The Battle of Avdiivka was one of the culminating moments of the Ukrainian war. The importance of this city for the Ukrainian war effort, its role as a communications node and industrial center or the possibility that, upon its fall, other key points such as Pokrovsk would be threatened, forced the Ukrainian Armed Forces to stand up to this city. of the Donbas. After months of fighting to take over the flanks of this city, Russian troops finally broke through the Ukrainian defenses in the south of Avdíivka in January 2024, although they would still need until mid-February to conquer the urban center. A defeat of the AFU that, despite the enormous attrition suffered by Russia, opened the doors to subsequent advances marking, along with what happened in Bakhmut, a before and after in the future of this war.
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Order of Battle
- The Battle of Pisky (24/02/2022-01/10/2022)
- Nine months of battles on the flanks of Avdiivka
- The Russian offensive of October-December 2023
- The fall of Avdiivka
- Bibliography
- Notes
Introduction
Avdiivka is a Ukrainian industrial city with an area of 29 km² and a population before the Russian invasion of Ukraine of 32.000 inhabitants. It is part of the Donetsk-Makiiv agglomeration in the Donbass region and is located less than 14 kilometers north of the city of Donetsk - capital of the homonymous oblast and the DPR (Donetsk People's Republic).[1]-, being the junction point of the region's roads. In addition, it is crossed by the Donetsk-Kramatorsk railway line. Its economy and population depended on Ukraine's largest petrochemical coke plant and its associated industry, in which it was the main producer of coke for the Ukrainian steel industry and one of the largest in Europe.
The importance of the city to the Ukrainian war and industrial effort, together with its value as a nexus of road and rail communications within the region[2], as well as its proximity to Donetsk and its airport -located just 7 kilometers to the south-, made Avdíivka an objective of high strategic value for Russia and the DPR militias since the hostilities of 2014. This caused the south of the city became 'no man's land' and was not the scene of low-intensity combat and artillery exchanges during the eight years prior to the invasion, with the exception of what occurred during the first battle of Avdíivka in 2017[3] -when Ukrainian forces maintained control of the city against DPR militias.
The 2017 battle, the incessant war activity around the city and the undeniable industrial and geographical value it possessed, caused the Ukrainian command to give priority to the defensive preparations of Avdiivka in anticipation of a possible Russian invasion.[4]. For this reason, shooting ranges were ordered to be cleared in the crop fields and agricultural extensions in the peri-urban terrain; fortified positions were built; defensive obstacles were erected and trenches dug; machine gun nests and foxholes were placed; Different defensive lines were prepared, mostly anchored to the small river courses and industrial drainage channels that cross the AO (Operational Area) both from north to south and from east to west, as well as in the few artificial heights - industrial waste dumps. and natural that dot the region around the city and that would hinder the south-north and east-west advance. The peri-urban defenses would be combined with those located inside a complex and dense urban and manufacturing terrain, where the micro district[5] industrial area, production plants and some buildings of a certain height would be converted into strongholds that, depending on the situational context, would give a certain advantage to the Ukrainian defenders.
By early 2022, Avdiivka and its surroundings had become in an authentic military citadel, representing a wedge stuck in the middle of the Russian deployment in southeastern Ukraine, with some advanced positions of the ZSU located no further than a couple of kilometers away from the Donetsk airport runway. Being under the control of Ukrainian forces, said 'citadel' would hinder, if not prevent, any Russian possibility for rapid exploitation westward from Donetsk.
As of the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022[6] and for almost two years -February 24, 2022 to February 17, 2024-, fighting for control of Avdíivka would take place. These were limited to the peri-urban territory immediately surrounding the fortress city and, only since the end of 2023, have they been developed in fully urban-industrial terrain.
The AO was delimited to the southwest by the approaches to the M-30 highway and the Donetsk bypass, the M-04, - a road level crossing, located between the towns of Pisky and Pervomais'ke, less than 4 kilometers southwest of Avdiivka. In this way:
- To the south, its limit was marked by the M-04 running through the chain of villages and towns of Sieverne, Vodyane, Opytne, Vesele and the Spartak district of Donetsk, as well as by the industrial drainage canals in the northern vicinity. from the city and airport of Donetsk.
- As for the west, the Ukrainian rearguard was deployed along the chain of towns of Berdychi, Semenivka, Orlivka and Tone'ke, as well as along the O0542 Yasinuvata-Zhelanne road, the main logistical route for the Ukrainian defenders.
- For its part, to the southeast the AO was delimited by the Skotovata River and the northwestern hills of Kruta Balka, of which the closest is the Ukrainian military cemetery, where those who fell in the 2017 battle rest.
- Finally, to the east-northeast, it bordered the industrial waste dumps of the Coke plant, the dam, the H-20 highway - located 4 kilometers east of the city - and the towns of Krasnohorivka, Kam'yanka, Novoselivka Druha and Stepove.
Order of Battle
Before proceeding to the detailed analysis of the military operations that took place for the control of Avdiivka, the author considers it necessary to present the ORBAT (Order of Battle) listing the units that, at one time or another from February 24, 2022 to February 24, 2024, it is known that they were deployed to the AO Avdíivka.
- ZSU (Zbroini syly Ukrainy-Armed Forces of Ukraine)[7]
- Operational and strategic groupings of troops “Khortytsia” and “Tavria”[8]
- Independent Presidential Brigade[9]
- 1.OTBr (Independent Tank Brigade)
- 3.OShBr[10] (Independent Mechanized Assault Brigade)
- 43.OABr (Independent Artillery Brigade)
- 47.OMBr (Independent Mechanized Infantry Brigade)
- 25.OSHB (Independent Assault Battalion)
- 53.OMBr
- 54.OMBr
- 55.OABr
- 57.OMPBr (Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade)
- 59.OMPBr
- 414.OPUBAS (Separate Regiment of Attack Unmanned Aviation Systems) 'Birds of Magyar'
- 71.OEBr (Independent Hunter Brigade)
- 72.OMBr
- 104.OBrTro (Infantry Brigade of the Territorial Forces)
- 107.OBrTrO
- 92.OBTrO (Infantry Battalion of the Territorial Forces)
- 109.OBrTrO
- 110.OBrTro
- 110.OMBr
- 115.OMBr[11]
- 116.OMBr
- 116.OBrTro
- 118.OMBr
- 127.OBrTro
- 227.OBTrO
- 237.OBrTrO
- 425.OSHB 'SKALA'
- 501.OBMP (Independent Marine Corps Battalion)
- 503.OBMP
- 'Sibir' Battalion[12]
- Russian Volunteer Corps
- Ukrainian support units: Omega special purpose unit, kyiv Police Regiment, as well as the 6., 9., 11. and 105. Border Detachments.
- VSRF (Vooružjonnyje Síly Rossíjskoj Federácii–Armed Forces of the Russian Federation)
- DMC (Central Military District)
- 2nd GCAA (Guard Combined Arms Army)
- 15th GSMRB (Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade)
- 21stGSMRB
- 30thSMRB (Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade)
- 35ºSMRB
- 5ºCAA (Combined Arms Army)
- 60th GSMRB
- 41thGCAA
- 55th GSMRMB (Guards Separate Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade)
- 74stGSMRB
- 90ºGTD[13] (Guard Tank Division)
- 6th TR (Tank Regiment)
- 80ºTR
- 239ºTR
- 2nd GCAA (Guard Combined Arms Army)
- DMS (Southern Military District)
- 8thGCAA
- 20th GMRD (Guard Motorized Rifle Division)
- 150ºMRD (Motorized Rifle Division)
- 1ºCCAAC[14] (Combined Arms Army Corps)
- 8thGCAA
- DMC (Central Military District)
The Battle of Pisky (24/02/2022-01/10/2022)
From the beginning of the invasion, Russian forces would try to surround Avdíivka. However, the city was still a secondary AO within Russian plans in February-March 2022.[21], so its capture was practically unfeasible, given that the vast majority of Russian units were deployed both in the north of Ukraine - in the attempt to capture Kiev - and on the land bridge and on the western bank of the Dnieper[22]. Due to this, for much of 2022 the weight of the fighting in the Avdíivka AO fell entirely on the militia units of the RPDa moderate artillery support and aerial VSRF and VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces)[23].
Ukraine, on the other hand, before the invasion had deployed a good part of its best units in the east of the country.[24], assigning a mechanized infantry brigade -54.OMBr-, a motorized infantry brigade -56.OMPBr- and an artillery brigade -55.OABr- to the outskirts of the citadel, which would be joined by two at the beginning of March territorial forces brigades -107. and 110.OBrTro-. The initial balance of forces was therefore tilted in favor of Ukraine.[25] and this would be demonstrated by the combats of the following months.
In this phase of the operations for Avdíivka the fighting was focused, although it was not limited[26], in the dispute over the H-20 to the east and the Avdiivka-Donetsk highway - the T0505 - to the southeast, as well as in the fight for control of the no-man's land adjacent to the north of the airport and the Spartak district of Donetsk to the south of the AO, as well as the hamlet of Pisky to the southwest. Due to the strong Ukrainian defensive lines around Avdiivka, Russia at all times attempted to envelop the city from the northeast and southwest, while pinning Ukrainian forces to the south and east of the city.
The few Russian forces, as well as the fact that the Kremlin's attention was focused on kyiv first and then since the end of March until the end of summer 2022 on the Donets curve, were insufficient to even break the demarcation line prior to the invasion. The only Russian territorial gains made during the first half of the first year of the invasion were northeast and east of Avdiivka. In fact, given the cost in lives and Russian material, it could be said that the profits obtained by Russia, were pyrrhic - the momentary capture of Kam'yanka on June 4[27] and the consolidation of positions on the eastern approaches to Novoselivka Druha by the end of that month.
However, in early July 2022, the balance of forces in the AO began to even out. Some of the Russian DMS and DMC units that had been deployed initially against kyiv and then at the Donets Bend[28], were redeployed to the AO throughout June. This allowed the VSRF to have forces to carry out a new assault on Pisky and reach the famous level crossing (48.06758197379927, 37.64911356670479). In this way, the Russian forces could gain the long-awaited exit to the west of Donbas, increasingly necessary to facilitate the development of their operations, which were beginning to show clear symptoms of exhaustion and stagnation, in eastern Ukraine.[29].
The capture and control of the level crossing that gives access to the M-30 (E50) highway between Pisky and Pervomais'ke would have given Russia the ideal springboard to exploit an operational axis of advance in a westerly direction, towards Pokrovsk. This, in the best of cases for the VSRF[30] would have allowed them to turn their backs on the entire Ukrainian deployment in the northeast of the country[31]. Or, at the very least, it would have allowed them to threaten to envelop Avdiivka from the southwest and cut off the main Ukrainian logistical artery.
In mid-August 2022, the danger to Ukrainian forces of possible Russian success southwest of Avdiivka led to a fierce two-month fight to gain control of Pisky, the level crossing and the northern outskirts of Nevelske. Russia, with part of the 150rd MRD recently deployed in the AO and half of the 1ºCAAC focused on the southern sectors of the same, it only managed to advance sporadically[32] and without time-space cohesion or sequentiality based on the volume of artillery fire and infantry assaults more typical of the First World War. Which led to the absolute destruction of the town of Pisky and the village of Vesele. However, despite the slow pace of advance and the need for volume of fire to attempt any advance, by the end of September Russian forces had managed to dislodge Pisky from Ukrainian troops.[33] and, although they had failed to seize the level crossing, it was now part of the no man's land between the Ukrainian lines on the southern approaches to Pervomais'ke and the Russian lines on the western outskirts of Pisky.
By the end of October 2022, the pyrrhic Russian advances on the Pisky-Pervomais'ke highway At the cost of material and human casualties that only increased daily, they showed that the southern pincer of the great Russian involvement in the Donbas would not even come close to materializing. Furthermore, the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Izyum-Kupyansk during September-October 2022[34] He was in charge of neutralizing the danger of Russian penetration in the north of Donbas.
Since the end of October, Ukrainian forces would carry out stubborn offensive actions trying to expel VSRF units from the newly captured territories, making a failed attempt to mechanized assault in the direction of Donetsk airport between October 23 and 25, 2022. Similarly, in order to draw Russian forces away from M-04 and maintain constant pressure on DPR and VSRF militia units south of Avdiivka, 'offensive exits', the 'planted with mines' and the 'hit & run' of small groups of motorized infantry -in possession of large number of anti-tank weapons– from the towns of Vodyane, Opytne and Pervomais'ke towards the disputed territories to the south. To the east of the city, Kam'yanka was left in no man's land, which again put distance between the Russian advance guards and H-20. Added to this was the impact of Western Ukrainian artillery along with long-range and precision ammunition, hitting Russian logistics and follow-up echelons.
By mid-November 2022 it was clear that nAvdíivka was not at immediate risk of capture, nor would there be a rapid breakout and subsequent Russian exploitation from the AO. The Kremlin's attempt to retain the strategic initiative in its hands with offensive actions in the southwest of Avdíivka had been completely truncated. In fact, Ukraine, after its operational victories in Kharkiv and Jeerson[35], as well as with his tenacious defense of Avdíivka, the bend of the Donets and Vuhledar, he had taken it. Furthermore, the VSRF and DPR militia units deployed in the AO showed clear symptoms of exhaustion and reduced capabilities, so they had no choice but to fortify and reinforce the positions obtained during the first eight months of the invasion, to go on the defensive until a new opportunity presents itself.
Nine months of battles on the flanks of Avdiivka
In early 2023, the ZSU, after three months on the offensive to unleash the Russian gains of the previous summer, failed to exert sustained pressure to break the Russian defenses, so the line remained unchanged. The Ukrainian units in the AO were exhausted and, with the exception of the 503.OBMP[36], they had been fighting for Avdíivka since the first day of the invasion and had barely received troop replacements[37]. By ello, At the end of January they were quickly deployed in the region, joining the defenders with new units[38], as well as others fresh out of rest and recovery periods[39], special forces battalions[40], border detachments and forces from other AOs[41].
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