks to the substantial increase in the defense budget, was repaired and reconditioned in large quantities during the years 2014 and 2015, a process that slowed down from 2016 due to the decrease in intensity of the conflict. Only the equipment of the units participating in international exercises or missions was in good condition, which should serve to highlight two closely related aspects:

• The false image that an army can give to the outside during exercises, especially if they are not realistic. In this sense, everyone was overconfident in the capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces before the conflict.

• The importance of this type of missions and exercises in order to have a highly prepared and well-equipped core, something that Ukraine lacked, having to entrust everything to the levies.

Another key factor, especially in the initial stage, had to do with the high level of Russian infiltration into Ukrainian intelligence, security forces and military. In addition, informal ties between members of both armies were cut, which led to the defection of Ukrainian commanders after the annexation of Crimea, going on to serve under the Russian flag.

Despite the embargo that Russia imposed on Ukraine, this country has been able to import some Russian components for its Armed Forces through a network of intermediaries and with the help of companies from Belarus, and to a lesser extent Moldova. On the other hand, North American/Western aid has been based mainly on non-lethal weapons or material, as well as light weapons and equipment that have not had a great impact on the course of events. For example, the AN/TPQ-48 counter-battery radars provided by the US have been of limited validity due to their short range. It was deliberate, since Washington wanted Ukraine not to escalate the situation.

The war in Donbas: a war without aviation

A characteristic of the Donbas war has been the null role of aviation. Neither the rebels, who lacked it, nor Russia, nor Ukraine have used it more than anecdotally.

As for the Ukrainian side, at first they used aircraft to punish rebel positions and to transport troops and material, but the high rate of shootdowns put an end to this practice. This was due to deficiencies in equipment and pilots. Of the 507 aircraft and 121 helicopters available on paper in 2014, only 15% of them were in flying condition at the start of the war.

The Ukrainian Air Force lacked Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) capabilities, essential to neutralize modern Russian air defenses. If in general the pilots lacked the hours and training for less complicated combat missions, this was coupled with the lack of electronic warfare equipment to be able to survive those missions.

Ukraine also depended heavily on the Russian market to buy spare parts for its devices, a supply that was logically interrupted except for the black market. As a consequence, the use of helicopters for rescue or transport, even if not in combat, has been reduced to a minimum due to the low operational capacity of the fleet and this even though since 2014 they only fly at very low altitude and always to the rear, never approaching less than 30 km from the front line.

Although the rebels only had low-level air defenses, they soon received Buk-M1 systems from Russia. This came as a bitter surprise to the Ukrainians, who followed flight paths high enough to evade any rebel SAM, especially the MANPADS, but against the Buk, with a much greater range, there was little they could do.

On the separatist side, there was no air force, since the Air Force was mostly on the government side. They were also unable to seize aircraft or have the capacity to operate them. This would have meant an excessive and highly specialized logistical burden. Of course, Russia could not provide its Air Force either. The reason was obvious, at first to maintain the plausible deniability, and after the terrestrial intervention, the implausible one. But if Russia had not supplied SAM systems to the separatists, it would have encountered a problem, as its own artillery, or at least that of its proxies, could be attacked, eliminating the most important factor of the Russian forces. That is why it supplied modern air defenses to the rebels, to maintain symmetry of capabilities and deny Ukraine the skies. Despite Russia not being able to use its air force, except as a deterrent and within Russian airspace, this was not necessary, as we have seen with the combined use of UAVs and artillery.

The absence of precision aviation/artillery also had consequences, especially when it came to eliminating specific targets such as snipers, or when providing close support to troops in full combat against a nearby enemy. These tended to operate at fairly short ranges, therefore the use of tube/rocket artillery was not indicated against them, as there was a chance of causing friendly fire. Therefore, direct fire was used in the form of tanks or artillery and SPG-9 recoilless cannons.

The Donbas war: urban warfare

Until well into the industrial revolution, cities only housed a small part of the world's population, something that has progressively changed since then. Already in the 40th century, the importance of cities is also evident in wars, but it is not until World War II when armies are forced to systematically fight for the capture or defense of cities, with around XNUMX % of combats taking place in said scenario.

The city thus becomes one of the most important strategic points and the fact is that cities are the bastions of state power, the epicenter of political, industrial, economic and commercial activity, communications, culture and the centers of networks. Of transport. As a consequence, the trend towards the urbanization of war has been increasing and everything indicates that it will continue to do so in the future.

Focusing on the Donbas region, it is highly urbanized, with the ethnic Russian population overrepresented. This factor is key during the beginning of the revolts, since government buildings in several cities in Donbas were taken by the rebels thanks to the support of the local, Russian-speaking population.

Although the cities are in themselves points of high strategic value, it must also be noted that precisely the places where the largest battles took place constituted very important railway nodes, in addition to other assets that made them strategic points. Although Russia's main objective has been to preserve the integrity of the two separatist republics, hence its intervention in the face of the inability of the irregular forces to do so, its entry into the conflict has also been motivated by the interest in taking over infrastructure that would allow both Separatist regions operate independently of Ukraine. These, of course, used to be in the cities too.

It is not an exaggeration to say that most of the main battles of the Donbas War have been sieges, saving the Zabrodski raid. We have, among others, the second battle for the Donetsk airport, Luhansk, or those suffered by the cities of Ilovaisk and Debaltsevo. Although the government side also laid siege to some cities, this practice only reached its greatest extent thanks to Russian help. After this, the members of the pro-kyiv side are besieged in each of the cities or airports where they were. That is why we will focus more on the sites carried out by the pro-Russian side with the support of the BTGs.

The importance of cities in the Donbas War can be attributed, in addition to what has already been explained, to three factors:

• Growing urbanization: This displacement of the population from the countryside to the city also entails the displacement of political problems. The Donbass region is highly urbanized and demographically dense. 90,4% of the population of Donetsk oblast is urban, while that of Luhansk is 86,8%.

• Increasingly volatile domestic political conditions: It is a phenomenon typical of developing countries that Russia has been able to exploit in the case of the Russian-speaking majority cities of eastern Ukraine, supporting the rebels and operating in the domain of information to impose a discourse favorable to the rebellion against kyiv. .

• Changes in the character of the armed conflict due to the predominance of armed non-state actors, which take advantage of the urban environment to try to compensate for the asymmetry of forces with respect to state forces. This coincides with the first phase of the war in Ukraine, in which organized armed groups of separatists took over state buildings and assumed political office with the subsequent support of Russian volunteers, mercenaries provided by the Russian state through Wagner, Russian intelligence agents, etc.

The Russian modus operandi was very similar to that of the Second Chechen War. In this, for example in the approach to Grozny, in those semi-urban areas in which they encountered resistance, they were surrounded, isolated and bombarded with artillery until they surrendered. Later the troops entered the town, clearing it of enemies. They are part of the lessons learned through blood and fire during the battle for Grozny in the First Chechen War. As was done in smaller towns, When they reached Grozny, the city was also isolated and bombed by both artillery and aviation.. In the Donbas war, this second option was not available, but the combined use of UAVs and artillery, as well as its long range and the proximity of the objectives, allowed it to be replaced.

This type of artillery bombardment also has its similarities with those carried out by the USSR during World War II. If the Russian army reached the vicinity of Grozny in mid-October, the bombardment by aviation and artillery lasted until December. The artillery “prepared” various areas by demolishing them for the subsequent entry of ground troops. However, the lack of guided munitions in significant quantities meant that troops could not be supported in close combat. The same thing would happen in Donbass, since the Russian army still has a pending issue of having a large and flexible stock of guided munitions.

Although it is an indiscriminate method against the civilian population present in cities, its effectiveness has been demonstrated. According to Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, “generally speaking, the side less concerned about the safety of civilians has the advantage, especially if this is combined with a disdain for reporting the truth and the ability to manipulate international opinion”. Although we have precisely tried to move away from information warfare, it is used in combination with the more conventional aspects of war that we touch on in this article. Therefore, while besieging a city like Debaltsevo, and attacking it indiscriminately with artillery, Russia used information warfare to shape that dominance in its favor. Of course, both sides attacked population centers indiscriminately and the truth is that this contempt for the civilian population had the desired effects in terms of effectiveness.

As a general rule, a siege included the establishment of reinforced checkpoints, trenches, etc., at strategic access points. Isolated Ukrainian forces were punished with indirect fire from tube and rocket artillery, mortars, and direct fire from relatively modern tanks such as the T-72B3 and T-90A, at least compared to the ancient T-64. Ukrainians, mostly unmodernized.

It is possible, given the firepower displayed by Russia through the deployment of several BTGs, that the sieges could have been much more intense and lasted less. However, there were good reasons to prolong the sieges:

• The annihilation of hundreds or thousands of Ukrainian soldiers by Russia would have put the latter in serious trouble before the international community. If it was already difficult to play with implausible denial (not to be confused with the plausible denial that we explain in the numbers 5, 8 y 12), such an action would have had important consequences for a country exposed to sanctions.

• Russia seeks to bring the Ukrainian government to the negotiating table, taking advantage of its desperate position and its intention to avoid a massacre. This was in part how Minsk I was reached after the siege of Ilovaisk, and Minsk II with that of Debaltsevo.

Furthermore, we must not rule out the possible search for the deterrent effect that is achieved with the slow attrition of the besieged troops. This is also valid for the civilian population to reduce support for official troops and reduce the number of troops who enrolled in volunteer battalions, key in this war by covering the shortcomings of the UAF.

Artillery has had a special role in the conflict, causing around 85% of the casualties on both sides. However, the one that has stood out and surprised the world has been Russia thanks, among other reasons, to the innovations introduced in the area of ​​Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), with special relevance to drones.

The long range of the Russian artillery, which reaches 90 km in the case of the 300 mm MLRS, together with the powerful ISR means: counter-battery radars, special forces, drones, electronic listening systems, etc., has allowed them to attack at a safe distance (to which the US pressure on Ukraine to not respond to fire has contributed, thus avoiding an unpredictable escalation), reducing the strength of Ukrainian operations without exposing itself, and concentrating massive fire with greater precision.

The lethality of Russian artillery was also increased thanks to the wide panoply of ammunition and submunitions at its disposal. This is the case of Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM), mine-dispensing ammunition, the use of radio-controlled fuzes and other types of sensors, top-attack munitions, thermobaric warheads, etc. Furthermore, thanks to the use of electronic warfare, Russia has been able to jam the radio-controlled artillery used by kyiv, thus reducing its effectiveness.

The combined use of these munitions, together with the poor armor of the armored personnel carriers (APC) of the BTR family and infantry fighting vehicles (ICV) of the BMP/BMD family, made the loss rate really high. These did not protect, not only against direct attacks, but also against the artillery splinters themselves. Unfortunately for their crews, the tanks present in the conflict were not much better prepared either, due to their poor upper protection and the unprotected gaps left by the reactive armor bricks.

The profuse use of artillery by both sides, but especially by the pro-Russian side, led to the decision to dig trenches, prepare well-fortified positions, and hide vehicles from both the sight of UAVs and indirect fire. That is why the construction of static defenses and camouflage has taken precedence over maneuver. Even the Ukrainians have used their own UAVs to monitor the signatures of their own positions.

But the preparation of defenses has not only been carried out in the face of a possible enemy offensive, first on the rebel side, to withstand the government attacks at the beginning of the conflict, and then on the Ukrainian side against the rebels and regular Russian troops. They have also been used to cover retreats and establish defense lines, as in the case of the Battle of Debaltsevo. In this case, the construction of solid trenches could be confirmed, with their bunkers excavated 2 meters deep, in addition to the use of numerous logs to protect the roof. This way the retreat route to Artemivsk was protected.

To counter this, Russia has used thermobaric weaponry, such as the TOS-1 Buratino and Kornet guided missiles in its 9M133F-1 thermobaric variant. The effects of this type of weapon are optimized against an enemy entrenched, or hidden in buildings or caves.

Another aspect that has made the fighting static is Russia's use of electronic warfare to locate Ukrainian emissions and then destroy their sources. This led the government side to significantly reduce the level of communications and operate radios and other transmitting electronic equipment remotely. Of course, all this resulted in less coordination, which in turn caused the heads of smaller units to be forced to take more risks when making decisions.

At this point it is appropriate to make a small aside and mention, even in passing, the battle of Zelenopillya, a clear example of a siege, but in this case in the electromagnetic domain. During the same, Russia showed off its ability to isolate several units in a physical space thanks to its previous isolation in the electromagnetic domain. Once without communications and their positions were located, they were destroyed taking advantage of the greater firepower. All of this came as a major shock to the Ukrainians, as well as a remarkable demonstration of both Russian capabilities in electromagnetic warfare and carry out interdomain operations.

These are fascinating developments, but not everything in this conflict has been like this. Many other practices, despite being proven effective, could seem much more archaic to us, such as the intensive use of trenches that we analyze below.

The war in Donbas: a trench war

The situation in Ukraine, especially after the cooling of the post-Minsk II conflict, could very well be described as “The First World War with 21st century technology”. This is due to the widespread use of trenches along the front by both sides, the stagnation of operations and the war of attrition to which they have been forced.

The biggest threats in Donbass come from snipers and artillery/mortars. The latter become more lethal thanks to UAVs, which are used to search and provide coordinates with which to carry out indirect fire, so camouflage is essential to increase survivability. This is evident in the care taken by combatants when it comes to camouflaging vehicles and covering positions with nets or vegetation, something they have been doing since even before the conflict cooled down. The fear of being discovered by the drones and the subsequent indirect fire have ended up stagnating the fight, denying any possible maneuver. Only during the night, because neither side barely operated thermal vision systems, and even less on board the UAVs, could movements be made safely, looking for a place to hide for when it was daylight, taking advantage of the trees, for example. .

Precisely the wooded areas have been highly coveted when it comes to placing positions since the beginning of the contest. Many roads are flanked by rows of trees where armored vehicles are hidden or between which trenches are dug. Also in the different crop fields or meadows there are lines of trees that delimit them and are used to establish foxholes that can control these large open fields and serve to observe enemy positions without exposing themselves to direct vision or drones. Even so, wooded areas are usually attacked out of pure precaution, since they are used not only to establish these positions, but also to place heavy material in them, such as trucks or cars.

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