The Yemen Civil War is a conflict arising from the Arab Spring and difficult regional and national conditions. Its worsening, throughout 2014, precipitated just a year later the direct military intervention of a group of countries led by Saudi Arabia. This intervention would include the use of all branches of the Armed Forces of the Arab country and would lead to a fight that has caused a long series of small and bloody defeats and excessively high casualties for a regional power, which on many occasions has been in bad shape. place, as do some of his allies. What is true in the criticism and the reality of the facts will be the object of this analysis.
First of all, it is worth taking into account the relationship of opposing forces and the historical, physical and ideological context in which they fight. Yemen is a country that was unified after a civil war in the 90s by Abdullah Saleh. In the early 2000s, the Zaidis - a branch of Shiism very close to Sunnism - gave rise to the birth of the Houthi movement, which soon became a problem for both the central government in Sana'a and its Saudi neighbors, since the Houthis had their theater of operations in the north, next to the border and, in addition, over time they received Iranian support.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia and other countries pressured Saleh to make way for Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, a politician favorable to Saudi interests. Although Saleh effectively stepped down from his position, the truth is that he remained in the shadows waiting for an opportunity that finally came in 2014, when protests in the capital led to a coup against Hadi. In this case, the coup plotters were the Houthis allied with their former enemy, Saleh.
The new alliance soon paid off on the battlefield and the tanks reached the southern port city of Aden, where Hadi had taken refuge. Aden, which in the days of the British Empire had been a highly valued coastal enclave, emerged as the capital of South Yemen. For its part, Saudi Arabia had warned that it would not allow this important city to fall into the hands of the Houthis, who at that time were already proxies for Iran.
It is in this context that each side gathered its forces. Hadi had the support of the coalition led by the Saudis and in which on paper numerous Muslim countries participated, although when it came down to it it was Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and to a lesser extent Sudan who supported the main effort. In addition, Hadi benefited from the support of the Yemeni army, some tribes in the country and the secessionist committees of the former South Yemen. Saleh, who had to face such a powerful combination of enemies, was also supported by part of the Yemeni Army and, above all, the Republican Guard. Furthermore, on his side were also the Houthis themselves, who had as much power as Saleh, as well as a few tribes. Added to this was the support of the Iranians, who sent advisors and abundant military material to their Shiite allies.
As a third element, although they had their own objectives and strategies, there were Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as other smaller fundamentalist groups that included a branch of the Islamic State. These elements experienced phases of fighting and non-aggression with Hadi and were always enemies of the Houthis. On the other hand, several Western countries, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, dedicated themselves to attacking these Sunni jihadists as part of their regional strategy.
As can be seen, the internal political context was extremely complex. The numerous tribes alone already posed a major diplomatic and political challenge while secessionist elements often strained internal relations. In fact, the threat of starting internal conflicts within both sides was and is so great that, in 2018, fighting occurred between members of each coalition. First, the Houthis felt strong enough to definitively finish off their unnatural ally, Saleh, who maintained a strong Republican Guard garrison in Sana'a and who was perhaps negotiating a separate pact with the Saudis. Be that as it may, after a series of intense skirmishes, Saleh's main centers of power in the capital were taken by storm and the president himself was assassinated.
On Hadi's side things were not much better either. In January 2018, a small conflict broke out inside Aden, a city in which South Yemen secessionist committees clashed with Hadi's government forces. Fortunately, Saudi pressure prevented this conflict from escalating with unforeseeable consequences that threatened, however, to dismantle Saudi Arabia's entire strategy in Yemen.
Stage
In terms of geography, Yemen is an extremely complex country: most of the territory consists of sparsely populated deserts in which only a few tribes reside and which are crisscrossed by very humble roads at best. These deserts border Saudi Arabia to the north and Oman to the east. For its part, the strip to the west of Yemen is made up of an intricate mountain system full of elevations, depressions, paths, low-quality roads and natural obstacles, this being the region where the majority of the population resides.
The main cities are Sanaa -located in the interior and former capital of North Yemen-, which is the main center of political and military power, and Aden, a port city where a good part of the little national industry is located, in most of it related to hydrocarbons. In addition, other important points are the port of Al-Hodeida, on the Red Sea and the city of Taiz, which, like Sanna, is an inland city nestled in a valley. Along with all of the above, Yemen also has numerous island territories both to the west and south, among which Socotra stands out, a large island that the USSR once used to build a naval base. This island has remained loyal to Hadi.
Precisely, the fact that Yemen is a country bordering the Red Sea has important implications, since an important part of the world's maritime traffic passes near its coasts - as we explain in the Maritime Safety Observatory in our Number 3 -, with the oil tanker traffic from the Persian Gulf. Hence, activities such as piracy, attacks with anti-ship missiles or the deployment of underwater mines are causes of concern for the International Community.
Regarding the armed forces of unified Yemen, they drew from the former armies of North Yemen and South Yemen, who received support, respectively, from the capitalist and Soviet blocs. Most of the material, from light weapons to battle tanks, ballistic missiles and anti-aircraft systems, was of Soviet design, with a few exceptions that included American, Iranian and Chinese material.
In another order of things, the arms market at a civilian level in Yemen is practically legal, and light weapons bazaars are very present throughout the country, without any serious attempt to eliminate this trade, with all that this entails. It implies a chronically weak and unstable state in which tribes still have a lot of importance, especially in the rural world.
The pro-Saleh camp
The most populated area of Yemen, the west - and where most of the fighting has occurred - stands out for the adversity of the terrain, plagued by intricate mountain systems with few passable roads for heavy vehicles, as well as beaches and deserts. rocky, all of which makes maneuver, logistics, security of forces and the use of new technological means difficult.
One of its inhabitant groups, the Houthis, although originally they could be treated almost like a sect, by 2018 they have shown to have local allies and strong roots in the north of the country, highlighting their capacity for resistance against the material superiority of the pro side. -Hadi, which feeds back into that idea of strong popular, political and tribal support internally.
The Iranian role has also been controversial and debatable, but what is clear is that it has existed and everything indicates that it has increased over time, according to this scenario it gained importance to the detriment of Syria. We cannot help but remember the arms shipments seized by the U.S. Navy, the ability of the Houthis to employ relatively complex long-range missile systems - something complicated without external support - as well as anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft batteries, all of which attests to Iranian collaboration, although one might also wonder to what extent These achievements have also been due to the support received from units of the Yemeni army. In any case, the training received through advisors belonging to the Axis of Resistance organized by Iran has instilled tactical principles that were already observed in Hezbollah in 2006, such as concealment, stealthy approach, rapid, decisive and close-range action, the use coverage, etc.
At a strategic level, the Iranian contribution is also important and, in fact, it is interesting to see the parallels with an apparently different conflict such as that in Lebanon, with the Houthis seeking constant wear and tear on the enemy in order to reach some kind of strategic balance that would allow them allow peace to be won and gains to be consolidated. In addition to what has been said, the Iranian influence can be seen in the limited but orderly use of propaganda and videos that show the Houthi war exploits, something that may have increased the feeling of triumph over the Coalition, with numerous samples that can be found effortlessly over the Internet.
If the weapons sent from Iran are important for the Houthis' combat capacity, no less important is the ability they have demonstrated to bypass the blockade to which Yemen has been subjected and which has plunged the country into famine. Thus, despite everything, arms shipments seem to have continued to arrive in sufficient quantities to keep the war alive, and it is likely that some of these arrive smuggled in small vessels that look like fishing boats or through Oman, a sultanate that has already been accused of having allowed Iran to send weapons to the Houthis.
With or without Iranian help, the truth is that Yemen's own history and the character that it has imbued in its inhabitants has served to exacerbate the problems of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Not in vain are we talking about people with great pride, accustomed to instability, the lack of institutions and, ultimately, conflict, which has left a mark on their legal system that practically authorizes citizens to possess firearms. war legally. This fact, so atypical in a dictatorship, says a lot about the Yemeni mentality.
The Yemeni tradition of shooting dates back to the times of the British Empire. Until the first half of the 20th century, all men carried a curved knife called a Janbiya, this being the main means of self-defense, while firearms were reserved for tribal wars or against the British. This was because ammunition and firearms were very expensive and stocks available were limited, so it was necessary to save cartridges and achieve good levels of accuracy from shooters. Currently, the festive use of light weapons and shooting as a widespread tradition help the militiamen to master some of the nuclear elements of the infantry, such as weapon maintenance, accurate shooting and economization of ammunition, all which makes them fearsome enemies.
As if this were not enough, the Houthis dominate the terrain and know how to move without being detected by Coalition aviation. Their war actions against Saudi Arabia are based on the use of IEDs, as well as coups and ambushes, all of which are carried out using small units that usually do not exceed even the size of a platoon.
Over time they have also evolved in such a way that concealment has received particular attention, which is why as of 2018 it is not unusual to see that all participants in a coup d'état are wearing an excellent ghillie-type camouflage suit, something which is not common even among the troops of the Special Operations corps.
Regarding its organization, it must be noted that today the Houthi side resembles a confederation formed by a hard core of truly Houthi fighters and a whole series of peripheral forces that probably include local tribes and chiefs, political parties, opportunists. and Yemeni army forces. Although it is the originally Houthi forces that receive training from foreign advisors, as well as the most advanced weaponry - such as ATGMs or the best precision rifles - this does not prevent the tribes from looting Yemeni army warehouses, or that they have acquired material on the black market, with the pro-Saleh army units having a large fleet of armored vehicles. It is important, in this sense, that we take into account that in Yemen the tribes are first-order actors and can vary in size and extension, but all of them have in common the ability to assemble detachments of militiamen armed with heavy machine guns, CSR or cannons. rapid-fire weapons mounted on civilian vehicles.
One of the best moves of the Houthis has been their know-how in the institutional framework of the Yemeni state, once represented by Abdullah Saleh. In July 2016, the Supreme Political Council was formed, which maintained the constitution and began to govern the parts of the country that were not in the hands of Hadi or the jihadist groups. In this way, political power was distributed and an important part of the FF . AA. and from the Republican Guard they came to be at the service of this organization led by ten people in which the Houthis have the upper hand.
In this way, they have not only managed to legitimize themselves in the eyes of a good part of the population of the disappeared North Yemen, but they have also taken control of the state that repressed them without destroying it, thus having the levers of a Yemeni state in their hands. which, although battered, still has numerous resources.
The Houthi strategy
In another order of things, and far from what one might think, based on their means, the Houthis have not limited themselves to dealing blows, but have sought at all times to attack the heart of Saudi Arabia in pursuit of strategic objectives. In this way, and despite not having an air force, they have tried to return the blows of enemy aircraft by launching ground-to-ground missiles. While it is true that these weapons have not achieved decisive effects, they have demonstrated their ability to reach the interior of the kingdom, even when defended by Patriot batteries, confirming the Houthi will and capacity to respond to Coalition attacks with medium-sized weapons. scope.
Of course, as with Palestinian rocket attacks on Israeli territory, the aim is to frighten, rather than harm, since the Houthi ballistic missiles are equipped with primitive guidance systems and are not available in industrial quantities. However, on more than one occasion they have managed to cause havoc that went beyond the merely psychological, ending the lives of several high-ranking Saudi officials and reaching some bases.
Normally, to maximize the chances of success, simultaneous salvos are fired against several strategic targets, such as airports, capitals, military bases or nuclear power plants, using Burkan II medium-range ballistic missiles, which have probably been supplied by Iran and are based on the C or D versions of the Soviet Scud family. This use in salvos complicates the task of the Saudi anti-aircraft artillery in establishing an adequate defensive bubble over all these objectives at the same time.
In addition, the use of other types of complex weapons such as anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, torpedoes and naval mines has also been important, thus damaging Saudi and Emirati ships of the line and even attacking US Navy ships. All with the aim of creating insecurity in the sea routes that pass through the vital Bab al-Mandeb strait that gives access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, particularly by using naval bomb vehicles and disseminating mines, something we have talked about in previous numbers.
The Saudi side
When talking about the pro-Hati camp, there is no choice but to focus on Saudi Arabia, a country that controls its every move. As we know, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of the last absolutist monarchies in the world and also one of the largest exporters of crude oil, as well as a regional power confronted with Iran for dominance of the Middle East, in a struggle fueled by the confrontation between the two branches of Islam that they both lead.
The Saudi army is a large army with many possibilities, having a total of 800.000 men divided equally between professional troops and reservists. For some years now they have had one of the five largest military budgets on the planet, rivaling Russia and India despite having only 33 million inhabitants.
The fact of being an absolutist monarchy is not trivial, and it has a crucial influence on the armed forces, not in vain is it a country accustomed to palace intrigues and distrust between its main political leaders. This environment has affected the configuration of the Armed Forces and the creation of two bodies intended to perpetuate the power of the ruling dynasty: The Saudi Royal Guard Regiment - under direct orders of the sultan - and the Saudi Arabian National Guard, the latter a sort of heir to the tribal militias that brought the Saud house to power at the beginning of the 20th century and which has hundreds of thousands of men in its ranks.
Key positions in both the Armed Forces and the Civil Administration are occupied by relatives and associates of the monarch Salman bin Abdulaziz, and the crown prince, Mohamad bin Salman. This derives from a highly centralized and hierarchical political and military structure to prevent internal plots, in which the military leadership has been chosen for its loyalty and not for its military preparation. Likewise, we must take into account the concept of “royal family”, very different from that which is usual in Europe. In the Arab case, this is a very large group that includes literally thousands of men who are likely to receive favored treatment and faster promotions.
Experience shows that when a clientelistic system is established at the level of senior management, it normally spreads and is nothing more than a mere reflection of what happens at the level of middle management and even the troops. This, taken in the case of Saudi Arabia, represents a heavy burden on the professionalism of its Armed Forces, seen in many cases as an easy tool for progress.
Precisely, one of the criticisms that the Arab armies have traditionally received has been that of the poor leadership of officers plagued by corruption, with insufficient technical preparation and with a tendency to abuse their subordinates, all of which affected their own performance. a soldiery that, demoralized, was not very diligent when it came to learning, exercising its skills or risking its life in the service of its country.
As for the Saudi procurement policy, it can only be considered mediocre at best: the exaggerated variety in terms of wheeled armored vehicles, light weapons or artillery are inadmissible in a well-organized army and, as a consequence, the The level of homogenization is generally low, thereby weighing down the entire logistics chain. The explanation of this acquisition policy has two origins but they are intertwined:
- Patronage and arbitrary practices may have allowed whims or corruption to materialize in the form of arbitrary purchases, sponsored by a juicy commission market.
- Saudi Arabia has often been forced to tighten diplomatic ties with the United States. For this it was necessary not to depend completely on Washington and in this way the kingdom has chosen to diversify its suppliers by acquiring material from multiple sources, from French battle tanks to Russian assault rifles and from Spanish wheeled armored vehicles to Brazilian multiple rocket launchers or artillery. Chinese self-propelled
The reader must keep in mind that Saudi Arabia maintains an important geostrategic position not only due to its position, controlling the Arabian Peninsula, but also because it controls a fundamental part of the hydrocarbons that are exported worldwide. In addition, they have been skilled enough to weave a network of regional forums that have allowed them to lead most of the Gulf crude exporters while maintaining a fickle but substantially stable alliance with the United States and strong relations. positive with most of the planet.
All of the above has an impact on the total access that the Saudis have to the markets, which allows them to sell their crude oil, obtain enormous profits and then access the products of most of the defense industries around the globe. This mix of money, good relations and full availability of defense products allows the Saudis to generously staff their SAF, something that very few armies can boast of today.
Likewise, good bilateral relations also allow them to send their cadets to military schools around the world, as well as participate in important binational and multinational maneuvers, all of which should help to alleviate to some extent the harmful effects of clientelism.
Regarding the industry, although Saudi Arabia is an important purchaser of defense material, the truth is that in recent years it has been making important efforts aimed at providing itself with a military industry. The existence of an indigenous arms industry, even though it is still in an embryonic phase, allows the state to request designs designed to meet its specific needs, as well as reduce political-strategic dependence on external suppliers.
A budding industrial capacity that will be necessary to put an end to another of the serious problems of its FAS: An insufficiently open mentality at the military level that has hindered the adoption of large-scale modernization programs. Thus, the Saudi infantry of 2018 is not much better equipped than in 1991 and, although its armored vehicles cannot be classified as outdated, in many cases they are already mature and outdated designs, in addition to the fact that they have not been taken into account. the lessons of recent conflicts, which would undoubtedly have led to equipping these vehicles with Active Protection Systems (APS) and changing the doctrine in use.
In this sense, the abuse of money can lead to seeking technological solutions to problems that are really human and have to do with the very idiosyncrasy of the FAS. Among them, it is worth highlighting the almost total dependence on the life cycle services offered by the companies that have sold material to the Saudis. Services that can only be performed inside certain military bases or specific facilities and that have led the Arab FAS to be incapable of carrying out the slightest maintenance under combat conditions.
Despite all of the above, Riyadh's ability to deploy troops near its borders should not be underestimated, since in the midst of the 1991 Gulf crisis the Saudis placed the 10th and 20th Mechanized Brigades, the 8th, and the Royal Mechanized Brigade, the 45th Armored Brigade, the 2nd Brigade of the National Guard, and the Royal Saudi Marine Battalion. A good part of these units participated in the first phases of Desert Storm with great success, dismantling more than six divisions of the Iraqi army, although it is fair to say that these were second-rate divisions that were also badly battered by air attacks and by Above all, they had very low morale.
Another interesting point derives from the relationship between information management at a tactical level and strong centralization, since this type of organization that limits the initiative of small units in exchange for allowing a higher command to make decisions tends to waste Much of the tactical advantages offered by modern C4ISR networks, likewise the Saudi military, technical and civilian mentality and experience when implementing and structuring the use of all these means could have degenerated into poor information management.
Let us remember that today the problem does not lie solely in obtaining data, but rather in managing it and getting it to the appropriate recipient in a timely manner, all of which is a challenge that only a careful design of strategic and tactical C4ISR networks can exploit. to the maximum.
Saudi diplomacy
In reality, the first Saudi success has been diplomatic, since they have managed to gain the real support of a large number of Muslim countries that have joined their Coalition, demonstrating the strength of Saudi Arabia's relations with its neighbors and with the Sunni world. Thanks to the above, Riyadh's allies contributed their own forces, which have played a crucial role. Thus, Sudan sent several thousand men, while the United Arab Emirates contributed a small but well-equipped armored battalion along with multiple aircraft and ships. Finally, countries such as Egypt, Senegal, Morocco, Qatar and Bahrain have sent in minor naval, air and land forces that, although sometimes numerous for political reasons, have remained in the rearguard. Allies have also helped advise and equip pro-Hadi Yemenis and even an unknown number of mercenaries have been hired for missions that included frontline combat.
Another success at the international political level has been the support provided by intelligence and the United States Navy, which has carried out attack missions on jihadist targets, patrolled the waters of the Persian Gulf, intercepting weapons shipments and providing security to the maritime traffic and has even helped destroy Yemeni anti-ship missile batteries. The role of the United States is also interesting in the sense that it has not retaliated against the kingdom despite the numerous accusations of Human Rights violations and the poor image it is generally giving itself.
However, so many balancing acts and so many actors could take their toll on Saudi Arabia and worsen its relations with some countries following accusations of having used foreign material to violate Human Rights. In this sense, there are already open judicial processes in Italy and Germany, and the debate is on the table in countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Spain or the United States.
The Saudi strategy
Now, in the case of the Saud kingdom, what has been the strategic modus operandi when intervening in Yemen? The truth is that Saudi Arabia has never been a country that likes to intervene directly in Yemen. Already in the 90s they did it in the northern part of the country, and to do so they focused on controlling the border and making use of their overwhelming superiority in firepower to carry out bombings. However, when they decided to carry out operations a little beyond the border demarcation, they suffered heavy casualties at the hands of guerrillas in ambush, so in reality the experience then and the current one can be considered similar, since today, although with an air campaign On a larger scale, the main lines of the Arab plan have been the same: The Saudis have avoided going far beyond the border and have simply made use of their artillery and aviation. In the few cases in which they have carried out offensive operations, they have suffered numerous casualties, exactly the same as in the 90s, at least in the land section.
The Saudi strategic logic is not, in any case, erroneous. When a state, for political or economic reasons, does not wish to carry out a high-intensity offensive, simultaneously mobilizing entire divisions in order to conquer and occupy large areas of territory, it must look for another path. In this case, Saudi Arabia has decided to support its local allies, letting them take the initiative even when at specific times they are directly supported by their own forces.
In the Yemeni context, modest forces have been deployed in southern Yemen in order to support the pro-Hadi side in offensive operations. In addition, the Saudis have focused on keeping the entire border with Yemen protected, trying to avoid direct combat on the ground. Instead they have delegated to their allies while launching air and maritime operations with the aim of wearing down the adversary while Hadi's forces bore the brunt of the fighting.
The Saudi ground forces carried out only limited offensives - albeit with massive support - aimed at guaranteeing the impermeability of the border. In this sense they became the anvil against which the Saudi proxies should destroy the Houthis while the royal air force and navy carried out their own operations taking advantage of Saudi supremacy in both elements. Precisely, although it has hardly had any media impact except in specific cases, naval operations have had superlative importance in the development of the Yemeni conflict, at least in the following aspects:
- The navies of the Coalition countries have dedicated themselves to monitoring the seas around Yemen with the aim of maintaining strict control over the traffic of goods through the country's ports, paying special attention to arms trafficking, a mission in which seem to have had indirect help from the United States.
- Another important objective for the Royal Saudi Navy and its allies was to maintain the security of maritime traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, vital for oil exports.
- On the other hand, maintaining control of the sea and particularly of the port of Aden has allowed the Coalition to supply and reinforce the pro-Hadi.
- Carry out limited amphibious operations on the western coast, some of which have resulted in resounding failures.
- Finally, in the most compromised situations, warships have provided naval support fire using their cannons, something that was important to prevent the city from falling definitively into Houthi hands at the most critical moments of the 2015 battle of Aden.
As for air weapons, they have been used effectively, especially in the early stages of the conflict, when the Coalition was able to obtain air supremacy and eliminate what remained of the Yemen Air Force on the ground, from which point they were able to act calmly except for the annoyance of some anti-aircraft batteries that, although they achieved some successes, never threatened to change the balance of power in the Yemeni skies. It should be noted that the Houthis have used air-to-air missiles modified to be fired from the ground, an idea that has had some success. Once mastery of the skies was obtained, the air force has dedicated itself to carrying out all types of missions:
- Close air support.
- Interception and precision strikes against high-value targets, including “decapitation” attacks aimed at taking out enemy leaders. The most prominent of these attacks killed the Houthi politician Saleh al-Sammad in April 2018, which attests, incidentally, to the effectiveness of Saudi intelligence on the ground. Other typical targets such as military bases, command centers, government buildings, airports, production centers, industries, storage tanks, etc. have also been attacked.
- Supply local allied forces under real sieges, as has happened in Taiz, where Saudi Arabia has carried out parachute supply drops to supply the defenders.
Returning to the ground war, Saudi Arabia remains unwilling to carry out a conventional offensive, even though it could surely achieve military success. The fact is that Yemen's guerrillas have always shown themselves capable of inflicting heavy casualties on the conventional armies they have faced. Without going any further, in the 60s the Egyptian president Gamel Abdel-Nasser sent a contingent that amounted to up to 70.000 men to the Civil War in North Yemen. The adventure was a disaster and the Egyptians suffered several thousand deaths, which could have affected the very outcome of the Six Day War.
Of course, it's not all downside aversion. Saudi Arabia is also not used to carrying out large military operations and the capacity of its logistics and other elements, such as coordination with support or friend-enemy identification, is not clear, not to mention that the poor network of roads and railways of Yemen would complicate matters even more. The Saudis have even less experience and preparation in the fight against insurgency, so once they conquer the country it would not be easy for them to maintain control nor do they have enough troops to do so, which would surely confront them with a scenario like that of Iraq in the middle of the past decade.
Another issue to consider is the internal politics of the kingdom, in which a high number of casualties could be used by some factions to spur internal rifts and resentment that may exist in a part of society. In line with the above, employing too many troops in the neighboring country would reduce the troops necessary to maintain internal control - just a few months ago there was an attempted palace coup - and all without taking into account the need to deter Iran. Despite everything, limited raids on Sana'a or even on the country as a whole have been assessed, plus the potential risks of such an operation and the possible international repercussion, with the discredit that it could entail, have forced such an idea to be discarded.
Taking all of the above into account, it is understood that, until now, most of the Saudi ground effort has focused on the establishment of advanced posts in front of the border, which has not prevented the Yemenis from infiltrating Saudi territory carrying out brave blows of the hand. In reality, things have been so timid that we cannot even talk about a security cushion in front of its border.
The largest independent land operation carried out by Riyadh has consisted of the amphibious assault on Midi, a small city with a small port and docks. This assault was led by elements of a marine infantry battalion equipped with BMR-600M1 produced under license and who suffered heavy casualties in several skirmishes. In that operation, about 150 km2 were gained.
The Saudi deployment
It is extremely difficult to specify the amount of the Saudi mobilization. Taking into account the limited data available, there are authors who speak of up to 150.000 men, a figure that out of prudence we will reduce to about 100.000 and that includes both the military and police forces, militias and border guards. To this force we could add some 100 aircraft used since 2015 and countless vehicles of all types.
By the end of summer 2015, Saudi Arabia would have deployed, at a minimum, the 23rd Battalion of the National Guard, the Prince Sad bin Abdul Rahman Brigade of the National Guard, an artillery battalion equipped with the M198 howitzer also of the GN, the 11th Mechanized Brigade and the 8th Armored Division- All this together with an important air component with logistical and attack missions, as well as units of its special forces, air defense units and a marine infantry battalion. In October 2017, Saudi Arabia was able to deploy its first Aviation Brigade to operate in Yemen. These types of units are equivalent to more than 50 helicopters, including multipurpose, reconnaissance and attack designs.
The deployment has been done diligently and those in charge of logistics seem to have fulfilled their task adequately, which would not have been possible if it had not been for the good civil and military infrastructure that the kingdom has maintained near the border with Yemen for decades. . Furthermore, both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force have done a good job of transporting material and men in a short time.
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