Wagner's missions in Africa have been characterized by being relatively successful for the personnel of this parastatal army, except in the case of Cabo Delgado, in Mozambique. Africa, in fact, has been a quiet destination for these mercenaries, until at the end of July, Wagner's greatest military disaster to date began to unfold, with the exception of what happened during the battle of Khasam, in Syria, on the 7th. and February 8, 2018. With the difference that on this occasion, after the Tuareg ambush on the Russian mercenaries, access to devices such as Starlink has allowed the networks to be flooded with images of the carnage perpetrated in the Adrar of the Ifoghas .
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- The Russian presence in Mali
- The military coup: the conditions are created for Russia's entry into Mali
- Africa Corps or Wagner?
- Context of the armed conflict in Mali
- The Tuaregs and the Adrar des Ifoghas area: a tough nut to crack
- The battle
- Departure from Tessalit (July 20)
- The start of the operation (July 22)
- Advance towards Boughessa (July 23)
- Renewed attacks (July 25)
- Regrouping and new offensive (July 26)
- Outcome and disaster (July 27)
- The magnitude of the tragedy: material and human losses
- The possible foreign involvement
- Ukraine
- The Tuareg ambush: Wagner's greatest disaster in Africa
The Russian presence in Mali
Before getting into the subject and narrating how the Tuareg ambush of Wagner's operatives was carried out, it is advisable to dedicate a few lines to explain to readers the particular context in which it occurred. Something all the more necessary given that it is a country with a conflict and foreign relations with which the public, even specialized ones, is usually not familiar.
On the other hand, it is necessary to make it clear that this is a conflict that lends itself to Manichaean visions, with quite a few who have transferred the Western rivalry with Russia to Mali, without even considering the orientation of the groups that operate there. in a black and white game. Having said that, we must not forget that Mali's army has been trained by European troops until recently; Even his military personnel have paraded with our troops as part of the National Holiday Day, in Castellana. Therefore, it is not possible to suddenly support rebels or organizations linked to Al-Qaeda simply because the country has been progressively getting closer to Russia or because the Tuareg ambush has cost the organization founded by Prigozhin dozens of deaths. What can be expected, if anything, is that democracy will be restored in the country, and that the Malian Army will no longer be linked to possible war crimes. Crimes that were already committed when MINUSMA or French troops operated, although in smaller numbers than now.
Turning to the matter at hand, the window of opportunity to gain a presence in Mali presented itself to Russia on October 23, 2019. At that time, more than forty African heads of state met in Sochi for the Russia-Africa summit, among them that of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. The latter made the following offer to Putin: «We need your friendship to be manifested in an area in which everyone knows that you are champions, the fight against terrorism. You yourself have said that you are qualified in this area, Mr. President Putin. We need this qualification today. Despite this offer, Russia did not deploy Wagner until very specific conditions were met.
Keita's words, in any case, did not come by chance. On the contrary, jihadist violence had increased in the Sahel during the previous months, with an escalation in the number of attacks and victims and an expansion beyond Mali towards Niger and Burkina Faso. What's more, the concern then was that the phenomenon would overwhelm the region, spreading beyond the Sahel to several countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea: Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo and Benin.
The military coup. conditions are created for Russia's entry into Mali
The 2020 Mali coup d'état occurred on August 18, 2020 and was carried out by a group of soldiers calling themselves the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP). The coup was led by the following figures: Colonel Assimi Goïta; the colonel Malick Diaw, deputy to the military chief of the Kati region, where the mutiny began, and who had just returned from Russia; and Colonel Sadio Camara, who also returned from Russia that same month, after a year in the Moscow Higher Military School.
The author of this article once considered this link between Russia and the coup plotters as a strong indicator of Wagner's future presence in the country. Even the possible indirect participation of Russia in a hypothetical coup, as it finally happened. After all, Russia has not only the capacity to intervene through this PMC, but also other tools that are very dear to coup plotters in much of the world.
In cases like Mali, Russia's intervention through the Wagner group and the use of its veto right in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in addition to other tools to protect dictatorial regimes, strongly questioned governments or coup boards subjected to strong international pressure, fosters an environment in which coups d'état become more viable, which is an incentive. The coup leaders, perceiving potential support from Russia, feel encouraged to take power, knowing that if necessary they will be able to count on a powerful ally that will provide them with military and diplomatic support in exchange for presence, which in many cases includes concessions. mining, related to hydrocarbons, etc.
There are many cases in recent years, starting with Syria, following by Sudan, and ending in Mali itself, which demonstrate that Russia, through Wagner, has intervened in several African conflicts, offering direct assistance to questioned governments and using his veto in the UNSC to block sanctions or interventions that could destabilize his allies.
Now, in addition to a dynamic of incentives, we must also talk about another of support prior to the coup. That is, Russian support can be seen as a guarantee of protection, encouraging coup leaders to seek support from Russia even before executing their plans. This is what this author believes happened in Mali: that the coup was hatched in Moscow while the future coup plotters resided in the Russian Federation.
That said, of course, in addition to external incentives, this coup also had internal ones. Thus, the motives underlying the coup d'état included a combination of political, economic and security factors:
- Widespread accusations of corruption and mismanagement by the Keïta government;
- Deterioration of the economic situation and lack of opportunities for the population;
- Increase in violence and insecurity due to conflicts with jihadist groups in the north and center of the country;
- Since June 2020, the country had witnessed massive protests led by the opposition movement M5-RFP (June 5 Movement – Rally of Patriotic Forces), which demanded the resignation of Keïta and;
- The great dissatisfaction within the armed forces, due to the lack of support and equipment in their fight against jihadist insurgents, was, ultimately, the most important element.
Continuing with the events in Mali, on August 18, the mutinous military headed to the Kati base, near Bamako, the country's capital. From there they advanced towards the city, capturing President Keïta and other high officials such as his prime minister, Boubou Cissé. That same night, Keïta announced his resignation in a televised message, citing that he did not want blood to be shed for maintaining his mandate.
As a result of the coup, the military announced the formation of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), the body that was to supervise the transition, promising the people elections. Subsequently, a transitional government was established with Bah Ndaw as president and Colonel Assimi Goïta as vice president, both on an interim basis.
The transition process, like in Sudan, where something similar happened - and, let's not forget, with a strong Russian and Wagner presence - failed. An 18-month transition period was initially agreed upon to restore civilian government and organize elections. However, in May 2021, another coup occurred, again led by Assimi Goïta, who dismissed Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane and appointed himself president of the transition. This is, since then, the political panorama in the Malian government.
As it is, we find ourselves with a military junta that is subject to strong questioning, not only internationally (EU, UN), but also regionally. Already in 2020, the relationship with the African Union was deeply affected, with Mali suspended from the International Organization of La Francophonie and severely threatened by ECOWAS, which also applied sanctions. The next blow reaffirmed the country's drift, and its regional and international isolation.
In this way, for 2021 Mali combined a series of dangerous ingredients:
- The existence of a military junta with ties to Russia prior to the coup;
- A highly questioned government and under international pressure;
- The need for military support in a counterinsurgency/counterterrorism war;
- The problem of raw materials, and;
- The profound rejection of the West.
It was, in short, the necessary breeding ground for Wagner and Russia to disembark with a possibility of stable permanence, something that would occur during the last four months of 2021 with the deployment of a contingent of between 300 and 400 “advisors”, who as They have always done much more than advise.
This Russian presence in the area also motivated France to make a decision that they may have been wanting for a long time: leave the country. Something that helped that the military junta “made the bed” for MINUSMA and the French. That said, the Malian government's new strategy was going to be much more aggressive in imposing state control over its entire territory.
Africa Corps or Wagner?
At a high level, this distinction may seem indifferent. After all, we are talking about mercenary companies and, as we have said on another occasion, the use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) by Russia is configured as a key foreign policy tool due to its adaptability and low political and economic cost. Companies that allow Russia to intervene in conflicts and support allied governments without officially committing and with greater flexibility.
Now, the issue is somewhat more complex if we descend from the top of the Kremlin to levels closer to the ground. So, as anyone who has read the daily reports on the war in Ukraine that are published daily in this magazine knows, for some time now the Russian Ministry of Defense is replacing Wagner's structure by one that is closer and under its direct control: it is what is known as Africa Corps, although there are also other “franchises” of the Ministry of Defense involved, such as the PMSC. Bear.
The absorption/substitution process is being anything but simple. Furthermore, it is very likely that in some destinations this transition has been completed at a greater speed or that the changes have been implemented to a greater extent than in others. Two factors would play here regarding Wagner's separation: 1) the end of the contracts signed with Wagner and its renewal in favor of Africa Corps and; 2) the arrival of new personnel with no previous connection to Wagner.
As a reference, one may wonder why the Wagner brand is still used even though it is no longer present. The explanations range from the inertia of those who deal with the subject to that of Wagner's own members, who feel that they remain practically the same and refuse to "abandon" their hard-fought and famous unit. It should also be noted that both Prigozhin and Wagner Group acquired a high reputation in Russia long before as especially during a good part of the Ukrainian War. On the other hand, and this is very important, the Russian Ministry of Defense may be interested in keeping Wagner's name as a shield given the criticism he faces for his management of the Africa Corps.
That is to say, failures, such as the one we discuss in this article, can be diverted towards a non-existent PMSC, thus avoiding the public institution taking its blame, or at least seeing its image damaged. Of course, taking into account that control of the Africa Corps is currently exercised directly by the Russian Ministry of Defense, on this occasion it will be more difficult for Putin's Government to evade responsibilities for both the possible crimes that committed by their troops as well as by the casualties suffered in actions such as the Tuareg ambush, which we will explain in the next sections.
Context of the armed conflict in Mali
Before narrating the Tuareg ambush on the column of the Malian Army and the Wagner Group, it is necessary to enter into the most direct background of the current conflict, which began with the withdrawal of the Barkhane operation and the MINUSMA mission, topic discussed in depth in the past in these same pages.
The new stage of the armed conflict in northern Mali was unleashed for several reasons, all of them related to the same: to solve the problem of reestablishing state sovereignty over the entire country, the military junta believed that the Russian alternative was the appropriate one, and not the French/MINUSMA one. Thus, in June, the Malian military junta requested the withdrawal of the MINUSMA peace mission. A withdrawal that began with the transfer of French military bases to the Malian state, which quickly generated disagreements between the government and the CSP. To understand this, it must not be forgotten that many of these bases are located in areas claimed by the groups that signed the 2015 peace agreement, which insisted on their right to control them.
The withdrawal of international forces eliminated the barriers that had previously prevented direct confrontations between the government and armed groups, contributing to further heating up an already precarious situation. The Army's takeover of the bases and the CSP's perceived threat to its influence in the areas they had administered since 2012 also played a crucial role in the restart of hostilities.
Tension increased when the Malian army, supported by mercenaries from the Wagner Group, began to take possession of MINUSMA bases, leading to a direct clash with the CSP. The clashes, initially more tenuous and sporadic, intensified with CSP attacks on Army posts in northern and central Mali and, later, with the Army's response, carried out through bombings and the deployment of additional troops.
The Tuaregs and the Adrar des Ifoghas area: a tough nut to crack
The scene of the battle, the mountainous area of the Adrar of the Ifoghas or Adrar of the Iforas He had already been the protagonist of intense combats in 2013 during the “Panthère” reconnaissance operation carried out by French and Malian troops, losing a Gallic soldier during his life. It is advisable to take this into account and draw a comparison to give it context. For it, we will use the french operation as a way to better understand the scenario, the appropriate tactics and the troops necessary to take and control this rugged region of Mali.
We do this, because various comments have been published on social networks that try to minimize the military capacity of the locals as a way of ridiculing Wagner's mercenaries. A somewhat absurd procedure, since already in 2013 reports from French soldiers indicated that the combatants of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) They showed superior maneuverability and good use of snipers compared to the Taliban. Superiority that was noted for example in the way the Tuareg fighters moved and managed their tactics in difficult terrain, using cover and snipers effectively.
Returning to the Adrar of the Ifoghas, it is a very difficult terrain, all of it riddled with rocks and caves, which significantly conditions the form of combat and the use made of weapons. For example, due to this difficult terrain, French forces had to dismount and pursue local fighters on foot, engaging in close-range combat. For their part, AQIM members, making the most of natural cover, moved from rock to rock and used their knowledge of the terrain to maintain a tactical advantage. Not in vain do we talk about an orography that is extremely reminiscent of that used by the Houthis in Yemen against the Saudi troops or the Kurdish peshmergas against the Turks.
This environment therefore caused traditional ranged combat methods to be less effective if not combined with dismounted infantry. That is to say, the terrain in Adrar des Ifoghas significantly reduces the advantage provided by the technology, so that the French soldiers were forced to use foot patrols to force the enemies out of their shelters and defensive positions, seeking to leave them exposed. to artillery fire or air support.
Despite the success achieved, the operation conducted in 2013 in Adrar des Ifoghas could have been a catastrophe for the French, according to Colonel Michel Goya. The audacity of the Gauls to dismount and fight by jumping from one rock to another in Adrar was risky and only thanks to an effective combination of ground troops and artillery and aviation support could a disaster be avoided. Goya pointed out that the closeness and harshness of the combat, in which around 100 Islamists perished in close combat, could have resulted in a disastrous situation if the French troops had not had adequate support and precise coordination between the different elements of the the force.
This is precisely where the interesting part of the example lies. The French combat force was made up of 1.200 French troops divided into 2 Interarms Tactical Groups. Air support was provided by 3 Puma helicopters, 2 Tiger helicopters, 2 Gazelle and Mirage 2000D fighter aircraft based in Ndjamena, Chad. As for artillery support, they had that provided by the 2 CAESAR 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers deployed in the region.
Furthermore, the French were not alone, but had the support of 800 soldiers from the trained Chadian army and an unknown number of Tuareg fighters from the MNLA and the Malian army. Despite which, they saw each other and wished each other, experiencing particularly tense moments.
The French experience It serves, therefore, to understand some of the shortcomings of the Russian operation that we will see below. In this case, Wagner's operatives and the Malian troops entered the area greatly outnumbered, since the column was made up of just over a hundred men and a dozen or two vehicles at most. Furthermore, they lacked artillery support, since Wagner does not have anything similar to the CAESAR in Africa. Regarding air support, he stood out for its scarcity, having only two helicopters, one of them combat and the other transport.
The battle
For the narration of the battle, the main sources have been used: messages uploaded to the Telegram channel Departemente, as well as those shared by sources very close to Wagner. Information that has been attempted to be compared with that shared by the FAMa, as well as with the numerous videos that appeared on networks about what happened and with other types of open sources.
However, it has been without a doubt Departments the channel that has provided the best information on the events and the one that has been monitoring the scenario almost daily since long before these events.
Departure from Tessalit (July 20)
Initial military operations in northern Mali began on July 20. On that date, apparently, two columns of vehicles left Tessalit. That was when the fighting began, although it was probably minor, since hardly any details have been reported. They would, therefore, be small skirmishes or exchanges with light weapons at a certain distance.
One of the columns, which was made up only of FAMa members and consisted of 21 vehicles, headed to the town of Inafarak (or In-Afarak), located approximately 120 kilometers north-northwest of Tessalit, in the Kidal region. A town on the border with Algeria, which is also an important commercial node in the region, hence the relevance of its control.
Apparently, two days after the column left, said town was taken... or at least that is what the FAMa communications officials stated on the 22nd through a statement in which it was announced that Inafarak was under control of the Malian armed forces. It was a premature announcement, since a couple of hours after taking the town, the CSP-DPA rebels returned and took control of the place again.
Most likely, once the Malians arrived by surprise, they had no problems defeating the meager local garrison. However, when reinforcements arrived a few hours later, they had no choice but to leave the area. In any case, the story of the FAMa column is secondary, what was truly relevant was creating the hypothesis that the Malians arrived by surprise, defeated the few local forces, but that when reinforcements arrived, or before they did , they fled the scene.
This is the story of the Malian column, but the one that interests us in this article is not this one, but the one that at the same time left Tessalit in a westward direction to head against Tinzawaten (or Tinzawatène, or also Tinzaouten), about 150 kilometers in short distance, but separated by the complicated orography of the Adrar des Ifoghas, arid and steep.
In this way, at the same time that the Malian column left on the 20th towards the northwest, another column composed of a dozen vehicles (24 according to another source), including technicals and MRAPs, headed towards Tinzawaten, including among its ranks a good number of members of the 13th Assault Battalion of the Wagner Group, under the command of commander Sergey Shevchenko, with the callsign "Proud".
The start of the operation (July 22)
On the 22nd, the Wagner/FAMa column arrived at Boughessa (or Boghassa). There, they received information about the presence of large groups of CSP-DPA militiamen in the Tinzawaten region. They therefore began a search and destroy operation to eliminate the Azawad rebels. According to sources close to Wagner, upon arriving at the scene, they found a group of about 100 armed men and 10 technicals (pick ups with a rear-mounted machine gun).
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