Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Overview
- Organization of the terrain
- Artillery
- Air Defense and Air Resources
- Drones
- Anti-tank weapons
- Electronic Warfare and Communications
- The transformation of the BTG. The assault detachments
- The situation from the point of view of armored and mechanized units
- The war of attrition and maneuver
- Conclusions
- Notes
- Bibliography
Introduction
This conflict is causing a significant evolution in the technological and strategic fields, although not so much in the tactical one. On the ground, both contenders have been adapting their tactics and organisation to a situation that at first reminds us of the First World War, but which at other levels is notable for the massive use of drones, the management of (dis)information, the use of precise long-range fires, electronic warfare (EW), and other aspects based on digital management. As a result, the employment profile of manoeuvre units and fire support units has changed, Command, Control and Communications (C3) Systems have been improved, and Headquarters have had to be moved away and dispersed to protect them from the action of long-range fires.
It can be said that a common factor for both sides is that they have had to reorient their way of acting. The Ukrainians have not been able to apply Western methods after receiving support in training and a large amount of material, and the Russians have rescued the old assault formations and their procedures, abandoning the concept of BTG.1.
On a terrain with a very advanced organization, the stagnation of the conflict shows extensive fronts in which any advance is at the cost of enormous losses, causing an almost total lack of mobility, and with it, of maneuver.
Failing this, and since the two armies have similar overall capabilities, the conclusion is that the one that best manages attrition has a better chance of winning (although it is not clear what “winning” will mean for either of them).
Along with an enormous loss of life, difficult to calculate, since the invasion began the Russians are estimated to have lost more than 3.000 tanks and some 5.000 armoured vehicles, while their opponents have lost more than 800 and 2.000 respectively.
It is of relatively little importance in the final outcome whether these figures may seem a lot or a little; what will really be key in maintaining the effort is the potential for replacing personnel and material in the current situation of practically stabilized fronts. In this sense, the more technologically complex the equipment used, the more difficult it will be to replace it and, no less important, to obtain crews, since they must have been trained in a necessary minimum period of time that they may not be able to afford.
In order to fit them into a single work, let us look at the particularities related to the topic we want to develop, extracted from the analysis of open sources, to which we will add some comments and clarifications of our own.
Overview
Before going into the circumstances affecting the maneuver units, let us briefly review the most relevant aspects that are influencing operations on the ground.
Organization of the terrain
One of the reasons for the stagnation of the actions is the intense organisation of the terrain developed on all fronts. Hundreds of kilometres of trenches, ditches, firing points, minefields, etc. have been built in successive lines that dominate the landscape, impeding mobility. Particularly striking is the change in the Russian offensive mentality towards this construction of defence lines against which enemy units crash, thus managing to prolong the war and wear down their adversaries.
They are forced to cross flat terrain with no natural obstacles, with areas delimited by rows of trees, characteristic of many areas of Ukraine, without air superiority and battered by artillery, helicopter and aircraft fire, also receiving tank, anti-tank and collective infantry weapons from the flanks of the positions, finally encountering minefields whose depth the Russians have increased to 500 meters, far from the regulation 120 m, making that nation probably the most mined in the world today. Before this increase, Ukrainian breaching means (mainly MICLIC, Mine Clearing Line Charge, of American origin and UR-77 Meteorit of Soviet origin) could open a deep enough hole for the attacking infantry to reach the enemy defensive positions.
However, since Russian logistics cannot supply enough mines, the depth has been achieved by resorting to a lower density than that indicated in the regulations. They have also resorted to the irregular arrangement of mines and to procedures such as including IEDs or placing one mine on top of another, ensuring that the attacking vehicle is immobilized in certain positions, avoiding cases such as those of vehicles equipped with pusher blades that can withstand the action of several mines before becoming immobilized.
In this situation, the Ukrainians need to carry out a thorough reconnaissance before any offensive, which implies a slow pace in the planning and subsequent execution of actions, and therefore they need to find a fast system for detecting mines (among others, it would be possible to use UAVs to obtain images of the terrain and analyze them), in order to be able to carry out operations beyond the defenses located immediately in front of their positions, quickly exploiting the opened gaps.
An added difficulty is that the Russians have prepared to demolish their positions from a distance if the enemy penetrates them. At one point, the possibility of having fire planned to attack these positions was considered, but it was shown that the method was not effective due to the Ukrainian anti-battery capacity, coupled with the range and precision of their guns. There were also some cases of friendly fire on elements that abandoned their positions due to coordination failures and, above all, communication failures.
Positions can thus be demolished as the vanguard of enemy units enter and while friendly troops are still leaving them via the rear branches. This directly affects the most prepared Ukrainian infantry units, the assault units, when they have not yet had time to change position or be relieved, and makes it difficult for them to clear positions and quickly clear them.
Artillery
The Russians have changed their forced fire doctrine due to the need to reduce ammunition consumption and wear on their parts.
Until now, based on statistics collected since World War II, their artillery had assessed the level of fire necessary to produce specific effects against defined targets, that is, they had estimated the number of shots of each type necessary to obtain the desired effects on a given target. Although they began the invasion in this way, they soon realized that this was unfeasible because they could not afford to expend such a volume of ammunition, because logistics would have to accumulate quantities that were too large and easily detectable, and because the wear and tear of the gun barrels would force them to be replaced at a rate that was also unfeasible.
As a result, they are seeking greater precision in achieving the same effects by reducing the number of projectiles needed, so priority has been given to the production of 152 mm laser-guided projectiles, combined with the use of target designation UAVs and UAVs dedicated to ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance).
Similarly, combined with ISR UAVs, they are increasingly using attack UAVs against Ukrainian forward elements.
However, they still rely heavily on MLRS, 120mm mortars and other less accurate weapons.
For its part, over the past year, Ukrainian artillery has been able to maintain fire superiority. It has been essential that they have better means of carrying out counter-battery fire after a good detection.
But they also face the problem of replacing worn-out barrels and supplying 155mm ammunition. Maintaining the operational readiness of the 17 artillery systems assigned to them is difficult, so, within their possibilities, they should limit their number and concentrate on increasing the number of pieces of each one, consolidating a reasonable fleet.
Air Defense and Air Resources
The Ukrainian DA has received a lot of high-quality Western equipment, but they need to increase the number of systems in order to cover such a long front and protect sensitive points in the interior. In addition, the West provides the intelligence necessary to manage them with maximum efficiency.
kyiv has a challenge in prioritizing protection between sensitive targets at home (protecting civilian lives and critical facilities) and those at the front. They have been largely successful in establishing a balanced defensive umbrella by integrating their old assets (such as the S-300 and Buk-M1) with the received ones, including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) – Stinger, Mistral, Avenger, Crotale, Strela, Piorun and others – and medium- and long-range missiles such as NASAMS, Patriot, Hawk, Aster, IRIS-T, etc.
On the other hand, the Russian air force has not been able to establish air superiority due to these capabilities, to its own errors in the planning and execution of operations and, to a no lesser extent, to the lack of training of its pilots due to the few hours of instruction, a problem that has been dragging on since the beginning of the invasion.
Good proof of this is that, avoiding entering the area covered by the enemy's air defences, they operate from their own airspace, using the BVR (Beyond Visual Range) capability of some of their aircraft.
An interesting and symptomatic aspect is that the Ukrainians have found that they lift GPS jamming so that their aircraft can use precise navigation to coordinate actions when carrying out attack maneuvers with air elements, given that both armies use many of the same platforms.
In any case, it is estimated that they will be able to maintain their combat rhythm under the current conditions, with the same number of sorties and ammunition consumption, assuming the current rate of losses.
The Ukrainian missile has had few opportunities to act because it cannot confront the enemy's advanced missiles (S-400 and Pantsir missile batteries). It is very scarce, very inferior to the Russian one, whose fighters have used their superiority in air-to-air capabilities to prevent it from operating except in some very specific actions, when the occasions were favourable.
They have been forced to operate from improvised bases and to adapt, with some success, their Soviet-origin systems to Western technologies, as has been the case with the MiG-29 Fulcrum with the AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles, achieving several successes.
Given all these conditions, a kind of balance between aviation and air defence systems was established from the start of the invasion, something that may change because the Russians are gaining experience, expanding the training of their pilots in the use of long-range and high-precision ammunition and are using air assets with greater flexibility.
On the other hand, in their strategy of attrition using long-range missiles and drones, they have increased the number of attacks on targets inside Ukraine, which increases the pressure on decisions regarding the deployment of the DA and, although they have been countering these attacks, it has meant a high consumption of ammunition. There are no alternative suppliers to Russia for weapons of Soviet origin and the sophisticated, expensive and therefore difficult to produce Western weapons are running out, which are not keeping up with consumption, exhausting reserves in allied countries.
As a side note, and with regard to Western aid, it is perhaps surprising that there are few self-propelled air defence systems of the Guepard type delivered, an issue that particularly affects mechanised formations. The reason is that our armies have few short- and medium-range air defence systems of this type because they rely on air superiority and, therefore, the importance of these systems is less, so they are not available in sufficient numbers.
In this context, the time may come when the Ukrainians will have to prioritize, as they cannot cover all targets. Russian aircraft could then find gaps through which to penetrate, increasing damage inside and to unprotected units, jeopardizing ground operations, especially where airspace is not covered beyond portable missiles.
In this situation, Ukraine's need to supply itself with an aviation system capable of countering these potential shortages becomes clear.
In other matters, and in general terms, this conflict has seen the use of helicopters very limited on both sides due to the situation on the ground. The density of the air defences, with a front line full of MANPADS, the lack of stealth of these aircraft, and the obligation to fly low to the ground, which prevents a correct recognition of enemy positions and makes it difficult to use on-board weapons, forces them to be used in support tasks. On few occasions they can use anti-tank vehicles and must carry out missions at low altitude transporting supplies, collecting wounded and launching unguided rockets from kilometres away. It is a common resource to fire S-8 rockets in a parabolic pattern which, although they are not very precise, will always have greater destructive capacity on a defensive position without exposing themselves to anti-aircraft defences than trying to use anti-tank missiles, since they do not expect to find a mass of armoured vehicles that offer them a suitable opportunity.
The size of the Ukrainian helicopter fleet could not afford to perform very well. The loss of aircraft has been compensated by the refurbishment of some old aircraft and the delivery by the West of some Western-designed aircraft and, above all, a good number of Soviet-made aircraft that were in service with their AFs. Some countries have also acted as intermediaries, acquiring and overhauling them before delivery. However, the real problem has been the loss of trained and experienced crews, which are more difficult to replace than the machines.
Some images have been circulated of several Ukrainian helicopters that were located and attacked by enemy artillery within a few minutes. This situation is due to the fact that, having to operate relatively far from their bases, which have also been attacked with long-range means, they are using the so-called FARP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point). This is an area close to their area of operations where they can land with a certain degree of safety and be supplied with fuel and ammunition within a few minutes, before they can be located and attacked.
However, although air defences can still provide good protection, the Russians have improved their communications and with them the process of locating a target and making the decision to attack it (kill chain), which until now had been very slow, putting the FARP at risk.
Consequently, the only possibilities left to them in order to reduce the number of losses are to speed up the resupply process, improve their air defences, switch to night operations or, as is almost always the case, a combination of these.
The Russians did have a powerful fleet of helicopters, but in some cases they have not been able to use them, or in others they have not known how to use them. In addition to the common circumstances we have discussed, disastrous decisions have been taken, such as that of Kherson airport, where Russia deployed a good number of aircraft, some of which were quickly destroyed by the Ukrainians.
Finally, it should be noted that they are deploying a helicopter equipped with EW means in the flight formations, with the intention of locating enemy radars. This gives an idea of the power of the Ukrainian air defence and the integration of these means in the target acquisition process.
Drones
In this conflict, the use of drones (the term UXV is being used to generically designate various types of unmanned systems) has multiplied enormously, especially aerial ones, with some great successes achieved by naval ones. Land-based ones are used to a lesser extent, without apparently notable results.
Their use has become so widespread that it is difficult to classify them. There are several groups characterized from a technical point of view by aspects such as weight, range of action, or means of control, and from a tactical point of view by the missions they can carry out. They are used in various roles, from surveillance/reconnaissance to communications support, EW, or as a weapons system. Depending on the occasion, they could be divided between attack and reconnaissance, although in some cases they can act successively in these tasks, for example, loitering munitions.2, which travel around an area of land sending images until they find a target and attack it.
They are being used by all types of units, at all levels. It is not unusual to find dozens of them operating between the lines on a few kilometres of front. In addition, a mixed use of drones designed specifically for military tasks has been achieved with other commercial ones (off the shelf) with some modification. We have already commented on the future they have in the field of image analysis in the recognition of mined areas more effectively and quickly. As weapons systems, the anti-tank version has a limited use compared to others such as those of Artillery or DA, but they are distinguishing themselves by being effective and cheap. They are difficult to locate and have the ability to attack targets in their weakest parts, in the case of armoured vehicles the junction of the turret with the barge, the upper part, the engine or the open hatches (this is so despite the fact that many videos in which drones are seen dropping a mortar grenade through a hatch must be discarded as mere propaganda, since the affected vehicles are abandoned).
FPV (First-Person View) aircraft, equipped with a camera, armed, and controlled remotely from points relatively far from the enemy, are particularly successful.
The Ukrainians started out with a big advantage over their opponents in terms of their use. However, the latter have managed to even the balance by producing the devices, developing counter-UAV means, and training personnel to control and manage their use.
The Kievites have seen their losses increase, not only because of the need to expose their drones more than recommended, but also because of the improvements and coordination of Russian EW and air defense systems.
Over time, the use of these means and the results obtained will have to be analysed with some care, as will the countermeasures applied, because the conditions in which this struggle is taking place have very particular characteristics.
In any case, their low price, small size and great mobility make them an effective and fearsome weapon, at least for now, since sooner or later a balance will be found between their offensive capacity and defenses. The classic confrontation between the shield and the arrow. Today, physical or kinetic attacks against them are very complicated. Along with classic measures such as concealment, masking and camouflage, the most effective is the use of EW, although shotguns or fishing nets have been used. The most effective actions are taking control of the device (“spoofing”), denying the GPS signal, and interrupting the radio link that allows them to be controlled or the ability of their optronic means to capture their targets.
In the near future, reconnaissance and security units will have to be reinforced with measures that alert them to their presence and even combat them before the bulk of the mechanized units reach the deployment. Anti-drone systems already exist, and there will be more and better ones in the near future, and they will have to be included in the templates and training programs.
Anti-Tank Weapons
Nowadays, there is less talk about the use of anti-tank weapons that were so effective in the early stages of the conflict, although this success was largely due to the disastrous tactical management of the attackers.
This conflict has not brought about any changes in the principles of use of these weapons. The terrain, flat or slightly undulating, is favourable, although the characteristic lines of trees that divide plots and some wooded areas have meant that the average distance of use on the ground is 1400 m, which means that these weapons are not used to their full potential. This is not surprising, because in almost any scenario it is easy to find obstacles such as buildings, masses of trees and undulations of the terrain, among others, in addition to the weather conditions and the resolution of the means of vision, which limit the visual field. Even missiles that can send an image of what is in front of them cannot be fired to find a target beyond the line of sight; it must have been detected before launch.
Protective measures have been extended, for example with new masking materials or grid "cages" that protect against hollow charges, which means that in most cases the target is not destroyed, but rather a limitation in its ability to move (in many English texts "mobility kill"), which facilitates subsequent action on them.
An important factor is the training of ATGM operators and the units in which they serve. In the case of the Russians, the best trained are those in charge of carrying out anti-tank ambushes. They seem to have sufficient systems and ammunition and tend to place them on the flanks of positions because, in addition to being tactically effective, it limits the risk of losing these units, which are scarce due to the level of training they need to achieve, to a minimum.
In the case of the Ukrainians, one can imagine the problem of training (and logistics, as with so many other teams), after receiving the heterogeneous amount of systems from the West.
Electronic Warfare and Communications
What the Russians call REB (Radioelektronnaya Bor'ba, analysts and translators use the terms Electronic Warfare and Radio Electronic Warfare interchangeably) does not exactly correspond to the Western concept of EW because it is aimed at broader electromagnetic operations. It is difficult to understand and explain in a few words the tasks it performs in this complicated field, so we will stick with the fact that it suppresses or protects, depending on whether its actions are offensive or defensive, the enemy's radio and mobile telephony means, radars, and electronic systems and EW capabilities. This includes C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, ISR), targeting and distribution systems, fire control, computers, and service/network systems, which it must have previously intercepted through signals intelligence (SIGINT), communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronics (ELINT).
One of their fundamental objectives is C2D, or Command and Control Disorganization, a resource that is much debated in their military publications and which refers to the disorganization of enemy units and the control of their weapons systems.
The modernisation programme for EW systems, which began in 2009, when EW troops were created as an independent speciality, seemed to have met with a resounding failure in the invasion two years ago. The material, organisation and training, all good, did not give the expected results, but they reacted and are now adapting and improving significantly.
As Col. Oliva Bermejo explains in an article in the magazine Ejército (see bibliography), there are reasons that explain the poor performance of these notable formations.
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