Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the latter country has been defending itself in multiple ways. Among them, resorting to the use of long-range weapons, from modified small planes to old drones of Soviet origin and, increasingly, to their own designs that have allowed them to reach targets more than 1.500 kilometers inside the Russian Federation. Beyond calling into question the reputation of what many considered to be the "best air defense in the world," the Ukrainian attacks have effectively limited Russia's ability to conduct attacks both through its combat aircraft and troops over the land; although not to the degree that kyiv wants. In the next lines we review the way in which Ukraine has been committing increasing resources in a race to develop long-range weapons that allow it to attack the heart of Russia without depending on allied deliveries or vetoes on the use of certain materials imposed until now.
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- The first attacks: the Soviet heritage
- The weapons delivered to Ukraine: HIMARS, ATACMS and cruise missiles
- Drones and modified commercial small planes
- The development of indigenous cruise and ballistic missiles
- Ukrainian impotence: the veto on the use of long-range weapons
- Conclusions
Introduction
A few hours after the invasion began, when the Russian Federation was still trying to implement a decapitation operation against the Zelensky regime that would ultimately prove impossible, the Ukrainian Armed Forces They launched a first long-range attack against the Russian air base of Millerovo, in the Rostov region (48.952660883170054, 40.29519347515778); a fundamental facility to support the Russian BTGs in their advance towards objectives such as Mariupol. In this case, the action was most likely the responsibility of the Ukrainian 19th Missile Brigade, which would have used Tochka-U missiles for this purpose.
Later there would be other significant attacks inside Russian territory, both with missiles such as those mentioned and with Bayraktar TB-2 drones and even using combat helicopters, like the one that took place on April 1, 2022 when two Mi-24s hit a fuel depot in Belgorod; a spectacular action that kyiv did not officially recognize, as in many other cases. Even after time, although it is a different case, On October 8, 2022, the Ukrainians managed to destroy the Kerch bridge, which links the Crimean peninsula with Russian territory, demonstrating its ability to plan and implement operations hundreds of kilometers from the front line.
In addition to this, we have witnessed in these two and a half years multiple actions at a notable distance from Ukraine, from the sabotage of Nord Stream in the Baltic –with increasingly conclusive evidence pointing to kyiv's hand– to the detonation of four explosive charges in the tunnel from Severomuysk (56.283596099745836, 113.34849213268936), located in the region of Buryatia, and crucial for being one of the transit points for freight trains that, from the People's Republic of China and North Korea, allow war supplies or supplies related to war activity to be transported to the Federation from Russia.
Despite this, the most relevant thing in purely military terms - especially at the operational level - has been the growing campaign of attacks against military installations of different types located in the Russian regions closest to Ukraine, although in some cases they have involved traveling longer distances. of dozens, if not hundreds of kilometers. A campaign that has been gradually extended to increasingly distant destinations, on several occasions reaching objectives in the Baltic and even further north, in the case of Olenegorsk (68.14989065532455, 33.4540013491479), already in the Russian Arctic and which has also increased in intensity recently.
In relation to this issue, although greater importance is given to air attacks, it is worth remembering that, in addition, the Ukrainians have demonstrated a devilish ability to do the same in the maritime domain, using unmanned surface vehicles, developed both from their own resources and thanks to the transfer of knowledge from countries such as the United Kingdom, in a process of constant evolution. The latter, by the way, have not only provided financing and know-how, but have also obtained an interesting feedback of every operation carried out by Ukraine; something that undoubtedly also happens with aerial vectors, since models as cheap as a few tens of thousands of euros are proving capable of offering an economical alternative to traditional cruise missiles, equipped with a greater explosive charge, yes, but also one or two orders of magnitude more expensive.
This last is, surely, the most relevant aspect of everything concerning the long-range weapons used by Ukraine so far in the war: what it implies in terms of military innovation; in relation with the possible Military Revolution in the making and with the more than evident Revolution in the Military Affairs of the dronic either; with the way in which States with limited capabilities can use advances in the collection, processing and transmission of information, as well as miniaturization, to their advantage, applying them for example to guidance and compensating the efforts of powers with much greater resources.
After all, if Ukraine is able to knock out military installations hundreds of kilometers from its borders, using means that have proven capable of circumventing the theoretically most advanced anti-aircraft defenses (although the immensity of the Russian territory makes it easier, without doubt this task) and; if we are seeing how proxy actors like those present in the Middle East are capable of carrying out comparable actions (with their own nuances); How long will it take other actors to import this knowledge, replicate it and increase the degree of threat they already pose?
The issue of long-distance Ukrainian attacks is, finally, a topic that also raises various questions (which we only point out, since they are not the subject of this article), in relation to the control of escalation. Thus, despite the in some cases strategic component of the attacks led by Ukraine (and being aware of the extended deterrence offered by the United States), Russia has at no time responded with a vertical escalation that many feared and still fear. This, which could be due in part to the limited degree of destruction caused by the vectors used by the AFU - and which would not justify the Russian resort to weapons of greater power - is, however, an issue that must be investigated in detail, since by the At the moment it is unknown what (if any) is the threshold beyond which escalation is inevitable, whether due to the number of vectors used in an attack, the type of objective reached with them or the degree of destruction caused in it. .
The first attacks: the Soviet heritage
The first long-range Ukrainian attacks were carried out, as we noted in the introduction, using Tochka-U missiles inherited from the times of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainians, in fact, would not be the only ones to use them, since Russia also used them in attacks as controversial as the one at the Kramatorsk railway station, which produced dozens of civilian victims. Thus, after the attack on Millerovo, the use of these missiles was reported, for example on a series of fuel depots in Bryansk, on April 25. There was also talk of its use against Kherson, when this town was under Russian control, at the end of the same month. Even regarding the famous Snake Island, reference was made to the Ukrainian resort to these missiles as the weapon of choice to defeat the positions established there by Russia.
The problem with the Tochka-U, beyond the limitations in range and accuracy, was their limited number. Designed in the early 60s, these were tactical ballistic missiles capable of hitting targets at just over 120 kilometers, but with a Probable Error Circle (CEP) of around 95 meters. in the SS-21 Scarab-B (Tochka-U) version in service with the AFU. It is not surprising, therefore, that they were used against relatively large and "easy" targets, such as fuel depots or air bases, nor that the number of launches was soon reduced once inventories were depleted. Also as its reach, given the movements on the front line, was proven insufficient to reach the points most coveted by the Ukrainians, given their military value.
Something similar would happen with two systems that are also quite old and rescued from oblivion for the occasion: drones Tupolev Tu-141 Strizh and Tu-143 Reys. Both the Tu-141 and the Tu-143 were developed during the Cold War for tactical reconnaissance missions, carrying optical cameras and, later, also television and infrared sensors. Although the total number is unknown, it is known that Ukraine stored at least several of them with their respective launch trucks in Khmelnytsky
Two of these would be responsible of the damage caused during the December 5, 2022 attack on the Diaghilevo air base (54.6500775885583, 39.57020933402331), in Ryazan, in which at least one Tu-22M3 bomber was affected. Furthermore, they would be seen later on several more occasions, resulting in some of them destroyed by Russian anti-aircraft defenses in subsequent attacks, such as the one that took place at the end of June 2022 in the Kursk region or another from early February 2023. What's more, as recently as January 2024, there was still talk of these devices regarding a series of explosions in an oil deposit in the Russian region of Bryansk, after an action in which Tu-143s converted into kamikaze drones had been used.
The most notorious incident, however, had taken place much earlier, in March 2022, when a Tu-141 hit Croatian territory without detonating and without causing victims. Apparently, the device from Ukraine -Russia denied any relationship, alleging that they had been decommissioned three decades ago- crossed Romanian airspace before entering Croatia without any anti-aircraft system being able to do anything to prevent it, which is significant, although nuanced given the lack of alert.
In any case, the performance of the Tu-141/143 was relatively low, despite the spectacular nature of some actions, so that during the first year of war up to 14 of them were shot down or crashed, which would represent a substantial part of the Ukrainian inventory. Now, they could have had an interesting function not so much to attack, but to reveal the position of Russian air systems, which would later be attacked by other means once detected by the Ukrainians.
In addition to legacy drones, it is not advisable to lose sight of the role played for a time by the Bayraktar TB-2 supplied to Ukraine by Turkey. Although in relation to these there are no cases of employment within Russian territory (Turkey has acted as a mediator and has tried to remain as equidistant as possible despite its membership in NATO), have had their role beyond reconnaissance and close air support, for example taking part in the Ukrainian operation against Snake Island, which we have already talked about and, in general, acting in much of the western Black Sea. However, the inherent limitations of these models, very useful until the logical adaptation processes have taken place on the Russian side, have penalized their use, finally leaving them out of the game.
On the other hand, and before moving on to the next section, it must also be taken into account that during the initial phases of the war, Ukraine was not only subject to much greater limitations than later on the part of its allies due to fear of escalation by part of Russia, but also that Not even the latter country had initiated a structured campaign of attacks against targets inside Ukraine.. That is to say, what we could currently consider as a salvo competition with daily attacks by both parties at increasingly greater distances, has been the result of a gradual process in which both technical advances and the help of the allies of both contenders (there is the example of Iran with the Shahed-131/136 drones or North Korea with ballistic missiles) and strategic changes.
The weapons delivered to Ukraine: HIMARS, ATACMS and cruise missiles
Before continuing with the development of indigenous weapons by the Ukrainian side, it is advisable to stop along the way, since since the summer of 2022 the AFU began to have M270 and M142 HIMARS launchers, as well as MARS II and, also, of abundant guided ammunition for them, although with limitations in terms of its range. Specifically, guided rockets of the M30 family were supplied, with a nominal range of 70 kilometers, although it is well known that they can go further, up to around 100 kilometers. What is better, its precision is millimetric, as demonstrated by the successive attacks on the Antonovsky Bridge over the Dnieper River, among others.
The arrival of the new launchers and ammunition, although from the beginning Ukraine's allies established limitations on their use - preventing them from being used against Russian territory - allowed the AFU three things:
- Erode Russian logistics, preventing ammunition and other supplies from reaching the front line, which in turn limited the combat capacity of its troops, contributing to the preceding wear and tear (remember that the first months of war had an exorbitant cost for Russia) to convert a war of movement, as it was in the first phases, into a war of attrition;
- Imposing new dilemmas on Russia, because every time it gathered resources and men for a new offensive, they ran the risk of being attacked by the guided munitions of the HIMARS, which largely prevented the effective concentration of forces and limited the possibilities to the time to use them. The latter was and is important, because it directly affects the strategic freedom of the Russian General Staff and will have forced them, with all certainty, to give up many of their plans.
- Prepare the stage for the Kharkov and Kherson offensives, which would have been impossible without the help of the HIMARS. In the first case, because they helped to "empty" a good part of the areas of Kharkiv under Russian control of troops and supplies, as well as to organize a response to the Ukrainian offensive. In the second, because they were the elements that ultimately allowed the Russian troops to be threatened with a large blockade, by attacking the passageways over the Dnieper.
Now, the prohibition of using these rockets against Russian territory, together with the range limitation of the models delivered (for a long time there was talk of the possibility of GMLRS-ER arriving, although they were in the testing or GLSDB phase), They ended up limiting their effectiveness. Russia, after a few months of confusion and losses, ended up adapting its logistics to the problems presented by the HIMARS, delaying its troop and equipment accumulation points, acting from airfields further away from the front or relying on trucks to the detriment of the railway to move supplies within the radius of action of the M30s, thus distributing their efforts.
It is not surprising that the great fight, for long months, between the Government of Ukraine and its American ally (in which several other States that pressured Kiev participated) had to do with the delivery of ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles. The problem lay, once again, in the control of escalation. Russia continued to masterfully use the threat of vertical escalation to moderate the support of some allies for Ukraine and it was feared that the ATACMS could provoke a more forceful Russian response (which did not necessarily have to be in Ukraine).
Despite this, in October 2023 Ukraine received the first ATACMS missiles, although in an old variant, specifically the M39 Block I with a range of 165 kilometers. The intention of the United States was so that the AFU could hit the Russian forces both inside the Ukrainian oblas under their control, and in part of the Crimean peninsula, once again degrading their logistics. However, They refrained from supplying more advanced variants, with up to 300 kilometers of range, until April 2024. The favorable decision was adopted, among other things, in response to the Russian use of North Korean missiles Hwasong -11A (KN-23) and/or Hwasong -11B (KN-24), with a greater range than any ATACMS variant, against targets in Ukraine.
Now, far from becoming a "game-changer" like the M30s were at the time, the ATACMS have had a residual impact in this war, since employment limitations have been maintained and that the Ukrainians, according to some sources , they would have made unintelligent use of them, which has caused the United States to persist in its refusal to allow them to be used against targets in Russia; which has motivated time and again complaints from the Ukrainian side.
Of course, with or without intelligent use, since its entry into service with Ukraine some interesting actions have been noted, like the attack on the Belbek air base, on the Crimean peninsula, managing to destroy at least four Russian fighter aircraft, as well as part of an S-400 anti-aircraft system. However, they have also been used for more controversial and, until now, difficult to explain attacks, such as those carried out against NIP-16 facilities, also in Crimea, related with the Russian space command and control and early warning system. Attacks that followed previous ones against radars Voronezh-DM y Voronezh-M (in these cases using drones, given the distances and the impossibility of using US weapons against these targets) and which certainly caused unpleasant exchanges of messages between kyiv and Washington due to its destabilizing potential.
ATACMS, however, have not been the only long-range vector operated by Ukraine in recent times. The country has also received a limited number (several hundred in total, however) Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG cruise missiles by United Kingdom, Italy y France. What's more, regarding the cruise missiles and also for months there was a tense situation with Germany, since this country refused to hand over Taurus based on different arguments, from fear of escalation by Russia to the need to maintain credible deterrence. In fact, the situation led to disagreements. between Germany itself (the second country, after the United States, that has collaborated the most in the defense of Ukraine) and France, for their different positions regarding the supply of cruise missiles.
In this case, the Storm Shadow/ SCALP-EG It is an air-launched cruise missile (Ukraine has mounted them on its Su-24M/MR after adapting pylons from the British Tornado GR4) powered by a turbojet, with a length of 5,1 meters and weight of 1.300 kilograms (of which 450 correspond to its warhead). It has a range of more than 250 kilometers. It is equipped with a triple guidance system that combines GPS, INS and TRN, following a semi-autonomous trajectory to its target, generally at a very low altitude and, in the final phase, ascending before identifying the target with an IR camera.
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