Until now, the Russian mercenary company Wagner has been surrounded by a certain aura of invincibility, despite some setbacks, such as those suffered in Syria against the US military. In recent months, however, the mission they are carrying out in Mozambique, in support of the Government, is dealing a severe blow to this tool of the Kremlin's foreign policy, to the point that it is suspected that they have been replaced by a South African company because of its problems.
Mozambique has been suffering in the northern, coastal, Muslim-majority region of Cabo Delgado, a jihadist insurgency with certain links to ISIS since October 2017, which has taken the lives of at least 700 people and more than 100.000 displaced people. Although it is a region of great poverty and smuggling, it is very rich in gas, with numerous projects by companies such as Exxon Mobil and Total, valued at 60.000 million dollars. However, the spiral of violence prevents these projects from being carried out, with an increasingly technical insurgency, capable of carrying out amphibious operations, and attacking previously unattainable objectives.
An insurgency, a president facing elections, and mineral and energy resources formed a perfect combination for Russia to sell a pack that included Wagner's mercenaries, electoral advisory and manipulation services, and resourceful businesses.
First approaches
Already the December 20th 2018 It was publicly suspected, as published by The Moscow Times, that Mozambique could be an attractive destination for Wagner. The fact is that it later came to light that in October 2018 a Wagner delegation that was on the Russian navy destroyer Severomorsk, composed of six representatives, disembarked in the port of Pemba, to later meet in the city of Palma and make a security proposal to the country's government, given the enormous problems they were having in the fight against the terrorist insurgency.
To put all this in context, we must remember that this is part of the "mercenary diplomacy" offensive that Russia was carrying out at that time, managing to penetrate the Central African Republic, where it deployed a contingent of about 170 contractors in March 2018, after managing to partially lift the embargo that was hanging over the country.
In April of the same year, Wagner also appears in Madagascar protecting the delegation that was in the country to obtain mining contracts in exchange for electoral manipulation services and political advice for the elections. There were also members of the FSB and the GRU in the protection device. Months later, the Severomorsk ship also stopped in Madagascar, making effective the military cooperation agreement signed weeks before, which included the visit of ships.
As we see, Wagner is still a very flexible and shadowy military unit, with a PMC structure. For practical purposes, however, it is not, which is why I prefer to call it pseudo-PMC. We could consider Wagner as one of the government tools exportable from the Kremlin, or with the capacity to also act with a certain independence, as was seen in the Conoco Fields. On that occasion he acted based on contracts signed with Syrian government agents, but without the Kremlin's cover. Due to this character of double dependency, state/private, and taking advantage of the fashionable term “hybrid war”, many consider it a hybrid tool.
After knowing the context, let's continue with Mozambique. The country's government, when acquiring security assistance, not only turned to Russia, taking advantage of official diplomatic channels, but also to others, such as OAM, of John Gartner, a former military man from the former Rhodesia, or Black Hawk, of the former South African Army Colonel Dolf Dorfling. Both know these scenarios perfectly; As Dorfling said, he knew Mozambique like the back of his hand, but given the prices the Russians were offering, and the political connections, they couldn't compete. There was a third company, although less known, Umbra Aviation. This proposed a much greater deployment, with helicopters and attack aircraft, in addition to the use of armored vehicles. I couldn't miss either Erik Prince and STTEP by Eeben Barlow, also founder of the legendary Executive Outcomes.
Regarding the price, OAM offered a team of 50 people for between 15.000 and 25.000 dollars. This is not the only case in which something like this has happened regarding the prices offered by Russian PMSCs. In Libya, another Russian PSC, RSB Group, obtained the contract with the cement company Libyan Cement Company to demine a facility in Benghazi, sending the price through the roof. While a British company offered 50 euros per m2 of demining, RSB offered it for between 10 and 15.
The business of PMSCs (Private Military and Security Companies) is closely linked to government support, just like that of weapons; It is not just a technical question, or at least when something more than technical is required. This is why countries like Ukraine, despite having numerous veterans, and having an associated defense industry capable of providing them with light weapons, cannot compete with the Russian one.
These types of companies also have a fairly large international impact, so they need diplomacy to match. Let's remember how STEEP which operated successfully in Nigeria against Boko Haram, was boycotted for other customers by the US, exerting great pressure to reject the contracts.
This is another phenomenon to take into account; Neophytes such as Russian companies are disrupting the market, at least in sub-Saharan Africa, thanks to their low prices and political connections, which allow them to be involved in broader service packages. For example, in the case of the Central African Republic, Wagner offers government protection, training, etc. At the same time, important diplomatic efforts are being made by the Russian state that has allowed them to become dealmakers, partly controlling the peace process, just as they did in Syria. But we must keep in mind that not all scenarios are the same, and the recipes that work (for the moment) in some countries may be counterproductive in others.
Arrival of Wagner's contractors and setback
We have to wait until August 2019, more specifically until visit of the Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi to Moscow, to meet with Putin and discuss cooperation issues in matters of defence, security, energy and mining resources, when on his return he brings with him the package of electoral and security services, ahead of the October elections.
A month later, on September 13, 2019, between 200 and 300 Wagner members arrive (160 according to CNN) to the country's capital, Maputo, aboard an An-124 in addition to some military material, and 12 days later, more material, such as Mi-17 helicopters.
The setbacks for Wagner's men began shortly after arriving. On October 10, for example, two operatives were ambushed in the district of Macomia, Cabo Delgado. On the 27th of the same month, five other men fell dead in another ambush, after stopping the convoy in front of some obstacles set up by the insurgents and being riddled with gunfire. Four of them are decapitated and the fifth died in the hospital from his injuries. Along with them, around twenty soldiers from the FADM (Mozambique Armed Defense Forces) perished in these attacks.
On November 18, 2019, Jasmine Opperman, an Africa analyst, and one of the best experts on security matters in Mozambique, reports that tensions between Wagner and the Mozambican security forces had increased. One of the main reasons was the lack of trust in the FADM. Even One week before frequent helicopter flying by Russian personnel had stopped. Also had been notified that members of the FADM had refused to participate in some operations with Wagner, or even the company itself selling information to the enemyIn addition to the numerous desertions, very dangerous intelligence leaks.
The fact is that the Russians themselves they recognized the enormous complexity of Cabo Delgado, as well as that they felt isolated and exposed. Because of this, at the end of November it seems that a strategic withdrawal of the majority of Russian contractor personnel is confirmed to rethink the approach to operations. Also they cloudy business of the FADM may have endangered the Russian mission, since the possibility of losing control by ceding part of it to the Russians could put them in danger. Perhaps this will better understand how they felt isolated.
In the middle of january of this year, Wagner was still not involved in any military operation, and its operatives were confined to their “winter quarters” (summer in that part of the globe) in Nacala, and a small part in Mbau.
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