China in cyberspace

An approach to Chinese thought in cyberspace: the information domain (zhi xinxi quan)

There is little we know about China in cyberspace. Increasingly, the media report on more or less malicious activities, from cyber attacks to information theft, often suspecting the communist regime. However, very little is written about how the People's Republic of China views cyberspace and how it should act in it, or the implications of the need to operate in the "fifth domain." facing the modernization of its Armed Forces.

The perceptions that human beings have of the world around them are not immutable or universal. And equally, the conceptions that we as individuals generate to understand it are not either, since they are necessarily biased by an infinite number of environmental factors (social, historical, cultural, political, etc.).  

In this sense, given that, the main pillars of the concept of cyberspace emerged in the United States as a result of the ARPANET project at the beginning of the seventies, it is logical to think that the way that states conceive the fifth domain is also unique, as it is biased by their own lines of political and military thought. characteristics. Nothing is further from reality, Well, just as we saw about Russia, there is also its own path for China in cyberspace.

Based on this reality, in this Focus we aim to draw – at least briefly – a conception of cyberspace as different from the Western one as is the way in which the Chinese political-military doctrine understands it.

First of all, to understand the Chinese military line of thought in this regard, we must focus on the environmental factors cited above on the importance that the historical factor has had (and continues to have) in Chinese society and political elites, since, Between 1839 and 1949, China was forced to experience a process of interventionalism and imperialism at the hands of the Western powers, Russia and Japan known as the “Century of Humiliation” (Century of humiliation).

This temporary period meant for the Middle Kingdom not only the interruption of the way in which it conceived itself as a political entity, but also an interruption of the Chinese political order and the eradication of any geopolitical aspiration that the elites could have for China to dominate. the tianxia (all under heaven) – a concept of Confucian doctrine for world governance (Fig trees and Rumbao, 2019)-.

However, it is precisely redressing the humiliation at the hands of Western powers that has led China, on the one hand, to seek a way out of this century of geopolitical decline by betting on acquiring greater international relevance thanks to its recent muscle. economic, and, on the other hand, to reinforce a renewed feeling of national exaltation in the face of the feeling of humiliation (Golden, 2017).

Awareness about the importance of information technologies for elites dates back to the times of Deng Xiaoping and the process of modernization and opening of the communist regime.

Or, put another way, China has not only begun to bet again on implementing a Sinocentric vision of the world, but also for reinforcing an entire line of characteristic and exceptional political and military thought based on the conception of China as a civilization incomparable to any Western nation-state – a new Middle Empire[1] (Li, 2015).

More specifically, since President Xi Jinping came to power as the General Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party (PPCh) in 2012, the theses aimed at reinforcing the tianxia to create a “community of shared destiny for humanity”[2] Not only have they increased; but, furthermore, everything seems to indicate that the political elites of the Party consider that the only possible way to achieve the full application of the tianxia is to situate at the forefront of the technological revolution in the face of a shrinking West.

In fact, the importance of information technologies for the Party's elites did not begin with President Xi Jinping, but rather dates back to the times of Deng Xiaoping and the process of modernization and opening of the communist regime.

However, for obvious reasons linked to the time period and the technological development experienced therein, it was not until the government of Jian Zemin (1989-2002) when China understood that it had to connect in one way or another to the global network that constituted the Internet. .

Samples of this incipient interest in technological development can be found in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), which establishes as a national priority the promotion of the information technology sector, the increase in accessibility to the network and the promotion of the use of digital technologies (Austin, 2014: 91); in statements taken from the 16th Party Congress in 2002, where information was formally recognized as essential to the growth of China's “comprehensive national power” (comprehensive national power, zonghe guojia liliang); and in the publication in 2005 of the  "National strategy for information development, 2006-2020" by the Chinese government (Cheng, 2017).


The rest of this article is available to subscribers only

If you are not yet subscribed, take advantage of our offer


Author

  • Josue Exposito

    Josué Exposito Guisado. Civil Guard. PhD student in Strategic Studies. Graduated in Political Sciences and Administration from the Pablo de Olavide University (Seville).

Be the first to comment

Leave a Reply