Search results for s-80

The S-80 Plus class submarines are platforms of a complexity that is difficult to explain. On many occasions, this type of program is compared to space programs, partly for marketing, but also to try to summarize, in a few words, the enormous number of systems and subsystems that make them up. Throughout the next three articles we will explain one by one which are the systems that, structured by the Combat System, will allow the S-81 “Isaac Peral” and its twins to be among the most capable conventional submarines in the world. For this we will talk, in this first article, about the sonar suite. Later, in a second installment, we will focus on surface sensors, communications, platform control and navigation systems, and countermeasures systems. Finally, a third article will be dedicated to weapons, since it is such a complex and controversial topic that [Keep reading…]

The choice of combat system for the S-80 submarines is an issue that has never been properly clarified. In fact, it has gone relatively unnoticed compared to other issues, with overweight problems or those related to the design and construction of the AIP plant taking center stage. Now, given the dates on which the surprising choice of Lockheed Martin's SUBICS system took place, the desperate situation of the naval sector in Spain and several other issues that we will address throughout the text, the decision regarding the combat system was potentially more important than any of the above. (Continue…) Dear reader, this article is exclusively for paying users. If you want to access the full text, you can subscribe to Ejercitos Magazine taking advantage of our offer for new subscribers through the following link.

A vital issue related to the S-80 Program and that has never been explained in the detail with which it should have been explained to the public, has to do with the impact of the program, a parameter that can be measured in very different ways. The most obvious is to assess the industrial returns, that is, the volume of money and the technological boost that the project leaves in Spain. With a total cost that is dangerously close to the barrier of 1.000 million euros per unit, we are forced to ask ourselves questions such as the following: What part of those almost 4.000 million reverts to Spanish companies? Does the program really act as a multiplier by generating industrial activity, promoting the development of new patents and creating jobs? Is the financial effort worth it from the point of view of the Spanish defense industry? On the other hand, the program [Keep reading…]

All kinds of atrocities have been said about the S-80 program. The most important and those behind the most aberrant - and false - legends are those related to buoyancy problems, a matter never fully explained and on which we will try to shed some light in the following lines. [Keep reading…]

The construction of submarines in Spain has a long history of disappointments and very few joys. Despite being the country where the submarine, as we know it, was invented, we have almost always been in tow, depending on foreign technologies and companies. In recent years, attempts have been made to reverse this situation with more heart than head, leading the submarine weapon, due to the delays of the S-80, to a desperate situation. [Keep reading…]

The Air Independent Propulsion System (AIP) is one of the key components of the future S-80 Plus. Recently presented by Navantia under the name “Best”, this system promises to give our submariners a clear tactical advantage. Now, the AIP will not be incorporated into the S-80 until the entry into service of the third unit and its development, a true obstacle course, can be classified as a nightmare for many reasons. [Keep reading…]

The fourth part of this story focuses on the evolution of the S-80 Program from a media point of view. In the more than sixteen years since the signing of the Execution Order, the milestones and problems have been multiple and the press has reflected this. The biggest problem, perhaps due to the inability of the Spanish Navy and Navantia (as the main perpetrators) to impose their story, is that the impact on the image of both has been enormous. [Keep reading…]

In the second part of this article we explained how Spain could have equipped itself, in collaboration with France, with an SSN (Nuclear Propulsion Attack Submarine). In this third installment we focus on the break with DCNS and the factors that influenced Spain's departure from the Scorpène program to enter the unknown, taking on the challenge of building its own submarine, the S-80. [Keep reading…]

The gestation of the S-80 program has been, if possible, longer and more complex than is usually admitted. In fact, it does not begin in 1989, as appears on the Navy website, but at the beginning of that decade. It was then that, among other options, it was very seriously considered to develop a nuclear submarine for which an acronym was even coined: the SUBESPRON (SPANISH Nuclear PROpulsion SUBMARINE). [Keep reading…]