Russia / NATO: the fight for control of the Baltic (I)

The evolution of naval strategy in the Baltic Sea since the end of the Cold War can be considered one of the great successes of Western geopolitics and, in particular, of NATO. This is so, because in the space of a few years the members of the Alliance have been able to wrest from Moscow control of a sea that, until then, had been considered a Soviet-Russian lake: a crucial scenario that, if of war, would have forced this organization into a costly battle to keep its lines of communication open, while closing them to its opponent. A process that has been enhanced after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has affected the naval strategies of both parties and which also has profound implications for other theaters, all of which justifies its study.

Table of Contents

• Introduction
• The Baltic in the Cold War

  • The Battle of the First Salvo

• The importance of the Baltic
• The Baltic navies and Naval Power
• The Kaliningrad enclave

Introduction

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the evolution of policies in the Old Continent in relation to the Baltic had been very different from that of the Cold War. The strengthening of ties with Russia, in cases like that of Germany, seemed to point to a peaceful and calm future in a region that is intimately marked by geography. In recent years, however, the attitude of a Russia that feels harassed, following the expansion of the European Union and NATO towards its borders, has caused a renewed sense of anxiety among the rest of the Baltic coastal states, breaking passing away any possible ties established in previous decades.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has acted as a catalyst for a whole series of changes that have radically altered regional balances, since the only two states that had remained outside NATO (ignoring, for logical reasons, Russia itself ), They have ended up knocking on the doors of the Alliance, consummating its adherence to it in a short space of time and, in the process, changing the panorama in this particular Theater of Operations at all levels.

In this article, which is published in two parts, we will see how from the Cold War itself to the present day the balance of forces in the region has been gradually changing. Also how this change has had and - to the extent that it continues to deepen - has numerous implications for both parties, as well as for other nearby theaters. All this, of course, from a purely naval perspective, speaking both of the composition of the navies that operate there, and of the strategy of Russia and NATO in said sea.

Control of the Baltic during the Cold War

During the almost half century of Cold War in Europe, the Baltic Sea would play a central role in the strategies of both contenders. The situation was very different from the current one, as we explained a few months ago when talking about the evolution of the German Deutsche Marine. On the one hand, the Warsaw Pact included nations such as the Baltic Republics, then members of the Soviet Union, as well as Poland and the People's Republic of Germany. Therefore, the coasts of said block extended uninterruptedly from Saint Petersburg (then Leningrad) to practically Denmark.

On the other hand, Sweden and Finland were initially neutral nations in a hypothetical conflict, although with a certain inclination towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Regarding this, finally, the Alliance had in this scenario the tiny coasts of the Federal Republic of Germany, which went from the border with Denmark to Lubeck. Norway and Denmark also provided their corresponding Baltic coasts, although they were almost entirely concentrated in the area of ​​the Danish straits, Skagerrak and Kattegat, which connect said sea with the North Sea.

As for the Soviet Union, it had one of its four main fleets based in this Theater of Operations: the Baltic Fleet. A fleet that, in fact, had - and has - a great naval tradition and a varied history, starring the numerous confrontations fought in the waters of said sea, although not only, as the adventure of Admiral Rozhéstvenski reminds us, who carried several units of said fleet until their fatal destination in Tsushima. Be that as it may, the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Fleet was considered one of the most prestigious within the Soviet Fleet and, generally, gave access to the highest positions in the military establishment of both the former USSR and the Pact of Warsaw.

The Baltic Sea was, therefore, practically surrounded by coasts belonging to the Warsaw Pact (as can be seen on the map below these lines) and the Baltic Fleet could count on a wide margin of internal maneuver in it. Its missions, that said, were two: supporting the advance of the Pact's ground troops on West Germany and seeking the rupture of the Danish straits for the projection of its oceanic units towards the North Sea and the Atlantic.

For the first mission, of a strategic nature, the Baltic Fleet would have at its disposal an important amphibious component in order to take over the main points of said sea, as well as a well-equipped airborne force that would act in coordination with the amphibious forces, seeking bypass NATO defenses, surpassing their lines and thus helping the penetration of the mechanized forces of the Red Army from East Germany.

For this mission, the Baltic Fleet would also be supported with a first-class air force, in charge of ensuring air coverage of the amphibious and naval units over the area of ​​operations. All this taking into account that the Warsaw Pact forces, unlike those of NATO, did not depend on maritime lines of communication for their offensive, since their basic logistics were based on land communications through the German territory and, where appropriate, even Finnish and Swedish territory.

The second main mission of the Baltic Fleet was focused on the capture of the Danish straits (Kattegat and Skagerrak) by its amphibious forces, in such a way that their possession would allow the departure of its oceanic units towards the North Sea and the Atlantic. By doing so, the Red Navy would substantially increase its ability to act on NATO sea lines of communication (SLOC); which in turn would force the Alliance's naval forces to withdraw resources from other scenarios in order to confront this new threat.

The Soviet Union could afford this naval strategy in said Theater of Operations since, as we have said, its lines of communication did not depend on the Baltic Sea for its main offensive and they considered it a closed lake controlled by their own naval and air forces. , as indeed it would be.

On the contrary, NATO faced a much more complicated operational situation. He had to keep open the maritime lines of communication with Norway and with neutral Sweden through the Baltic Sea. However, this was only a secondary objective, since the main objective was to pocket the Baltic Fleet of the Soviet Union in the region of the Gulf of Finland, around the area where Saint Petersburg is located. Something extremely complex to execute due to the possession of the coasts by the USSR and which implied that NATO naval formations would have to go too far into territory controlled by the enemy. Furthermore, with everything that involves doing it in shallow waters like those of the Baltic, plagued by mines as well –Even today, there are hundreds of mines from the Second World War that continue to be found in its waters.– and within reach of aviation, land anti-ship batteries and, of course, communist ships and submarines.

NATO's objective, in broader terms, was to keep the Baltic closed and, as far as possible, devoid of naval confrontations, in order to save resources that could be used in other, initially more important scenarios. What's more, if we remember that during World War II, Nazi Germany had managed to achieve this objective by disabling the Soviet Fleet, confining it to port. In this way, the Nazi regime was able to maintain control of the Baltic all the way to the Gulf of Finland, but with the advantage of carrying out a successful land offensive in the USSR itself.

Continuing with NATO, combat operations in the Baltic would be carried out using platforms that were outside the usual oceanic standard among the navies that are part of the Alliance. To achieve this, conventional submarines of low tonnage were used, as well as fast boats equipped with anti-ship missiles and an important air component to cover naval operations. And, of course, by intensive resort to mine warfare. After all, the Baltic is, perhaps together with the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the scenario in which naval mines could take over a good part of the naval war, if the required minefields can be adequately deployed. , both offensively and defensively.

To implement its strategy, NATO started from a precarious situation compared to the Warsaw Pact, since its bases and deployment areas were further west and its extension was a minimum compared to the Soviet one. This consequently forced it to project its coastal naval power towards an area whose coasts were in the power of its enemy. Furthermore, with its main point of interest in the Atlantic, the resources that NATO could allocate to the Baltic Theater of Operations were, both in quantity and quality, second line. Only the submarine forces, based on the German squadron, could be considered a first-rate naval force. Perhaps enough, along with the rest of the elements, to carry out extensive mining operations and to constantly harass the Baltic Fleet thanks to the corvettes and fast missile boats.

This, which was applicable to NATO as a whole, was also applicable to some of its individual member states. Thus, for example, Norway and Denmark had their main areas of interest in the North Sea, allocating a smaller part of their resources to the Baltic. Only Germany was the one that, for obvious reasons, allocated more resources to this sea, as it had to prevent not only its coasts from being blocked, but also that Soviet troops could use it as support for a land operation.

That said, the use of the territorial waters of Sweden and Finland to harass the Baltic Fleet was taken for granted, although the Soviet Union would also carry out actions in the same direction. All knowing that it is extremely difficult to speculate about how both nations - neutral - would have reacted in the event of hostilities. In the first case, Sweden, this country always had a tendency towards the Atlantic Alliance, while Finland was more inhibited by the long land border it maintained with the USSR and its past experience. In any case, the violation of air, sea and land spaces, especially in the case of a Soviet offensive in the High North against Norway, would determine the path to follow for both nations and would have important consequences in the Baltic.

Despite the fact that the naval resources were smaller than those that the Soviet Union could oppose and that it had a powerful Air Force, NATO would maintain a powerful air capacity in the region. A capacity that would ultimately define how far the Soviet Baltic Fleet could risk itself. In fact, the air battle for dominance of the Baltic would be critical for both sides and highly contested, since in addition to the numerous units deployed, both sides had the possibility of sending reinforcements from other theaters, if necessary, at a time when which the number of devices in service was much higher than the current one.

Moving on to anti-ship artillery, the Baltic was - and still is - one of the few areas of the globe in which coastal batteries, mostly equipped with anti-ship missiles, have strategic importance. Due to the short distance between shipping routes and coasts, the use of this type of weaponry is of vital importance, being capable of effectively attacking a naval group without the need to deploy warships and also benefiting from the camouflage offered by the environment, as well as the versatility in terms of platform location. It is not surprising, therefore, that both contenders had them in their arsenals for intensive use.

The Battle of the First Salvo

As in the Mediterranean, in the Baltic the disposition of the naval forces in its first hours was going to greatly define the final result of the confrontation, under the concept of the Battle of the First Salvo. An offensive start, with long-range anti-ship vectors by both contenders, would seek to destroy in the first hours the maximum number of enemy units, which could hardly be replaced by others after this exchange of missiles. At least not in the short term and only after transfer from other theaters. In the case of NATO, as long as the organization retained control of the Danish Straits, it would also keep open the possibility of reinforcing the Baltic Theater of Operations with units from other areas. For the Soviet Union this was more than complicated to consider, since the Danish straits prevented the entry of any Northern Fleet unit. And the system of river canals that connected Leningrad with the Northern Fleet or the Black Sea Fleet was slow to operate and susceptible to attack in its basic infrastructure to condemn its use and prevent the transfer of resources through it. Therefore, the Soviet Baltic TVD was always considered as an isolated element and dependent on the outcome of the Red Army's actions on the German plains. In this way, if they could project their naval units to the Bornholm island area, and maintain a status quo similar to the beginning of hostilities, it could be a success for them. Having said the above, we can consider that during the Cold War, NATO de facto recognized the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in this maritime Theater and was content with the closure of this region to immobilize the Baltic Fleet, while the Pact opted for the intensive use of its land and air superiority to force the breaking of the NATO blockade and try to project its naval power outside said region. If the Soviet ground offensive disrupted defenses in Germany, then amphibious operations could be accelerated and carried out further west, while diplomatic pressure would increase on Sweden and Finland. A plan for which the Soviet Union depended on the good work of its ground forces, but also on the ability to match, since NATO's most modern weaponry was, in principle, superior to that of a USSR that opposed numbers as best argument to keep your footing at the end of the Battle of the First Salva. A battle that could last days or weeks, but could even be much faster, with substantial parts of the opposing fleets being neutralized in a matter of hours once the conflict begins...

The importance of the Baltic

Before continuing with the current state of the naval situation in the Baltic, let's look at some particularities of this scenario, as well as of the coastal nations, which makes it a very special area and in which, in many aspects, it does not apply. the conception of Naval Power that is more familiar to us in the West.

The coastal nations are; Denmark, Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, Finland, Sweden and Norway. Among them, some such as Denmark, Germany or Norway have been focusing in recent years on operations in the North Sea or even beyond, betting on projection capacity and versatility in the design of their warships. Only Germany has cared –despite all its problems and shortcomings-, to maintain capabilities suitable for fighting in this scenario, aware that it continues to be NATO's main support in these waters.

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