The Battle of Rafah 2024

Another frustrated victory for Israel

Israeli armored vehicles during the Battle of Rafah
Israeli armored vehicles during the Battle of Rafah, May 2004. Source: IDF.

This article analyses the Battle of Rafah, which took place in May 2024 and, according to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself, was of “critical” importance. To this end, the following lines will delve into topics such as the background, placing the Battle of Rafah within the framework of the current conflict in the Gaza Strip. In addition, the scenario will be analysed, the participating forces and their plans prior to the battle will be studied, the development of the battle will be narrated and some final conclusions will be provided, which will place special emphasis on aspects such as tactics or the intrinsic difficulties of fighting in urban terrain. Ultimately, the Battle of Rafah is interesting from different points of view, as an irregular urban confrontation on a border with a third country and, furthermore, within a region with enormous significance in world geopolitics.

Table of Contents

  • Background
  • Stage
  • Forces in presence

    • Israel
    • Guerrilla

  • The plans for the battle of Rafah

    • Political conditions for the start of the battle
    • The problem of the civilian population in Rafah: the displaced

  • Development of the Battle of Rafah
  • Rafah after the battle
  • The Israel Defense Forces and the labors of Sisyphus
  • Conclusions

    • Need for population evacuation
    • Tactical and organic
    • Occupation of urban land and its governance
    • Need to surround the urban area
    • The future of war in the Gaza Strip

  • Bibliography
  • Notes

Background

(Author's note: As in other works, we will not use English to cite Arabic toponyms. We will refer to the irregular Gazan element by the generic (and classic) name of guerrilla.[1]).

On October 7, 2023, Israel suffered a major surprise terrorist attack of unprecedented proportions, leaving 1.189 dead and 252 kidnapped by various terrorist groups from the Gaza Strip. The country responded with a declaration of war and the mobilization of 300.000 reservists.

A few days later - on October 27th - Israel has begun operations inside the Gaza Strip, intervening significantly from north to south. The southernmost part of the Strip, Rafah Governorate, bordering Egypt, was left for last.

In the first months of the war, the large urban centers of the Strip, such as Gaza City and Khan Yunis (خان يونس) were subjected to this first intense phase by the Israeli forces and were "cleansed" of enemies and their infrastructures destroyed. Then the second phase was passed where, without occupying the "cleansed" areas, operations were carried out thanks to the support of Intelligence that pointed out targets of opportunity.

In February 2024, following these operations in the northern and central areas of the Strip, Rafah was supposed to be "cleaned" without interruption. But this was not the case due to political impositions, mainly due to the possibility of negotiating a ceasefire. Unfortunately, For the counter-guerrilla (the Israel Defense Forces) the operation was delayed until the month of May, as we will see later, giving the guerrillas (Hamas and other groups) time to perfect the defense of Rafah and recover in other areas of the center and north of the Strip, since this Rafah governorate was a base, almost intact, from where to organize and feed this recovery; in addition, being on the border with Egypt, it was a place where supplies were received from abroad.

The Battle of Rafah, that said, consisted of a series of battles[2] irregular groups within a guerrilla environment, subject to the ups and downs of politics (domestic and foreign), as is normal, on both sides of the conflict. Thus, the beginning, development and end of the battle of Rafah were mainly subject to the domestic and foreign policy of Israel, the United States, Egypt, Iran, other countries and international organizations; also to that of the non-state actors involved, where the Palestinian groups (most of them terrorist in nature) stand out, as well as Hamas as the main force in the Strip and the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria). All this without forgetting Lebanon, a state that is home to Hezbollah (Party of God), an organization that is, de facto, a state within the Lebanese state; also Syria with its hornet's nest of guerrillas, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and practically the entire Arabian Peninsula, where we highlight the Huzi movement.[3] in Yemen, Mountainous guerrilla group capable of damaging maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aden, or to attack with missiles [4]to Israel.

https://www.revistaejercitos.com/articulos/las-fuerzas-de-defensa-de-israel-y-el-combate-urbano-en-la-franja-de-gaza/

The Stage

Terrain always exerts a tyrannical influence on tactics, both for the guerrilla and the counterguerrilla. In urban combats, the physical terrain is necessarily linked to the population it supports, a matter we will discuss later.

Physically, the terrain in Rafah has identical characteristics to the other two large urban centres, Gaza and Khan Yunis. Although the terrain is generally flat, it is criss-crossed by two lines of heights parallel to the coast, which consists of a long beach with shallow waters.

South of Rafah we have a maximum elevation of 105 meters, the Abu Auda vertex, a dominant terrain that extends towards Al-Sufi (الصوفية). In this area there is a sparsely urbanized area that is the ill-fated project of the airport of the Strip.

Next comes the fully urbanised Rafah "refugee camp" which is located on the next line of heights, further towards the coast.

It is worth highlighting the Saladin Road, this section from the Rafah crossing to separate Al Sufi from the old town of Rafah, is presented as an obligatory coordination line.

The terrain where the Battle of Rafah took place is characterised by the virtual absence of significant elevations, the presence of the coast to the west and the fact that it is crossed by the Saladin Road. Source: Own elaboration.
The terrain where the Battle of Rafah took place is characterised by the virtual absence of significant elevations, the presence of the coast to the west and the fact that it is crossed by the Saladin Road. Source: Own elaboration.

The terrain suggests first taking the dominant area of ​​land south of the Saladin Highway, which we have generally called Al-Sufi and, logically, the border crossing; secondly, the terrain suggests occupying the upper part of Rafah, which is the urbanized refugee camp; and thirdly, advancing on the more modern area of ​​Tal Al-Sultan (Sultan's Hill) near the coast. This is what the 162nd Armored Division, the large Israeli unit that fought this battle, did, as we will see later.

A significant element, and of primary importance, is the border between Israel and Egypt. To isolate Rafah, the Israel Defense Forces prioritized advancing parallel to the separation line with Egypt.

From the point of view of urban structure, there are three major areas: to the south, up to Saladin Highway (a road that crosses the entire Strip), is the least densely urbanized area; the city center is the densest part of buildings; and finally, we have the modern Tal al-Sultan neighborhood, to which we must add the vacant lots located to the northeast of the neighborhood that appear to house Hamas installations underground.

The border line on the Gaza Strip side has as its characteristic point the 40-meter mark, a gentle but prominent hill that allows observation of the border and Rafah.
The border line on the Gaza Strip side has as its characteristic point the 40-meter mark, a gentle but prominent hill that allows observation of the border and Rafah. Source: Own elaboration.

Forces in presence

Israel

The Rafah area has been under the responsibility of the 162nd Division "Ha-Plada" (Steel Formation) of the Southern Command.

The 162nd Division has had a variable number of brigades assigned to operations over Rafah; this is normal to allow for relief and to adapt capabilities to the intensity of the fighting. Of these brigades, some have been organic, such as the 401st Armored Brigade (with modern Merkava tanks) and the 84th Infantry Brigade (mechanized, perhaps with Namera, a sophisticated personnel carrier on the Merkaba IV chassis). These professional brigades have been there since the beginning of the battle that began on May 7, 2024.

Israeli brigades[6] have homogeneous battalions[7], This benefits instruction, training and logistics, but is not practical in combat, especially in urban areas, where it is essential to combine tanks with infantry and other support such as sappers, reconnaissance elements and special units. This is why brigades modify their organization to be able to form tactical groups.[8]; for example, the 401st Armored Brigade "I'kvot haBarzel" has deployed with:

  • Its headquarters, signals company and organic logistics support battalion.
  • 601st Sapper Battalion, also organic.
  • 52nd Tank Battalion (organic to the 401st Brigade (with Merkava V Barak)[9] , a priori, an ideal tank for combat in localities).
  • 424th Mechanized Infantry Battalion (organic part of the 84th Brigade).
  • 932nd Infantry Battalion (organic part of the 933rd Brigade)
  • 13 º Shayetet (it is a special operations unit, literally Flotilla 13, organic to the Israeli Navy).

If we look at the combat organization of the 84th Infantry Brigade "Givati", this was:

  • Its headquarters, signals company and organic logistics support battalion.
  • 8170th Sapper Battalion (organic part of the 84th Brigade).
  • 9th Tank Battalion (organic part of the 401st Brigade).
  • 432nd Mechanized Infantry Battalion (organic part of the 84th Brigade).
  • 846th Reconnaissance Battalion (organic to the 84th Brigade)

We see how the 401st Brigade, of its three tank battalions, has only deployed with one of them (the 52nd) giving the 9th to the 84th Brigade and leaving the third of them (the 46th) perhaps as a reserve; it has also received an infantry battalion, the 932nd from the 933rd Infantry Brigade, which is also organic to the 162nd Division. Since the 401st Armored Brigade does not have a reconnaissance unit, a special operations unit from the Navy has been added (the 13th Shayetet).

The 84th Infantry Brigade, for its part, has received a tank battalion (the 9th of the 401st) and has left two of its infantry battalions, the 424th and the 435th, in reserve, initially deploying with only the 432nd and the 846th Reconnaissance Battalions. The reconnaissance battalions of the Israeli infantry brigades have a somewhat special training and are very well suited to combat against urban guerrillas.

But this structure of the 162nd Division, with two brigades, was not permanent; thus, on May 21, the 933rd Infantry Brigade "Nahal" appeared on the scene with:

  • Its headquarters, signals company and logistics support battalion.
  • A company of sappers from the 601st Battalion (organic part of the 401st Brigade).
  • 46th Tank Battalion (organic part of the 401st Brigade), which we said was in reserve or, perhaps, being integrated into this brigade.
  • 435nd Mechanized Infantry Battalion (organic part of the 84th Brigade).
  • 931st Infantry Battalion (organic part of the 933rd Brigade).
  • 934th Reconnaissance Battalion (organic part of the 933rd Brigade).
  • 277th Light Infantry Battalion (organic to the 521st Territorial Brigade/80th Territorial Division/Southern Command)

In this case, it is significant that the 933rd Brigade draws on sappers from the 601st (of the 401st Brigade), this is probably because the organic sapper battalion of the 933rd Brigade (the 7107th) is a reserve battalion, although the rest of the brigade is regular (or from the professional army).

The 12th Infantry Brigade "Negev" from the reserve, of the "Sinai" territorial division (Southern Command) also appeared during the battle. It is not clear what units it consisted of, but it seems that it deployed, in addition to its headquarters and its signals and logistics company, its reconnaissance battalion (the 6863rd) plus a tank unit (perhaps a battalion) and the 50th Infantry Battalion (of the 933rd Brigade). Again, we see how the Israeli command avoids mobilizing reserve units, complementing them, if possible, with professional units.

By May 21, there is also news about the 7th Armored Brigade.Saar in the Golan Heights» of the 36th Division (Northern Command), so we can say that on May 22, 2024 the 162nd Division had 5 brigades (84th, 933rd, 401st, 12th and 7th) to which we must add part of the 89th Special Operations Brigade (98th Division/Central Command). This brigade seems to have deployed with two of its battalions the 212th "Maglan" and the 621st "Egoz", along with a tank company (perhaps from the 75th Tank Battalion of the 7th Brigade) and another of sappers (perhaps from the 603rd Battalion of the 7th Brigade).

On May 28, the 828th Armored Brigade (training) appears on the scene.[10]) "Bislamach" (Reserve) of the 146th "Ha-Mapatz" Division of the reserve (Northern Command), although it was withdrawn on July 6, 2024.

In addition to these units, the participation of units from the divisional core of troops (from the 162nd division) should be considered: the divisional signals battalion "Afik", the 215th Artillery Brigade "Amud ha Esch" and the division's logistics brigade.

As in other locations in the Gaza Strip such as Khan Yunis (pictured), the IDF had to fight in a complex urban environment during the battle for Rafah. Source: IDF.
As in other locations in the Gaza Strip such as Khan Yunis (pictured), the IDF had to fight in a complex urban environment during the battle for Rafah. Source: IDF.

Guerrilla

The main force of the guerrillas was Hamas' Rafah Brigade with three battalions (katibas / كتائب) which at the beginning of the battle were practically intact. Some sources speak of four: the North, East, South and West battalions.

There are other groups such as the al-Quds Brigades (of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad), the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (of Fatah), the National Resistance Brigades (of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), which have been the most active. Some sources point to, in addition to the above, the al-Nasser Saladin Brigades (of the Popular Resistance Committee, apparently derived from Fatah and financed by Hezbollah) or the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades (of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). All these organizations are not really brigades that comprise several battalions; they adopt this name in a generic way and are really a set of guerrilla teams or cells.

Although all guerrilla groups claim responsibility for the actions, the bulk of the guerrilla force, and the most organized, have been the Hamas battalions. The deployment of the battalions of Hamas' Rafah Brigade may have been as follows.

Deployment of guerrillas in the face of the Rafah battle
Deployment of guerrillas in the face of the battle of Rafah. Source: Own elaboration based on a map of https://t.me/moriahdoron/9936.

Plans ahead of the Rafah battle

A battle is a series of fights, and its execution is therefore tactical, although the approach is usually based on a military strategic objective, in this case, on the part of the Israeli forces. The objective was to control the border of the Strip with Egypt in order to isolate it and cut off supplies to the Gaza guerrillas; and, at the same time, to destroy the military capabilities of all the guerrillas in the area and the Hamas government in the urban complex. For the guerrillas, the strategic purpose was cognitive.

The guerrilla's battle plan was similar to that of other "resistances" in other localities. The guerrillas admitted this disadvantageous battle due to the lack of a sanctuary zone.[11] where to take refuge and, aware of being condemned to tactical defeat, sought strategic victory in the Western cognitive sphere, exploiting its image as a victim.

The Hamas Brigade, "defending" the city, sought out long-distance harassment, ambushes supported by improvised explosive devices, relying on anti-tank fire (especially with the RPG anti-tank rocket launcher) and mortar fire against the landed infantry, or long-distance fire from select snipers, mining buildings in order to blow them up when the enemy recognized them and avoiding hand-to-hand combat, and, above all, promoting images with which to feed its messages of victimhood in the face of a demonized enemy.

The Israeli forces' plan for Rafah was to isolate the city and destroy Hamas' Rafah Brigade, and to do so, to advance rapidly along the border to the coast, occupying the Rafah crossing and Point 41 in the first stage. In the second stage, they sought to organize a border path from C. 105 to the sea, passing through C. 40. At the same time, they advanced through the open fields to the south and southeast until reaching the Saladin Line road, which could well have been the first coordination line; once they reached the coast, they would attack the central area of ​​Rafah, and Tal al-Sultan (Sultan's Hill, perhaps the original name of C. 41) and the Hamas military installations in the open fields to the north of that neighborhood. The plan could have been the following.

Possible IDF plan for Rafah battle
Possible IDF plan for the Battle of Rafah. Source: Own elaboration.

The Israeli plan for Rafah, as it was for the cities of Gaza and Khan Yunis (خان يونس), did not include the occupation and control of the entire urban area, except for a border path with Egypt about 800 meters wide and covering the entire border, and some key points to be able to carry out selective actions once the guerrillas have significantly lost their military capabilities.

In addition, the Israeli plan called for avoiding civilian casualties as much as possible by issuing advance evacuation orders to the civilian population in areas of potential clashes, as well as the use of precision weapons and munitions to avoid unwanted damage and, of course, exquisite target intelligence.

Perhaps the Israeli plan was intended by the Southern Command to take place in February so that the battle would have ended before the start of Ramadan 2024 (Sunday, March 10), but a series of political conditions delayed them for reasons that we will see later.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6u7mrxCJVPc

Political conditions for the start of the battle

The operation on Rafah was postponed for political reasons. On 20 February, there were rumours of a possible deployment of the 98th Parachute Division to Rafah after the completion of the "clean-up" of Khan Yunis.

By the end of February, Hamas's control of the territory in Rafah was chaotic, with supplies for the civilian population entering from Egypt through "crossing 96" being raided by the population before Hamas took control of them.

On February 27, IDF spokesman Daniel Hagari reported that Israel was seeking to ensure supplies and medical assistance to displaced people by creating safe zones before launching operations in Rafah. Furthermore, negotiations for the release of hostages put any advance on Rafah on hold.

Ramadan passed and there were rumours that operations in Rafah would take place in April, but ceasefire negotiations advised a further delay.

For Hamas, the ceasefire and hostage release agreements are in its interest if Israel gives in and withdraws completely from the Strip, including the border with Egypt. Since Israel, logically, cannot accept these terms, nor can Hamas consent to be besieged with its enemy controlling everything entering and leaving the Strip, the negotiations are starting from a very difficult situation, not to say that they are doomed to failure, unless one of the sides agrees to be defeated.

Hamas would be defeated if, for example, Israel abandons the Strip but not the Rafah border with Egypt. Israel would be defeated if it abandons the entire Strip, including the border with Egypt, since Hamas would soon be recovered and reorganized by the supplies that would enter through Egypt.

Negotiations are likely to be delayed by international pressures driven by third-party interests in the Middle East region, as well as by domestic political reasons of the most important parties involved.

On May 5, the Israeli defense minister said he doubted Hamas would agree to a ceasefire in the ongoing negotiations; and Hamas probably did not see a defeat in Rafah as a threat to its survival. The experience of Gaza and Khan Yunis (خان يونس) advises it to do so, as it was able to re-emerge in those same places after two severe defeats. The fact is that, the next day, May 6, the Israeli government ordered the continuation of the operation.Iron Swords» in Rafah.

https://www.revistaejercitos.com/articulos/la-guerra-de-guerrillas-urbana-de-hamas-en-la-franja-de-gaza/

The problem of the civilian population in Rafah: the displaced

The Israel Defense Forces estimated that around 100.000 people would be displaced by the battle, while other institutions estimated many more. This figure was increased, as we will see, by the development of the operations. The humanitarian zone from Al-Mauasi (المواصي) to Khan Yunis was extended by April 28.

The evacuation of the population, in addition to being a mandatory prior step under International Humanitarian Law, favors the counter-guerrilla and harms the guerrilla, since the latter loses, on the one hand, the capacity for tactical dispersion and, on the other, opportunities to add "innocent victims" to its cognitive operations, which is why the former strive to carry them out and the latter to hinder them.

Al-Mauasi area
Al-Mauasi area. Source: Own elaboration.

Development of the Battle of Rafah

Broadly speaking, the Battle of Rafah was for the Israeli forces a large-scale mop-up operation, with strong opposition from the guerrillas; and for Hamas and the other guerrilla groups, a series of actions aimed at wearing down their adversary. It differs from the development of a conventional battle, where the objectives are usually defined by the occupation of the terrain or the destruction of a force.

Israeli preparatory fires began on May 2024, 50, when the Israeli Air Force bombed some XNUMX targets in the Rafah area. These were, in general, high-value targets for the guerrillas, so their destruction diminished their capabilities.

Following the delays we have noted, in early May, the United States, the United Nations and others put pressure on Israel not to launch the operation on Rafah given the huge number of displaced people in the governorate. However, after assessing the massive and progressive movement of the population out of the foreseeable combat zones, on May 5 the Israeli defense minister announced with political ambiguity: "a powerful operation in Rafah in the near future».

Hamas, for its part, attacked an Israeli position near Kerem Shalom on this day with 114 mm rockets and mortar fire. It was a fire control center, probably of the divisional artillery.[15] of the 162nd Armored Division responsible for carrying out the operations in Rafah. With this action, Hamas gave signs of having intelligence on its opponent, although the results of the attack were more psychological than physical destruction.

On May 6, the Israeli War Cabinet unanimously decided to continue the operation "Iron Swords» in Rafah[16], so the Israeli forces redoubled their efforts with public information actions to ensure that the maximum number of civilians left the foreseeable combat zones, designating as a place of refuge the "humanitarian services area" of Al-Mauasi (المواصي), an area previously extended, towards Khan Yunis, by the Israeli command. Opportunely, on the same day, the American floating dock located at the end of the Netzarim trail (outside the battle space) was made operational for the disembarkation of humanitarian aid, since its entry through the south, with the foreseeable beginning of operations in Rafah, would not be possible.

On May 2024, XNUMX, the Israelis advanced on Rafah, with the main objective being the border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, but also an advance to the Saladin Highway in the south and east of Rafah Governorate. Hamas would claim responsibility for clashes in the Souk Al-Sufia (سوق الصوفية) neighborhood.

The Israeli 162nd Division initiated this advance with two of its brigades: The 84th Infantry Brigade «Givati» and the 401st Armored Brigade «Ikot HaBarzei", forming tactical groups as we have already indicated.

During the first few days there were clashes with procedures that would be repeated throughout the battle. Let's see.

The guerrillas, mainly Hamas, confronted the Israeli forces with light weapons, anti-tank weapons, especially RPGs, improvised explosive devices and mined points. They mainly sought out small-scale urban anti-tank ambushes. There were more elaborate attacks, with opportune mortar fire on the landed Israeli infantry and complementary ambushes, to the main action, on possible arrival streets for reinforcements or medical evacuation vehicles.

Israeli forces, when they located the enemy, almost systematically called for fire support, which was usually carried out with air fire, probably with remote-controlled aircraft most of the time, but also with fixed-wing or mobile aircraft (helicopters). A variable number of air assets (depending on the intensity of the operations) were in constant flight (probably 24 hours a day, every day of the operation), so that, after the call for fire, the execution of the same was a matter of a few minutes; or seconds if, for example, the pilot of the corresponding UCAV had the target on his screen, since in many cases they were monitoring them in real time. Thus, on May 7, up to a hundred air attacks could be counted in Rafah and, although the number of confirmed casualties among the guerrillas is usually low, on that day, and due to these attacks, there were about 30 fatalities. On the other hand, although to a lesser extent, the Israeli troops also had artillery support; Furthermore, it was also common to use tank fire as an immediate response due to its precision.

Most likely between the night of May 8 and the early hours of May 401, the XNUMXst Armored Brigade occupied the Rafah border crossing. Geolocated images taken by Israeli soldiers, which were posted on social media that day, confirmed this.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FWJiAwuaSaQ

Once at this crossing, Israeli forces were busy trying to keep the humanitarian aid flowing. Israel's agency for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories said that aid trucks were allowed to pass through Karen Shalom for inspection; however, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) said there were no workers to handle the aid because of Israeli forces' operations in the area. Wall Street Journal, Citing Egyptian official sources, it reported that Egypt had blocked the entry of all aid trucks to the Strip into Egypt. To top it off, unidentified elements harassed Palestinian workers heading to Karen Shalom with fire. Hamas blamed the attack on Israel for invading Rafah. The fact is that the Palestinians in the Strip received no aid, except for the American floating dock at the end of the Netzarim channel.

On May 162, images appeared in open sources that suggest that the XNUMXnd Division advanced along two axes: on the one hand, via Karen Shalom towards the Rafah border crossing; and on the other, Karen Shalon towards Al-Bayuk, with the Saladin Highway as the limit of advance.

The first of these appears to be the main effort and was led by the 401st Armored Brigade, running along the so-called "Philadelphia Corridor," the future border trail; the second was led by the 84th Infantry Brigade. The two brigades formed battalion-level tactical groups where company-type units were mixed, so that a tank battalion gave up one or two tank companies and received one or two mechanized infantry companies. On the other hand, there was no occupation and consolidation of the terrain, but the bulk of the tactical groups made an appearance or destroyed previously designated objectives, without passing the Saladin Highway in the Al-Bayuk area. The occupation of the terrain was therefore minimal and aimed at providing security for the units' logistical route and establishing future bases of departure for new attacks.

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