Chad in troubled waters

Today, Chad still remains stable amid the growing instability of its conflictive neighborhood (Sudan, Libya, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger). And it is not only about the region, the Sahel (which includes the problems in Mali and Burkina Faso), but also about the increase in clashes of interests between large and medium powers. Their interest in starting, strengthening or expanding their influence on the African continent, including Chad, is precisely one of the few things that all of them have in common. And yet, the country's president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, has also had to deal with a transition in power, after the sudden death of his father in 2021, social protests, economic problems, and different types of violence in his territory.

Table of Contents

• Introduction
• Domestic politics: power, a family matter
• refugee crisis
• The different origins and causes of violence in Chad
• Chad in the middle of the geopolitical dispute
• To end…

Introduction

Now “I am the elected president of all Chadians, both those who voted for me and those who made other decisions,” says Mahamat Idriss Déby after being declared the winner by a wide margin in the presidential elections of May 6 of this year. 2024[1]. An electoral process that closes the transition period in Chad after the death of the previous president in April 2021 and that opens a stage of five more years at the head of the country for Mahamat Idriss Déby, until now at the head of the Transitional Military Council. But, on this occasion with a “civilian” mandate with the intention of giving it, to a certain extent, some legitimacy, as can be deduced from his words.

Idriss Déby remains at the helm of the nation at a time when several crises overlap, some caused by man and others beyond his control, and in a situation with increasingly more turbulence, internal and external, intertwined, which threaten the fragile Chadian stability. The future of the country depends, at least in part, on his performance, in principle in the short and medium term, in what seems to be a far from easy task in light of the problems that are accumulating, increasing and looming on the horizon.

Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 42,3% of the population below the poverty line and an extreme poverty rate that has been rising in recent years, up to 35,4% in 2023[2]. Its economy is highly dependent on oil, which is affected by the fluctuation of its prices, and recently it has also been shaken by food inflation and problems with some crops due to droughts and floods. Thus, the country has few resources to deal with, among other issues, a growing refugee crisis, especially from Sudan (although the civil conflict in the neighboring country is not the only one that is shaking Chad's foundations). In 2024, around 6 million people need humanitarian assistance[3].

And to this is added the activity of rebel groups in the country, especially in the north, the increase in jihadist activity in Lake Chad, to the south, and the conflicts between communities, shepherds and peasants, for the most part, due to access to dwindling resources, as a consequence of drought and torrential rains due to changes in the climate.

All without forgetting that the men at the top of power in Chad must navigate the changes in the region in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger, for example, and deal with the increasing competition between global and regional powers, and the entry on the scene of some of them with renewed interests in Africa, such as Russia or the United Arab Emirates, to name just two.

Domestic politics: power, a family matter

And, in this context, at the top of the power pyramid in Chad today is Mahamat Idriss Déby. General of the Chadian Army, 40 years old, and son of the previous president Idriss Déby Itno. He has been declared the winner in the presidential elections of May 6, 2024 with 61% of the votes obtained by his Coalition for a United Chad (by obtaining more than 50% of the votes he avoids a second round) compared to 18,5 % of his main rival in these elections (although not the only one), and prime minister, the opposition Succès Masra of Los Transformadores.

At first, Masra himself declares himself the winner of the first round of the elections and calls on his people to a “peaceful protest.” Something that deflates after the publication of the official results[4]. The military presence in the streets and the memory of the brutal repression of previous demonstrations undoubtedly deters a good number of citizens from participating. Likewise, among other considerations, a military presence that could be considered somewhat “intimidating” in various polling stations has been able to encourage undecided voters to finally vote for the official candidate, Idriss Déby. This, together with the iron-fisted performance of Idriss Déby these years, the harassment and demolition of the opposition (and the capture of one of its figures, Succès Masra) and the state control of the Army and institutions, not only powerfully reminds the way his father exercises power, but also increases doubts about the justice and transparency of the electoral process and the veracity of its results, both inside and outside the country.

Until reaching these elections, three years of political transition have passed, after the death of the previous president. After three decades of ruling Chad with an authoritarian hand, Idriss Déby Itno died unexpectedly on April 20, 2021 as a result of injuries suffered during a visit to troops on the country's northern front in a rebel attack. A political shock that unleashes a process in which the Constitution is suspended and the Transitional Military Council is formed, which appoints the president's son, Mahamat Idriss Déby, as head of the country.

This is the chronology of the main national political events in the country between this date and the presidential elections:

A succession of events that reflects the consolidation of power by the dead president's son in the midst of relative political and social tension. While it is true that Idriss Déby is the first leader of a Transitional Military Council in the region to take the step of calling elections with the intention of giving a certain veneer of legitimacy to his mandate, it is also true that: “Fair elections and free were never likely,” as Troels Burchall Henningsen, of the Royal Danish Defense College, maintains.[5].

In addition to the above, because he called them just a few months after the death of his cousin, and until then main rival, Yaya Dillo of the Socialist Party Without Borders (in a shootout with the security forces after an unclear incident) and the recruitment of Masra, without giving time for the appearance of new possible important opposition figures. And, thus, being the son of the previous president, he has changed little in the country.

In fact, the hopes that the opposition may have had at the beginning that the disappearance of Idriss Déby Itno would represent a certain opening towards a somewhat more democratic system, today, after the failed national dialogues with an opposition that considers itself deceived by the authorities, the maneuvers of Idriss Déby and the harsh repression of the protests, have largely vanished. Thus, it could be argued that the summit of power in Chad remains a family affair.

However, it is necessary to make several qualifications to what has already been stated. The first is that, although the opposition has its fiefdom and support in the big cities, it largely lacks it in the rural areas, where 76% of Chadians live.[6]. Secondly, there has been an agreement with the opposition, which has allowed Succès Masra to return from exile, to be appointed prime minister (which has disappointed his supporters, something that is likely to have been reflected in his electoral result). and a general amnesty for those detained for the Black Thursday protests of October 2022.

And, thirdly, the violent death of the opponent and cousin of the current president, Yaya Dillo, in February of this year 2024 suggests a growing dissension within the clan in power, the Zaghawa, to which the presidential family belongs, and that, with barely 5% representation in the population, has controlled the country for the last three decades, with the support of other northern elites such as the Gorane and ethnic Arab groups. Recent moves by the president, such as the creation of the Rapid Intervention Force (a kind of Praetorian Guard), and the positions in the Army achieved by Gorane and Arab supporters of the president, have generated unrest among the Zaghawa, who see themselves to a certain extent displaced[7].

Another major source of tension within the N'Djamena regime is Chad's position regarding the conflict in neighboring Sudan. There have been intense disputes between the Zaghawa families over the authorization given by Idriss Déby to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to supply weapons and equipment to the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of General Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo from Chadian territory. At the same time, Chad has obtained a loan of 1.500 billion dollars, which represents more than 80% of the state budget, as well as its own military equipment.

With strong family ties in both Chad and Sudan, this ethnic group is deeply divided. While some in N'Djamena approve of support for the RSF, the Sudanese branch of this group, based in Northern Darfur, and attacked and massacred by the RSF for ethnic reasons, has chosen to support the side of its enemy, the Sudanese regular army of the General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

With the increase in violent clashes between the RSF and Zaghawa militias in Darfur, the latter could seek revenge by supporting a possible coup against the N'Djamena government, as has already happened in the past. A risk that increases as fighting intensifies in northern Darfur, particularly around the town of El-Fasher, which is home to a large part of the Zaghawa community of Darfur, harassed again by the RSF[8].

refugee crisis

But the civil conflict in neighboring Sudan affects Chad in more ways than one. The most urgent is the refugee crisis in the east of the country, due to its destabilizing potential, among other circumstances, due to the limited resources that N'Djamena has and the difficulties of the United Nations due to the lack of financing to care for hundreds of thousands. of people in extreme situations.

Since the start of hostilities, the flow of refugees and returnees to Chad has been constant, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency, UNHCR. For this month of June 2024, it is estimated that more than 600.000 people have crossed through the 32 border posts into Chad, whose government estimates that, by the end of the year, there will be more than 900.000.[9].

A number that has been increasing in recent months, because in addition to the clashes we must add the famine that is beginning to wreak havoc in the neighboring Sudanese province of Darfur. This situation, together with the lack of food in the Chad area, is especially worrying when the malaria season approaches, since malnutrition (coupled with the lack of water and hygiene and overcrowding in refugee camps) makes people especially vulnerable to these types of diseases.

But, in addition, hunger also forces other population groups in Darfur, not punished by the RSF attacks, such as the Arabs, to also flee to Chad, as the Zaghawa and the Masalit have already done. This may mean the reproduction of the Sudanese conflicts, but now, on Chadian territory.

In this way, the situation in eastern Chad is becoming increasingly alarming, since, to the clashes between ethnic groups, we must add the constant increase in refugees due to the dramatic deterioration of the situation in neighboring Sudan, due to civil conflict and famine, and the shortage of infrastructure and food for them all[10].

The different origins and causes of violence in Chad

Although the situation described in the previous section is, perhaps, the main and most pressing one, it is not the only ongoing problem in Chad. Ethno-political divisions (including those between peasants and herders), the action of rebel groups (most based in Libya, Sudan or the Central African Republic) and the almost a decade of jihadist operations in the Lake Chad area are powerful factors. destabilization of the country[11].

A look at the humanitarian map of the country helps to locate most of these conflicts:

The map highlights in green the high number of internally displaced people (about 216.000 people) in the Lake Chad area, which is largely the result of the conflicts outlined in the previous paragraph in a region that represents a compendium of them.

Since 2023, an increase in violence between nomadic shepherds and sedentary peasant-farmers has been detected in this area, but also in other areas, such as the south, center and east of the country.

Some clashes that are also influenced by the inter-ethnic/community axis[12]. Only in a few days last March of this 2024 there have been dozens of deaths. Among the reasons for the intensification of this type of violence is inflation and competition for access to natural resources, especially land.[13].

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